Sebastian Hahn 026e7987ad Sanity-check consensus param values
We need to make sure that the worst thing that a weird consensus param
can do to us is to break our Tor (and only if the other Tors are
reliably broken in the same way) so that the majority of directory
authorities can't pull any attacks that are worse than the DoS that
they can trigger by simply shutting down.

One of these worse things was the cbtnummodes parameter, which could
lead to heap corruption on some systems if the value was sufficiently
large.

This commit fixes this particular issue and also introduces sanity
checking for all consensus parameters.
2011-01-15 19:42:17 +01:00
2011-01-15 19:42:17 +01:00
2011-01-15 19:42:17 +01:00
2010-11-22 22:44:20 -05:00
2011-01-03 11:50:39 -05:00
2010-02-22 00:41:48 -05:00

Tor protects your privacy on the internet by hiding the connection
between your Internet address and the services you use. We believe Tor
is reasonably secure, but please ensure you read the instructions and
configure it properly.

To build Tor from source:
        ./configure && make && make install

Home page:
        https://www.torproject.org/

Download new versions:
        https://www.torproject.org/download.html

Documentation, including links to installation and setup instructions:
        https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html

Making applications work with Tor:
        https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO

Frequently Asked Questions:
        https://www.torproject.org/faq.html
        https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ

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