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Merge remote-tracking branch 'asn/bug12207_second_draft'

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2014-07-16 15:33:00 +02:00
parent 8c7fbdf3af b74442db94
commit d8705ec720
8 changed files with 1028 additions and 72 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/or/entrynodes.c
+119 -71
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
* circumvention).
**/
#define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
#include "circpathbias.h"
#include "circuitbuild.h"
@@ -155,7 +157,7 @@ entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, const node_t *node,
/** Return true iff enough time has passed since we last tried to connect
* to the unreachable guard <b>e</b> that we're willing to try again. */
static int
entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
entry_is_time_to_retry(const entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
{
long diff;
if (e->last_attempted < e->unreachable_since)
@@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
* a descriptor (routerinfo or microdesc) for it.
*/
static INLINE const node_t *
entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
entry_is_live(const entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
int assume_reachable, int need_descriptor, const char **msg)
{
const node_t *node;
@@ -350,7 +352,7 @@ control_event_guard_deferred(void)
* If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not
* already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
* Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
static const node_t *
STATIC const node_t *
add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend,
int for_discovery, int for_directory)
{
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend,
/** Choose how many entry guards or directory guards we'll use. If
* <b>for_directory</b> is true, we return how many directory guards to
* use; else we return how many entry guards to use. */
static int
STATIC int
decide_num_guards(const or_options_t *options, int for_directory)
{
if (for_directory && options->NumDirectoryGuards != 0)
@@ -836,7 +838,7 @@ update_node_guard_status(void)
/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from
* EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */
static void
STATIC void
entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
{
smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
@@ -995,31 +997,120 @@ choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t type)
return choose_random_entry_impl(NULL, 1, type, NULL);
}
/** Helper for choose_random{entry,dirguard}. */
/** Filter <b>all_entry_guards</b> for usable entry guards and put them
* in <b>live_entry_guards</b>. We filter based on whether the node is
* currently alive, and on whether it satisfies the restrictions
* imposed by the other arguments of this function.
*
* We don't place more guards than NumEntryGuards in <b>live_entry_guards</b>.
*
* If <b>chosen_exit</b> is set, it contains the exit node of this
* circuit. Make sure to not use it or its family as an entry guard.
*
* If <b>need_uptime</b> is set, we are looking for a stable entry guard.
* if <b>need_capacity</b> is set, we are looking for a fast entry guard.
*
* The rest of the arguments are the same as in choose_random_entry_impl().
*
* Return 1 if we should choose a guard right away. Return 0 if we
* should try to add more nodes to our list before deciding on a
* guard.
*/
STATIC int
populate_live_entry_guards(smartlist_t *live_entry_guards,
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards,
const node_t *chosen_exit,
dirinfo_type_t dirinfo_type,
int for_directory,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const node_t *node = NULL;
const int num_needed = decide_num_guards(options, for_directory);
smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_new();
int retval = 0;
int need_descriptor = !for_directory;
tor_assert(all_entry_guards);
if (chosen_exit) {
nodelist_add_node_and_family(exit_family, chosen_exit);
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_entry_guards, const entry_guard_t *, entry) {
const char *msg;
node = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
need_descriptor, &msg);
if (!node)
continue; /* down, no point */
if (for_directory) {
if (!entry->is_dir_cache)
continue; /* We need a directory and didn't get one. */
}
if (node == chosen_exit)
continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */
if (smartlist_contains(exit_family, node))
continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
if (dirinfo_type != NO_DIRINFO &&
!node_can_handle_dirinfo(node, dirinfo_type))
continue; /* this node won't be able to answer our dir questions */
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node);
if (!entry->made_contact) {
/* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
* guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
* the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
* guard list without needing to. */
retval = 1;
goto done;
}
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= num_needed) {
retval = 1;
goto done; /* We picked enough entry guards. Done! */
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
done:
smartlist_free(exit_family);
return retval;
}
/** Pick a node to be used as the entry guard of a circuit.
*
* If <b>state</b> is set, it contains the information we know about
* the upcoming circuit.
*
* If <b>for_directory</b> is set, we are looking for a directory guard.
*
* <b>dirinfo_type</b> contains the kind of directory information we
* are looking for in our node.
*
* If <b>n_options_out</b> is set, we set it to the number of
* candidate guard nodes we had before picking a specific guard node.
*
* On success, return the node that should be used as the entry guard
* of the circuit. Return NULL if no such node could be found.
*
* Helper for choose_random{entry,dirguard}.
*/
static const node_t *
choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory,
dirinfo_type_t dirinfo_type, int *n_options_out)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_new();
const node_t *chosen_exit =
state?build_state_get_exit_node(state) : NULL;
const node_t *node = NULL;
int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0;
int need_descriptor = !for_directory;
int preferred_min = 0;
const int num_needed = decide_num_guards(options, for_directory);
int retval = 0;
if (n_options_out)
*n_options_out = 0;
if (chosen_exit) {
nodelist_add_node_and_family(exit_family, chosen_exit);
consider_exit_family = 1;
}
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_new();
@@ -1032,50 +1123,19 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory,
retry:
smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
const char *msg;
node = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
need_descriptor, &msg);
if (!node)
continue; /* down, no point */
if (for_directory) {
if (!entry->is_dir_cache)
continue; /* We need a directory and didn't get one. */
}
if (node == chosen_exit)
continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */
if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_contains(exit_family, node))
continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
if (dirinfo_type != NO_DIRINFO &&
!node_can_handle_dirinfo(node, dirinfo_type))
continue; /* this node won't be able to answer our dir questions */
#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */
if (options->EntryNodes &&
!routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
/* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards))
goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
if (options->StrictNodes) {
/* in theory this case should never happen, since
* entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
tor_fragile_assert();
} else {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
}
}
#endif
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node);
if (!entry->made_contact) {
/* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
* guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
* the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
* guard list without needing to. */
goto choose_and_finish;
}
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= num_needed)
goto choose_and_finish; /* we have enough */
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
/* Populate the list of live entry guards so that we pick one of
them. */
retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
entry_guards,
chosen_exit,
dirinfo_type,
for_directory,
need_uptime, need_capacity);
if (retval == 1) { /* We should choose a guard right now. */
goto choose_and_finish;
}
if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
/* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least
@@ -1115,18 +1175,7 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory,
need_capacity = 0;
goto retry;
}
#if 0
/* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the
same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win
here. */
if (!node && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
/* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
* set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
* bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */
consider_exit_family = 0;
goto retry;
}
#endif
/* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
}
@@ -1144,7 +1193,6 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory,
if (n_options_out)
*n_options_out = smartlist_len(live_entry_guards);
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
smartlist_free(exit_family);
return node;
}
src/or/entrynodes.h
+16
View File
@@ -77,6 +77,22 @@ int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory);
#endif
#ifdef ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
STATIC const node_t *add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen,
int reset_status, int prepend,
int for_discovery, int for_directory);
STATIC int populate_live_entry_guards(smartlist_t *live_entry_guards,
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards,
const node_t *chosen_exit,
dirinfo_type_t dirinfo_type,
int for_directory,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity);
STATIC int decide_num_guards(const or_options_t *options, int for_directory);
STATIC void entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options);
#endif
void remove_all_entry_guards(void);
void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
src/or/routerlist.c
+9 -1
View File
@@ -3296,6 +3296,14 @@ routerlist_reset_warnings(void)
networkstatus_reset_warnings();
}
/** Return 1 if the signed descriptor of this router is older than
* <b>seconds</b> seconds. Otherwise return 0. */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
router_descriptor_is_older_than,(const routerinfo_t *router, int seconds))
{
return router->cache_info.published_on < time(NULL) - seconds;
}
/** Add <b>router</b> to the routerlist, if we don't already have it. Replace
* older entries (if any) with the same key. Note: Callers should not hold
* their pointers to <b>router</b> if this function fails; <b>router</b>
@@ -3465,7 +3473,7 @@ router_add_to_routerlist(routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg,
}
if (!in_consensus && from_cache &&
router->cache_info.published_on < time(NULL) - OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) {
router_descriptor_is_older_than(router, OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE)) {
*msg = "Router descriptor was really old.";
routerinfo_free(router);
return ROUTER_WAS_NOT_NEW;
src/or/routerlist.h
+3
View File
@@ -212,6 +212,9 @@ STATIC int choose_array_element_by_weight(const u64_dbl_t *entries,
int n_entries);
STATIC void scale_array_elements_to_u64(u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries,
uint64_t *total_out);
MOCK_DECL(int, router_descriptor_is_older_than, (const routerinfo_t *router,
int seconds));
#endif
#endif
src/test/include.am
+1
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \
src/test/test_cell_queue.c \
src/test/test_data.c \
src/test/test_dir.c \
src/test/test_entrynodes.c \
src/test/test_extorport.c \
src/test/test_introduce.c \
src/test/test_logging.c \
src/test/test.c
+2
View File
@@ -1313,6 +1313,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t circuitmux_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t cell_queue_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t options_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t socks_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t extorport_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t logging_tests[];
@@ -1344,6 +1345,7 @@ static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = {
{ "circuitlist/", circuitlist_tests },
{ "circuitmux/", circuitmux_tests },
{ "options/", options_tests },
{ "entrynodes/", entrynodes_tests },
{ "extorport/", extorport_tests },
{ "control/", controller_event_tests },
{ "hs/", hs_tests },
src/test/test_descriptors.txt
+304
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:11
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test000a 127.0.0.1 5000 0 7000
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint C7E7 CCB8 179F 8CC3 7F5C 8A04 2B3A 180B 934B 14BA
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest 67A152A4C7686FB07664F872620635F194D76D95
caches-extra-info
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAOuBUIEBARMkkka/TGyaQNgUEDLP0KG7sy6KNQTNOlZHUresPr/vlVjo
HPpLMfu9M2z18c51YX/muWwY9x4MyQooD56wI4+AqXQcJRwQfQlPn3Ay82uZViA9
DpBajRieLlKKkl145KjArpD7F5BVsqccvjErgFYXvhhjSrx7BVLnAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAN6NLnSxWQnFXxqZi5D3b0BMgV6y9NJLGjYQVP+eWtPZWgqyv4zeYsqv
O9y6c5lvxyUxmNHfoAbe/s8f2Vf3/YaC17asAVSln4ktrr3e9iY74a9RMWHv1Gzk
3042nMcqj3PEhRN0PoLkcOZNjjmNbaqki6qy9bWWZDNTdo+uI44dAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
contact auth0@test.test
ntor-onion-key pK4bs08ERYN591jj7ca17Rn9Q02TIEfhnjR6hSq+fhU=
reject *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
rx88DuM3Y7tODlHNDDEVzKpwh3csaG1or+T4l2Xs1oq3iHHyPEtB6QTLYrC60trG
aAPsj3DEowGfjga1b248g2dtic8Ab+0exfjMm1RHXfDam5TXXZU3A0wMyoHjqHuf
eChGPgFNUvEc+5YtD27qEDcUjcinYztTs7/dzxBT4PE=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:11
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test001a 127.0.0.1 5001 0 7001
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint 35DA 711C FC62 F88B C243 DE32 DC0B C28A 3F62 2610
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest 9E12278D6CF7608071FE98CE9DCEE48FA264518A
caches-extra-info
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAPbyUrorqoXMW4oezqd307ZGxgobqvQs2nb3TdQyWrwsHtJmS3utdrJS
xJUZPNHOQ2hrDWW1VvevYqRTGeXGZr9TDZ3+t/gVUttqYRhuzzgEKVAZSsTo5ctO
QNHnzJ6Xx/w/trhWqPTeJ7R0TCyAbWW7aE3KaKdwvZilRZp/oRUnAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBALwOJ7XZHBnjJEuwF3Os6eashNbTH9YnH8TBZBdKgu3iFJYqDslcMIPX
gWCJ9apPHyh1+/8OLRWeEYlwoZzgGi0rjm/+BNeOOmJbjfyjk97DuB9/2O5zr1BM
CvOHqQSzMD+vz1ebvfM039a2mO8lXruUFPZQaFVxk8371XP2khqhAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
contact auth1@test.test
ntor-onion-key t5bI1ksTdigOksMKRHUDwx/34ajEvDN1IpArOxIEWgk=
reject *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
KtMW7A/pzu+np6aKJSy6d7drIb4yjz8SPCo+oQNxj2IqNHJir2O2nWu69xy+K0c1
RL05KkcDaYzr5hC80FD1H+sTpGYD28SPkQkzPw+0pReSDl93pVXh0rU6Cdcm75FC
t0UZzDt4TsMuFB0ZYpM3phKcQPpiDG6aR0LskL/YUvY=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:11
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test004r 127.0.0.1 5004 0 7004
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:10
fingerprint CC6A 48BD 52BD 9A2C 6670 5863 AC31 AE17 6E63 8B02
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest B5CC249CEF394B5AFCA0C77FA7D5605615FA487C
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAMze36Hupy7HACcF3TMv5mJuZbx3d3cS0WYLl6vTeChBgpS5CEXq6zIu
d31YmtUcxH6fOjDOudhbnXuoh1nH4CP+LocVHAdlGG1giAm7u8yZudVvVJiIqFgQ
wVDcWx8LbGCi5P9J/ZPKAIVsSyS7xkOqHjz3VMo/uYLbQCFAwfkdAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAM/qGP365x6bH+ug7rKVy7V5lC9Ff2Jfk0wlTFIzzwn+DMSG6xDvulKe
wcIzgGNdQu7qlKlQUif3GPMr0KSS32cRsmoRQJcsm9+lGUK871NyZ8AyrHT+LhyF
cs718P0iN5yKF2FikNr727kEANCzvC1l9eP4qF5GGzsNtglbJ7bTAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
ntor-onion-key a9Pavqnx7DFhMWUO0d17qF9Py8+iie4FnxTHaTgfIXY=
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
HVW7kjBgEt+Qdvcrq+NQE1F9B8uV9D38KA2Bp6cYHLWCxL6N4GS8JQqbOEtnqaj7
Vxrv7uy1Fzb15Zr+1sUVMxNv+LLRfr+JzfETMNYVkYDrNgr1cAAVEQzFWbIziond
xMFp64yjEW9/I+82lb5GBZEiKdEd4QqWMmQosoYMTM8=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:12
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test002a 127.0.0.1 5002 0 7002
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint 29C7 BBB6 C437 32D5 BDF1 5671 F5C5 F1FB 6E36 4B47
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest 9BB181EA86E0130680C3CC04AD7DE4C341ADC2C7
caches-extra-info
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBALNH19oF8Ajf+djlH/g7L+enFBf5Wwjmf3bPwNKWZ9G+B+Lg8SpfhZiw
rUqi7h21f45BV/dN05dK6leWD8rj1T9kuM9TKBOEZxIWeq7zbXihyu4XPxP4FNTS
+0G7BhdP4biALENmeyLhUCZaw5Ic/jFkHT4gV9S0iVZiEDwC9twXAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBALeyQGMQBHgTxpO/i30uHjflTm9MNi3ZBNcOKpvBXWYgY42qTqOZ7Uam
c5pmZhTLrQ1W8XlGDw8Cl8ktZ0ylodLZyUNajBtJvSFWTb8iwdZsshW6Ahb8TyfI
Y7MwTlQ/7xw4mj1NEaui6bwGgEZUs18RTqhDrUc2Mcj1Yf61Rq+7AgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
contact auth2@test.test
ntor-onion-key ukR41RjtiZ69KO0SrFTvL0LoZK/ZTT01FQWmCXTCUlE=
reject *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
IY2s/RY4tdahrgfGG+vW7lOvpfofoxxSo7guGpSKGxVApiroCQtumoYifnnJ88G2
K4IbxwEO8pgO8fnz1mibblUWw2vdDNjCifc1wtXJUE+ONA0UcLRlfQ94GbL8h2PG
72z6i1+NN0QahXMk7MUbzI7bOXTJOiO8e2Zjk9vRnxI=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:12
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test006r 127.0.0.1 5006 0 7006
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint 829B 3FAA A42B 605A EB0B F380 8F32 8ED1 73E7 0D25
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest 7ECB757002EB9B5838B13AE6F2357A5E585131B8
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBALsNBChcLVndlS4HNXL3hxBJVgXctATz6yXcJt3bkDB5cjv7Q9fqN3Ue
j3SI1OUBx4YrLcSLD/hELHVilLrrfbaraAFfAsydlRLjTVcMRx5FFlDd0E7TAadc
71CkTipNnjwqz1mTRKkEFeepnh/JaFDidY9ER1rMBA5JRyBvqrD9AgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAPgipA8yLj1kqrMlAH7cK7IQEdmqmfNHGXdkYQ+TKtfLh0zeEIvvh9yh
k+vKHS+HVoHo3tecB9QjJyDyyJTiETXCupSOY+ebG648JADAvv8v1WiE+KBXtjpl
qgDTrDj5CwGuY6cvQdej5yg1UAVlMMZSg3thL3tCYtQbOq66lAlnAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
ntor-onion-key q02F3AQsCX7+zXNpfTqBF8O8lusPhRJpQVxOnBvbOwc=
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
L1fdgoN/eXgdzIIXO63W4yGoC9lRozMU+T0Fimhd/XFV8qxeUT83Vgf63vxLUHIb
D4a80Wj7Pm4y5a766qLGXxlz2FYjCdkp070UpgZneB+VifUlFd/bNAjsiYTstBKM
EI2L0mhl9d/7KK8vgtadHdX1z1u7QjyF6ccnzhfqeiY=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:12
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test003r 127.0.0.1 5003 0 7003
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint 71FD 3A35 F705 8020 D595 B711 D52A 9A0A 99BB B467
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest 3796BE0A95B699595445DFD3453CA2074E75BCE8
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAL44ctIioIfCYFzMTYNfK5qFAPGGUpsAFmS8pThQEY/tJU14+frJDBrC
BkLvBs05Bw7xOUb0f2geiYGowBA6028smiq5HzTO7Kaga8vfV7AnANPX+n9cfHCr
/2cMnKkT/GZzpdk0WbUw5Kc/G1ATIPFQHA8gZAi1fsSIDDn3GRV5AgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBALlPo5AI1mVTi+194yOSf40caoFlxSTfXt8KjGVa1dO/bpX7L3noOjYg
goU4Aqim7BHmBWQDE/tZNTrchFoLQFHi9N4pv/0ND3sY904pzqGpe3FeTuU8P9Jg
q2w3MeO3GwG8CJf4FOdSkgi8UKkJhOld4g4kViQbrFLXfdFvnT/zAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
ntor-onion-key qluYCRrsesOTkavCLnNK6H1ToywyDquCyYeP0h/qol4=
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
d09K7rW/OpVzoUpfZXJuJW7a+P4pROCOZTgvDUIy/Nv+EAjcYqv95PlJ8cAMqnn3
1oQibRmmQwn0OmG5cB8NaZiueaVIRheGzHEM8rndpHn5oFXdFvV7KKjScvfuBbTk
RYME8XyawRaqsEZnwirDDlZuiZOjdQs8bbGsko3grJE=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:12
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test005r 127.0.0.1 5005 0 7005
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint EB6E 42ED E6BF 5EE0 19F5 EFC1 53AD 094C 1327 7B76
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest C031EE4E1AE826C1E3C4E21D81C961869E63F5D2
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAMd9Fm4KTSjFDzEABPZ1fwBCC2DNgee6nAmlde8FRbCVfcIHRiJyv9YG
h530yUJal3hBfiWwy/SBA4LDz1flNCEwJm81s3waj4T9c676dAOLPcnOcJM5SbaQ
hYPDrIZLEZHAk+IoM+avKYYocwCJXwx6WTtsedF0wJBZ9mQAJERJAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAKT7ldhV43S1CgoER/pU0Rigf0NzcSy25DQJrMRQnNmXnL03Dwuv/Iu7
dCjgg64odnvSkXHFhkbjGcg8aXikvfbMyZTbsD8NrrP6FS6pfgPgZD9W2TK7QdHI
QXwx1IYaaJK4nDUNfJhjrclydEdxmHbO1nLG1aS0ypn/G0EBpOSnAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
ntor-onion-key umFmyRPA0dIsi0CFYCbGIPe2+OUkyslTkKKDEohjQQg=
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
JiXEbqPgDPWEb9DzCYINRXfmvMIc/IRtvshS8Vmmn7DW67TrTLKCEAnisGo92gMA
bhxGb9G5Mxq/8YqGoqdI2Vp6tfKlz/9AmjHzFAo01y42gafXIdr1oUS2RimA8jfF
hwfQkbG0FYEsJrH3EUa8sMhcjsEaohK/kgklMR7OgQY=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
@uploaded-at 2014-06-08 19:20:12
@source "127.0.0.1"
router test007r 127.0.0.1 5007 0 7007
platform Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev on Linux
protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
published 2014-06-08 19:20:11
fingerprint DABD 2AAF 8C9F 3B71 7839 9C08 DCD8 CD9D 341D 0002
uptime 0
bandwidth 1073741824 1073741824 0
extra-info-digest F80104A0DFFB4EB429325D41D1F71E5BF8C6C726
onion-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAL42fYAriR/JeB/9NpVq5Y5EEHca+ugIpaSdRfbopWDtFjXLEk2jmO5A
KoAGIkTKDr7e9101x63H+0Nh/7w3uYs/WqTXEH8/1sHwe+0PY2HL0S6qhlOo6X54
EfK0nDDBAWFOpyiAMHRk8JVikKb56+FVIhCJgi1RIbLIiUQK2/kxAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
signing-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAKQj2U5hmB68V6NQBqD8DfIkJjovvM8t6nGfYpkT8ORsROnmgI5mjM38
cmh5GIjY9RgoOWolLmsWQ4SXtS0FvrPft1M61UMTSHzlrEeuod5KenV7vGlX2TxT
0DoA5TL9yY7CmxCk8CNRCtN/g7WocgIiP4KCIiEZ4VE6LIb6sxUnAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
hidden-service-dir
ntor-onion-key 1UBS8rTlL39u9YxRJWhz+GTG1dS15VRi4au1i5qZOyI=
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
router-signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
m7xHh+XPdLN+qcMLz1dBAEAmcdCFrtdseMHCc0FyAP2kXdayxqe3o2IOOHN++bTH
Y5iHsZembsIJJ+D/d0YEKWKh42TUWCXBu0Gbfc4OcNuR6PFlTWO2wk7rDT3HOiFr
pe3wJqZYkLxlBDamROAlMMRe71iag89H/4EulC18opw=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
src/test/test_entrynodes.c
+574
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#include "orconfig.h"
#define STATEFILE_PRIVATE
#define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
#define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
#include "test.h"
#include "entrynodes.h"
#include "routerparse.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
#include "routerset.h"
#include "statefile.h"
#include "config.h"
/* TODO:
* choose_random_entry() test with state set.
*
* parse_state() tests with more than one guards.
*
* More tests for set_from_config(): Multiple nodes, use fingerprints,
* use country codes.
*/
/** Dummy Tor state used in unittests. */
static or_state_t *dummy_state = NULL;
static or_state_t *
get_or_state_replacement(void)
{
return dummy_state;
}
/* NOP replacement for router_descriptor_is_older_than() */
static int
router_descriptor_is_older_than_replacement(const routerinfo_t *router,
int seconds)
{
(void) router;
(void) seconds;
return 0;
}
/* Number of descriptors contained in test_descriptors.txt. */
#define NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS 8
/** Parse a file containing router descriptors and load them to our
routerlist. This function is used to setup an artificial network
so that we can conduct entry guard tests. */
static void
setup_fake_routerlist(const char *fname)
{
int retval;
char *contents = NULL;
struct stat st;
routerlist_t *our_routerlist = NULL;
smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
/* Read the file that contains our test descriptors. */
test_assert(file_status(fname) == FN_FILE);
contents = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st);
test_assert(contents);
/* We need to mock this function otherwise the descriptors will not
accepted as they are too old. */
MOCK(router_descriptor_is_older_than,
router_descriptor_is_older_than_replacement);
/* Load all the test descriptors to the routerlist. */
retval = router_load_routers_from_string(contents, NULL, SAVED_IN_JOURNAL,
NULL, 0, NULL);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
/* Sanity checking of routerlist and nodelist. */
our_routerlist = router_get_routerlist();
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(our_routerlist->routers), ==, NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
routerlist_assert_ok(our_routerlist);
our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(our_nodelist), ==, NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
/* Mark all routers as non-guards but up and running! */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(our_nodelist, node_t *, node) {
node->is_running = 1;
node->is_valid = 1;
node->is_possible_guard = 0;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
done:
UNMOCK(router_descriptor_is_older_than);
tor_free(contents);
}
/* Unittest cleanup function: Cleanup the fake network. */
static int
fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr)
{
(void) testcase;
(void) ptr;
routerlist_free_all();
nodelist_free_all();
entry_guards_free_all();
or_state_free(dummy_state);
return 1; /* NOP */
}
/* Unittest setup function: Setup a fake network. */
static void *
fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase)
{
/* This is the file containing our test descriptors. */
const char *fname = BUILDDIR "/src/test/test_descriptors.txt";
(void) testcase;
/* Setup fake state */
dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
MOCK(get_or_state,
get_or_state_replacement);
/* Setup fake routerlist. */
setup_fake_routerlist(fname);
/* Return anything but NULL (it's interpreted as test fail) */
return dummy_state;
}
/** Test choose_random_entry() with none of our routers being guard nodes. */
static void
test_choose_random_entry_no_guards(void *arg)
{
const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
(void) arg;
/* Try to pick an entry even though none of our routers are guards. */
chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
/* Unintuitively, we actually pick a random node as our entry,
because router_choose_random_node() relaxes its constraints if it
can't find a proper entry guard. */
test_assert(chosen_entry);
done:
;
}
/** Test choose_random_entry() with only one of our routers being a
guard node. */
static void
test_choose_random_entry_one_possible_guard(void *arg)
{
const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
node_t *the_guard = NULL;
smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
(void) arg;
/* Set one of the nodes to be a guard. */
our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
the_guard = smartlist_get(our_nodelist, 4); /* chosen by fair dice roll */
the_guard->is_possible_guard = 1;
/* Pick an entry. Make sure we pick the node we marked as guard. */
chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, ==, the_guard);
done:
;
}
/** Helper to conduct tests for populate_live_entry_guards().
This test adds some entry guards to our list, and then tests
populate_live_entry_guards() to mke sure it filters them correctly.
<b>num_needed</b> is the number of guard nodes we support. It's
configurable to make sure we function properly with 1 or 3 guard
nodes configured.
*/
static void
populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(int num_needed)
{
smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
int retval;
/* Set NumEntryGuards to the provided number. */
options->NumEntryGuards = num_needed;
tt_int_op(num_needed, ==, decide_num_guards(options, 0));
/* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 0);
/* Walk the nodelist and add all nodes as entry guards. */
our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(our_nodelist), ==, NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(our_nodelist, const node_t *, node) {
const node_t *node_tmp;
node_tmp = add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 1, 0, 0);
test_assert(node_tmp);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Make sure the nodes were added as entry guards. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
/* Ensure that all the possible entry guards are enough to satisfy us. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), >=, num_needed);
/* Walk the entry guard list for some sanity checking */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_entry_guards, const entry_guard_t *, entry) {
/* Since we called add_an_entry_guard() with 'for_discovery' being
False, all guards should have made_contact enabled. */
tt_int_op(entry->made_contact, ==, 1);
/* Since we don't have a routerstatus, all of the entry guards are
not directory servers. */
tt_int_op(entry->is_dir_cache, ==, 0);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
/* First, try to get some fast guards. This should fail. */
retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
all_entry_guards,
NULL,
NO_DIRINFO, /* Don't care about DIRINFO*/
0, 0,
1); /* We want fast guard! */
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), ==, 0);
/* Now try to get some stable guards. This should fail too. */
retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
all_entry_guards,
NULL,
NO_DIRINFO,
0,
1, /* We want stable guard! */
0);
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), ==, 0);
/* Now try to get any guard we can find. This should succeed. */
retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
all_entry_guards,
NULL,
NO_DIRINFO,
0, 0, 0); /* No restrictions! */
/* Since we had more than enough guards in 'all_entry_guards', we
should have added 'num_needed' of them to live_entry_guards.
'retval' should be 1 since we now have enough live entry guards
to pick one. */
tt_int_op(retval, ==, 1);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), ==, num_needed);
done:
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
}
/* Test populate_live_entry_guards() for 1 guard node. */
static void
test_populate_live_entry_guards_1guard(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(1);
}
/* Test populate_live_entry_guards() for 3 guard nodes. */
static void
test_populate_live_entry_guards_3guards(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(3);
}
/** Append some EntryGuard lines to the Tor state at <b>state</b>.
<b>entry_guard_lines</b> is a smartlist containing 2-tuple
smartlists that carry the key and values of the statefile.
As an example:
entry_guard_lines =
(("EntryGuard", "name 67E72FF33D7D41BF11C569646A0A7B4B188340DF DirCache"),
("EntryGuardDownSince", "2014-06-07 16:02:46 2014-06-07 16:02:46"))
*/
static void
state_insert_entry_guard_helper(or_state_t *state,
smartlist_t *entry_guard_lines)
{
config_line_t **next, *line;
next = &state->EntryGuards;
*next = NULL;
/* Loop over all the state lines in the smartlist */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guard_lines, const smartlist_t *,state_lines) {
/* Get key and value for each line */
const char *state_key = smartlist_get(state_lines, 0);
const char *state_value = smartlist_get(state_lines, 1);
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
line->key = tor_strdup(state_key);
tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s", state_value);
next = &(line->next);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(state_lines);
}
/** Free memory occupied by <b>entry_guard_lines</b>. */
static void
state_lines_free(smartlist_t *entry_guard_lines)
{
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guard_lines, smartlist_t *, state_lines) {
char *state_key = smartlist_get(state_lines, 0);
char *state_value = smartlist_get(state_lines, 1);
tor_free(state_key);
tor_free(state_value);
smartlist_free(state_lines);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(state_lines);
smartlist_free(entry_guard_lines);
}
/* Tests entry_guards_parse_state(). It creates a fake Tor state with
a saved entry guard and makes sure that Tor can parse it and
creates the right entry node out of it.
*/
static void
test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple(void *arg)
{
or_state_t *state = or_state_new();
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
smartlist_t *entry_state_lines = smartlist_new();
char *msg = NULL;
int retval;
/* Details of our fake guard node */
const char *nickname = "hagbard";
const char *fpr = "B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212";
const char *tor_version = "0.2.5.3-alpha-dev";
const char *added_at = "2014-05-22 02:40:47";
const char *unlisted_since = "2014-06-08 16:16:50";
(void) arg;
/* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 0);
{ /* Prepare the state entry */
/* Prepare the smartlist to hold the key/value of each line */
smartlist_t *state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuard");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s %s %s", nickname, fpr, "DirCache");
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardAddedBy");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s %s %s", fpr, tor_version, added_at);
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s", unlisted_since);
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
}
/* Inject our lines in the state */
state_insert_entry_guard_helper(state, entry_state_lines);
/* Parse state */
retval = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
tt_int_op(retval, >=, 0);
/* Test that the guard was registered.
We need to re-get the entry guard list since its pointer was
overwritten in entry_guards_parse_state(). */
all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 1);
{ /* Test the entry guard structure */
char hex_digest[1024];
char str_time[1024];
const entry_guard_t *e = smartlist_get(all_entry_guards, 0);
tt_str_op(e->nickname, ==, nickname); /* Verify nickname */
base16_encode(hex_digest, sizeof(hex_digest),
e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
tt_str_op(hex_digest, ==, fpr); /* Verify fingerprint */
tt_assert(e->is_dir_cache); /* Verify dirness */
tt_str_op(e->chosen_by_version, ==, tor_version); /* Verify tor version */
tt_assert(e->made_contact); /* All saved guards have been contacted */
tt_assert(e->bad_since); /* Verify bad_since timestamp */
format_iso_time(str_time, e->bad_since);
tt_str_op(str_time, ==, unlisted_since);
/* The rest should be unset */
tt_assert(!e->unreachable_since);
tt_assert(!e->can_retry);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_noticed);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_warned);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_extreme);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_disabled);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_use_noticed);
tt_assert(!e->path_bias_use_extreme);
tt_assert(!e->last_attempted);
}
done:
state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
or_state_free(state);
}
/** Similar to test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple() but aims to test
the PathBias-related details of the entry guard. */
static void
test_entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias(void *arg)
{
or_state_t *state = or_state_new();
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
char *msg = NULL;
int retval;
smartlist_t *entry_state_lines = smartlist_new();
/* Path bias details of the fake guard */
const double circ_attempts = 9;
const double circ_successes = 8;
const double successful_closed = 4;
const double collapsed = 2;
const double unusable = 0;
const double timeouts = 1;
(void) arg;
/* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 0);
{ /* Prepare the state entry */
/* Prepare the smartlist to hold the key/value of each line */
smartlist_t *state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuard");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line,
"givethanks B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212 NoDirCache");
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardAddedBy");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line,
"B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev "
"2014-05-22 02:40:47");
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "2014-06-08 16:16:50");
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
state_line = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardPathBias");
smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%f %f %f %f %f %f",
circ_attempts, circ_successes, successful_closed,
collapsed, unusable, timeouts);
smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
}
/* Inject our lines in the state */
state_insert_entry_guard_helper(state, entry_state_lines);
/* Parse state */
retval = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
tt_int_op(retval, >=, 0);
/* Test that the guard was registered */
all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 1);
{ /* Test the path bias of this guard */
const entry_guard_t *e = smartlist_get(all_entry_guards, 0);
tt_assert(!e->is_dir_cache);
tt_assert(!e->can_retry);
/* XXX tt_double_op doesn't support equality. Cast to int for now. */
tt_int_op((int)e->circ_attempts, ==, (int)circ_attempts);
tt_int_op((int)e->circ_successes, ==, (int)circ_successes);
tt_int_op((int)e->successful_circuits_closed, ==, (int)successful_closed);
tt_int_op((int)e->timeouts, ==, (int)timeouts);
tt_int_op((int)e->collapsed_circuits, ==, (int)collapsed);
tt_int_op((int)e->unusable_circuits, ==, (int)unusable);
}
done:
or_state_free(state);
state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
}
/* Simple test of entry_guards_set_from_config() by specifying a
particular EntryNode and making sure it gets picked. */
static void
test_entry_guards_set_from_config(void *arg)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
const char *entrynodes_str = "test003r";
const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
int retval;
(void) arg;
/* Prase EntryNodes as a routerset. */
options->EntryNodes = routerset_new();
retval = routerset_parse(options->EntryNodes,
entrynodes_str,
"test_entrynodes");
tt_int_op(retval, >=, 0);
/* Read nodes from EntryNodes */
entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
/* Test that only one guard was added. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), ==, 1);
/* Make sure it was the guard we specified. */
chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
tt_str_op(chosen_entry->ri->nickname, ==, entrynodes_str);
done:
routerset_free(options->EntryNodes);
}
static const struct testcase_setup_t fake_network = {
fake_network_setup, fake_network_cleanup
};
struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = {
{ "choose_random_entry_no_guards", test_choose_random_entry_no_guards,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "choose_random_entry_one_possibleguard",
test_choose_random_entry_one_possible_guard,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "populate_live_entry_guards_1guard",
test_populate_live_entry_guards_1guard,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "populate_live_entry_guards_3guards",
test_populate_live_entry_guards_3guards,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "entry_guards_parse_state_simple",
test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias",
test_entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "entry_guards_set_from_config",
test_entry_guards_set_from_config,
TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};