this was causing directory authorities to send a time of 0 on all
connections they generated themselves, which means everybody reachability
test caused a time skew warning in the log for that relay.
(i didn't just revert, because the changes file has been modified by
other later commits.)
This isn't actually much of an issue, since only relays send
AUTHENTICATE cells, but while we're removing timestamps, we might as
well do this too.
Part of proposal 222. I didn't take the approach in the proposal of
using a time-based HMAC, since that was a bad-prng-mitigation hack
from SSL3, and in real life, if you don't have a good RNG, you're
hopeless as a Tor server.
For now, round down to the nearest 10 minutes. Later, eliminate entirely by
setting a consensus parameter.
(This rounding is safe because, in 0.2.2, where the timestamp mattered,
REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL was a nice generous 60 minutes.)
Now we explicitly check for overflow.
This approach seemed smarter than a cascade of "change int to unsigned
int and hope nothing breaks right before the release".
Nick, feel free to fix in a better way, maybe in master.
This would make us do testing circuits "even when cbt is disabled by
consensus, or when we're a directory authority, or when we've failed
to write cbt history to our state file lately." (Roger's words.)
This is a fix for 9671 and an improvement in our fix for 5049.
The original misbehavior was in 0.2.2.14-alpha; the incomplete
fix was in 0.2.3.17-beta.
The spec requires them to do so, and not doing so creates a situation
where they can't send-test because relays won't extend to them because
of the other part of bug 9546.
Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
The spec requires them to do so, and not doing so creates a situation
where they can't send-test because relays won't extend to them because
of the other part of bug 9546.
Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
(Backport to Tor 0.2.3)
Relays previously, when initiating a connection, would only send a
NETINFO after sending an AUTHENTICATE. But bridges, when receiving a
connection, would never send AUTH_CHALLENGE. So relays wouldn't
AUTHENTICATE, and wouldn't NETINFO, and then bridges would be
surprised to be receiving CREATE cells on a non-open circuit.
Fixes bug 9546.
Relays previously, when initiating a connection, would only send a
NETINFO after sending an AUTHENTICATE. But bridges, when receiving a
connection, would never send AUTH_CHALLENGE. So relays wouldn't
AUTHENTICATE, and wouldn't NETINFO, and then bridges would be
surprised to be receiving CREATE cells on a non-open circuit.
Fixes bug 9546.
Fortunately, later checks mean that uninitialized data can't get sent
to the network by this bug. Unfortunately, reading uninitialized heap
*can* (in some cases, with some allocators) cause a crash if you get
unlucky and go off the end of a page.
Found by asn. Bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha.
Andrea Shepard
Nick Mathewson
Roger Dingledine
Karsten Loesing