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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3' into release-0.2.3

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2012-08-03 13:34:20 -04:00
parent ab4c6b6543 93be3a8822
commit daeaa9ff04
15 changed files with 185 additions and 65 deletions
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Makefile.am
+16 -17
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@@ -24,23 +24,22 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
#install-data-local:
# $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(LOCALSTATEDIR)/lib/tor
# Assume a tarball is in .. for now.
dist-rpm:
RPM_BUILD_DIR="/tmp/tor-rpm-build-$$$$"; \
rm -rf $$RPM_BUILD_DIR; \
mkdir $$RPM_BUILD_DIR || exit 1; \
for subdir in BUILD RPMS SOURCES SPECS SRPMS; do \
mkdir $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/$$subdir; \
done; \
mkdir $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/SOURCES/tor-$(VERSION); \
cp -R ./ $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/SOURCES/tor-$(VERSION)/; \
pushd $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/SOURCES/; \
tar zcf tor-$(VERSION).tar.gz ./; \
popd; \
LIBS=-lrt rpmbuild -ba --define "_topdir $$RPM_BUILD_DIR" tor.spec; \
mv $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/SRPMS/* .; \
mv $$RPM_BUILD_DIR/RPMS/* .; \
rm -rf $$RPM_BUILD_DIR
# Allows to override rpmbuild with rpmbuild-md5 from fedora-packager so that
# building for EL5 won't fail on https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=490613
RPMBUILD ?= rpmbuild
# Use automake's dist-gzip target to build the tarball
dist-rpm: dist-gzip
TIMESTAMP=$$(date +"%Y-%m-%d_%H.%M.%S"); \
RPM_BUILD_DIR=$$(mktemp -d "/tmp/tor-rpm-build-$$TIMESTAMP-XXXX"); \
mkdir -p "$$RPM_BUILD_DIR"/{BUILD,RPMS,SOURCES/"tor-$(VERSION)",SPECS,SRPMS}; \
cp -fa "$(distdir).tar.gz" "$$RPM_BUILD_DIR"/SOURCES/; \
LIBS=-lrt $(RPMBUILD) -ba --define "_topdir $$RPM_BUILD_DIR" tor.spec; \
cp -fa "$$RPM_BUILD_DIR"/SRPMS/* .; \
cp -fa "$$RPM_BUILD_DIR"/RPMS/* .; \
rm -rf "$$RPM_BUILD_DIR"; \
echo "RPM build finished"; \
#end of dist-rpm
dist: check
changes/bug6043
+6
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Packaging (RPM):
- Our default RPM spec files have been updated to work with mock
and rpmbuild on RHEL/Fedora. They have an updated set of
dependencies and conflicts, a fix for an ancient typo when creating
the "_tor" user, and better instructions. Thanks to Ondrej
Mikle for the patch series; fix for bug 6043.
changes/bug6480
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Major bugfixes:
- Avoid read-from-freed-RAM bug and related double-free bug that
could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes
bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
changes/bug6490
+4
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor features:
- Warn when Tor is configured to use accounting in a way that will
link a hidden service to some other hidden service or public
address. Fix for bug 6490.
changes/bug6500
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Fix some typos in the manpages. Patch from A. Costa. Fixes bug 6500.
changes/bug6530
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Major security fixes:
- Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus
document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a
remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
o Security fixes:
- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
grained information about which relays a client was picking
(middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
(see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
doc/tor-rpm-creation.txt
+43 -13
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@@ -2,18 +2,9 @@
##
The process used to create the official rpms is as follows:
Download latest stable libevent from
http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/
The first step of compiling libevent is to configure it as follows:
./configure --enable-static --disable-shared
Complete the "make" and "make install". You will need to be root,
or sudo -s, to complete the "make install".
Check for a successful universal binary of libevent.a in, by default,
/usr/local/lib by using the following command:
"file /usr/local/lib/libevent.a"
You'll need to install libevent headers, usually located in package named
libevent-devel. Alternatively, you could download latest libevent from
http://libevent.org/ but that shouldn't be necessary.
Download and Extract the latest tor source code from
https://www.torproject.org/download
@@ -23,4 +14,43 @@ LIBS=-lrt ./configure
make dist-rpm
You should have at least two, maybe three, rpms. There should be the binary
i386.rpm, a src.rpm, and on redhat/centos machines, a debuginfo.rpm.
(i686|x86_64).rpm, a src.rpm, and on redhat/centos machines, a debuginfo.rpm.
The debuginfo rpms are created if package redhat-rpm-config is installed (case
of redhat distros).
This step suffices unless you want to create RPMs for distros other than the
one you used for building.
## Instructions for building RPMs for multiple architectures or distributions
## using 'mock' on Fedora or RHEL (and clones)
Make sure you have mock installed and configured, see following HOWTOs for setup:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/How_to_create_an_RPM_package
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Using_Mock_to_test_package_builds
Take the source RPM generated by previous step, and execute mock for every
target architecture (the names come from files in /etc/mock, strip the .cfg
extension in the -r parameter):
mock --rebuild -r fedora-17-x86_64 tor-X.Y.Z.src.rpm
Building for EL5 from newer distro (e.g. EL6 or Fedora 17) will fail due to bug
(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=490613).
Here's a workaround:
Before even building the source RPM, install fedora-packager and instruct
the build system to use rpmbuild-md5 like this:
yum install fedora-packager
export RPMBUILD=rpmbuild-md5
Then proceed as usual to create the source RPM and binary RPMs:
LIBS=-lrt ./configure
make dist-rpm
mock --rebuild -r epel-5-x86_64 tor-X.Y.Z.src.rpm
(Note: don't build under OpenVZ - it breaks unshare() syscall, which in turn
breaks mock. It could save you several hours.)
doc/tor.1.txt
+2 -2
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@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge. +
+
In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor
client launches the pluggable transport proxy exacutable in
client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in
__path-to-binary__ using __options__ as its command-line options, and
forwards its traffic to it. It's the duty of that proxy to properly forward
the traffic to the bridge.
@@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
**V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
bandiwdth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset)
**V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
doc/torify.1.txt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
wrapper available on a system. It calls torsocks or tsocks with a tor specific
configuration file. +
torsocks is an improved wrapper that explictly rejects UDP, safely resolves DNS
torsocks is an improved wrapper that explicitly rejects UDP, safely resolves DNS
lookups and properly socksifies your TCP connections. +
tsocks itself is a wrapper between the tsocks library and the application that
src/or/config.c
+29
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@@ -594,6 +594,7 @@ static void option_reset(const config_format_t *fmt, or_options_t *options,
const config_var_t *var, int use_defaults);
static void config_free(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options);
static int config_lines_eq(config_line_t *a, config_line_t *b);
static int config_count_key(const config_line_t *a, const char *key);
static int option_is_same(const config_format_t *fmt,
const or_options_t *o1, const or_options_t *o2,
const char *name);
@@ -3066,6 +3067,20 @@ config_lines_eq(config_line_t *a, config_line_t *b)
return 1;
}
/** Return the number of lines in <b>a</b> whose key is <b>key</b>. */
static int
config_count_key(const config_line_t *a, const char *key)
{
int n = 0;
while (a) {
if (!strcasecmp(a->key, key)) {
++n;
}
a = a->next;
}
return n;
}
/** Return true iff the option <b>name</b> has the same value in <b>o1</b>
* and <b>o2</b>. Must not be called for LINELIST_S or OBSOLETE options.
*/
@@ -3848,6 +3863,20 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
if (accounting_parse_options(options, 1)<0)
REJECT("Failed to parse accounting options. See logs for details.");
if (options->AccountingMax) {
if (options->RendConfigLines && server_mode(options)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with a hidden service and an "
"ORPort is risky: your hidden service(s) and your public "
"address will all turn off at the same time, which may alert "
"observers that they are being run by the same party.");
} else if (config_count_key(options->RendConfigLines,
"HiddenServiceDir") > 1) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with multiple hidden services is "
"risky: they will all turn off at the same time, which may "
"alert observers that they are being run by the same party.");
}
}
if (options->HTTPProxy) { /* parse it now */
if (tor_addr_port_lookup(options->HTTPProxy,
&options->HTTPProxyAddr, &options->HTTPProxyPort) < 0)
src/or/dns.c
+18 -12
View File
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static void add_wildcarded_test_address(const char *address);
static int configure_nameservers(int force);
static int answer_is_wildcarded(const char *ip);
static int dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname);
or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname,
int *made_connection_pending_out);
#ifdef DEBUG_DNS_CACHE
static void _assert_cache_ok(void);
#define assert_cache_ok() _assert_cache_ok()
@@ -596,10 +597,12 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
{
or_circuit_t *oncirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit);
int is_resolve, r;
int made_connection_pending = 0;
char *hostname = NULL;
is_resolve = exitconn->_base.purpose == EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname);
r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname,
&made_connection_pending);
switch (r) {
case 1:
@@ -639,16 +642,11 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
dns_cancel_pending_resolve(exitconn->_base.address);
if (!exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
if (!made_connection_pending && !exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
/* If we made the connection pending, then we freed it already in
* dns_cancel_pending_resolve(). If we marked it for close, it'll
* get freed from the main loop. Otherwise, can free it now. */
connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn));
// XXX ... and we just leak exitconn otherwise? -RD
// If it's marked for close, it's on closeable_connection_lst in
// main.c. If it's on the closeable list, it will get freed from
// main.c. -NM
// "<armadev> If that's true, there are other bugs around, where we
// don't check if it's marked, and will end up double-freeing."
// On the other hand, I don't know of any actual bugs here, so this
// shouldn't be holding up the rc. -RD
}
break;
default:
@@ -667,10 +665,15 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
* Return -2 on a transient error. If it's a reverse resolve and it's
* successful, sets *<b>hostname_out</b> to a newly allocated string
* holding the cached reverse DNS value.
*
* Set *<b>made_connection_pending_out</b> to true if we have placed
* <b>exitconn</b> on the list of pending connections for some resolve; set it
* to false otherwise.
*/
static int
dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out)
or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out,
int *made_connection_pending_out)
{
cached_resolve_t *resolve;
cached_resolve_t search;
@@ -684,6 +687,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(exitconn->_base.s));
assert_cache_ok();
tor_assert(oncirc);
*made_connection_pending_out = 0;
/* first check if exitconn->_base.address is an IP. If so, we already
* know the answer. */
@@ -757,6 +761,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
pending_connection->conn = exitconn;
pending_connection->next = resolve->pending_connections;
resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection;
*made_connection_pending_out = 1;
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Connection (fd %d) waiting for pending DNS "
"resolve of %s", exitconn->_base.s,
escaped_safe_str(exitconn->_base.address));
@@ -797,6 +802,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
pending_connection = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(pending_connection_t));
pending_connection->conn = exitconn;
resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection;
*made_connection_pending_out = 1;
/* Add this resolve to the cache and priority queue. */
HT_INSERT(cache_map, &cache_root, resolve);
src/or/routerlist.c
+23 -8
View File
@@ -1709,6 +1709,8 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl,
double *bandwidths;
double tmp = 0;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int i_chosen;
unsigned int i_has_been_chosen;
int have_unknown = 0; /* true iff sl contains element not in consensus. */
/* Can't choose exit and guard at same time */
@@ -1871,12 +1873,17 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl,
* from 1 below. See bug 1203 for details. */
/* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */
i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl);
i_has_been_chosen = 0;
tmp = 0.0;
for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
tmp += bandwidths[i];
if (tmp >= rand_bw)
break;
if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) {
i_chosen = i;
i_has_been_chosen = 1;
}
}
i = i_chosen;
if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) {
/* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able
@@ -1909,7 +1916,9 @@ static const node_t *
smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule)
{
unsigned i;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int i_chosen;
unsigned int i_has_been_chosen;
int32_t *bandwidths;
int is_exit;
int is_guard;
@@ -1983,9 +1992,10 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
if (is_guard)
bitarray_set(guard_bits, i);
if (is_known) {
bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX
// XXX this is no longer true! We don't always cap the bw anymore. Can
// a consensus make us overflow?-sh
bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw;
/* Casting this_bw to int32_t is safe because both kb_to_bytes
and bridge_get_advertised_bandwidth_bounded limit it to below
INT32_MAX. */
tor_assert(bandwidths[i] >= 0);
if (is_guard)
total_guard_bw += this_bw;
@@ -2108,6 +2118,8 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
/* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */
tmp = 0;
i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl);
i_has_been_chosen = 0;
for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
is_exit = bitarray_is_set(exit_bits, i);
is_guard = bitarray_is_set(guard_bits, i);
@@ -2122,9 +2134,12 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
else
tmp += bandwidths[i];
if (tmp >= rand_bw)
break;
if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) {
i_chosen = i;
i_has_been_chosen = 1;
}
}
i = i_chosen;
if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) {
/* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able
* to occur any longer. */
src/or/routerparse.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2853,7 +2853,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out,
int flavor = networkstatus_parse_flavor_name(tok->args[1]);
if (flavor < 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse document with unknown flavor %s",
escaped(tok->args[2]));
escaped(tok->args[1]));
goto err;
}
ns->flavor = flav = flavor;
tor.spec.in
+16 -11
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# This should be incremented whenever the spec file changes, but
# can drop back to zero at a new Tor version
%define specver 0
%define specver 1
## Things users may want to change
#
@@ -108,17 +108,14 @@ License: 3-clause BSD
Vendor: The Tor Project (https://torproject.org)
Packager: Erinn Clark <erinn@torproject.org>
%if %{is_suse}
Requires: openssl >= 0.9.7
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.7, rpm >= 4.0, zlib-devel
%else
Requires: openssl >= 0.9.7
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.7
%endif
%if %{is_fc}
BuildRequires: rpm-build >= 4.0
Requires: openssl >= 0.9.7, libevent >= 1.4.13
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.7, libevent-devel >= 1.4.13, asciidoc
# Fedora 16 and RHEL 5 have following conflicting packages according to rpm search
%if %{is_rh}
Conflicts: tor-core, tor-lsb, tor-upstart
%endif
Requires(pre): /usr/bin/id, /bin/date, /bin/sh
Requires(pre): %{_sbindir}/useradd, %{_sbindir}/groupadd
@@ -213,7 +210,7 @@ if [ ! -n "`/usr/bin/id -u %{toruser} 2>/dev/null`" ]; then
# One would also like to default the UID, but doing that properly would
# also require thought.
if [ -x %{_sbindir}/nologin ]; then
%{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g %{torgroup} -d% {_localstatedir}/lib/%{name} -s %{_sbindir}/nologin %{toruser} 2> /dev/null
%{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g %{torgroup} -d %{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name} -s %{_sbindir}/nologin %{toruser} 2> /dev/null
else
%{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g %{torgroup} -d %{_localstatedir}/lib/%{name} -s /bin/false %{toruser} 2> /dev/null
fi
@@ -287,6 +284,14 @@ exit 0
%attr(0750,%{toruser},%{torgroup}) %dir %{_localstatedir}/log/%{name}
%changelog
* Thu Jun 21 2012 Ondrej Mikle <ondrej.mikle@gmail.com>
- fixed to work with both rpmbuild and mock on RHEL/Fedora
- removed unnecessary files from rpm such as .git repo
- fixed build dependencies and package conflicts
- fixed creating _tor user on Fedora 17 (ancient typo)
- added/updated build instructions for RPM creation
- confirmed to build and run on EL5, EL6, Fedora 16/17, OpenSuse 12.1
* Fri Aug 20 2010 Erinn Clark <erinn@torproject.org>
- add conflicts for Fedora packages
- add logic for SuSE since it requires special doc handling