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Tweaks to bug2798 based on comments by arma

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2011-07-11 17:02:03 -04:00
parent 2797fd8f68
commit d82384658d
2 changed files with 8 additions and 16 deletions
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changes/bug2798
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
o Major bugfixes:
- When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes (as with
'EntryNodes {cc}' or 'EntryNodes 1.1.1.1/16'), choose only a
random subset to be guards, and choose them in random
src/or/circuitbuild.c
+7 -15
View File
@@ -3984,10 +3984,10 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
}
/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list
* of guard nodes, at the front. */
/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from
* EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */
static void
entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
{
smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
@@ -4017,12 +4017,6 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
/* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
/* XXXX023 Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is
* potentially an enormous list. For now, we disable such values for
* EntryNodes in options_validate(); really, this wants a better solution.
* Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers
* changes or the entrynodes setting changes.
*/
routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes,
options->ExcludeNodes, 0);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node,
@@ -4036,17 +4030,15 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
});
/* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable
* nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */
* nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) {
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
continue;
} else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded");
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
continue;
} else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall");
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
continue;
} else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
@@ -4059,7 +4051,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
/* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
/* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
/* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
@@ -4125,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
if (should_add_entry_nodes)
entry_guards_prepend_from_config(options);
entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
@@ -4150,7 +4142,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
if (options->StrictNodes) {
/* in theory this case should never happen, since
* entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
* entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
tor_fragile_assert();
} else {
log_info(LD_CIRC,