Merge branch 'feature22976_squashed'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2017-08-24 09:23:43 -04:00
9 changed files with 67 additions and 72 deletions
+8
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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
o Minor features (integration, hardening):
- Added a new NoExec option, to prevent Tor from running
other programs. When this option is set to 1,
Tor will never try to run another program, regardless of
the settings of PortForwardingHelper, ClientTransportPlugin,
or ServerTransportPlugin. Once NoExec is set, it cannot be
disabled without restarting Tor.
Closes ticket 22976.
+7
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@@ -775,6 +775,13 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
circuits. If the option is set to "default", we obey a
parameter in the consensus document. (Default: auto)
[[NoExec]] **NoExec** **0**|**1**::
If this option is set to 1, then Tor will never launch another
executable, regardless of the settings of PortForwardingHelper,
ClientTransportPlugin, or ServerTransportPlugin. Once this
option has been set to 1, it cannot be set back to 0 without
restarting Tor. (Default: 0)
CLIENT OPTIONS
--------------
-63
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@@ -289,37 +289,6 @@ sb_rt_sigaction(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
return rc;
}
#if 0
/**
* Function responsible for setting up the execve syscall for
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
*/
static int
sb_execve(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
{
int rc;
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
// for each dynamic parameter filters
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
== SCMP_SYS(execve)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(execve),
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add execve syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
return rc;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
/**
* Function responsible for setting up the time syscall for
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
@@ -1063,9 +1032,6 @@ sb_stat64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
sb_rt_sigaction,
sb_rt_sigprocmask,
#if 0
sb_execve,
#endif
sb_time,
sb_accept4,
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
@@ -1417,26 +1383,6 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
return 0;
}
#if 0
int
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(execve), com);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
return -1;
}
elem->next = *cfg;
*cfg = elem;
return 0;
}
#endif
/** Cache entry for getaddrinfo results; used when sandboxing is implemented
* so that we can consult the cache when the sandbox prevents us from doing
* getaddrinfo.
@@ -1910,15 +1856,6 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
return 0;
}
#if 0
int
sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com)
{
(void)cfg; (void)com;
return 0;
}
#endif
int
sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
{
-8
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@@ -156,14 +156,6 @@ int sandbox_cfg_allow_rename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file1, char *file2);
*/
int sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file);
#if 0
/**
* Function used to add a execve allowed filename to a supplied configuration.
* The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file; that pointer is stolen.
*/
int sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com);
#endif
/**
* Function used to add a stat/stat64 allowed filename to a configuration.
* The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file; that pointer is stolen.
+20
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@@ -4142,6 +4142,20 @@ process_handle_waitpid_cb(int status, void *arg)
#define CHILD_STATE_EXEC 8
#define CHILD_STATE_FAILEXEC 9
/** @} */
/**
* Boolean. If true, then Tor may call execve or CreateProcess via
* tor_spawn_background.
**/
static int may_spawn_background_process = 1;
/**
* Turn off may_spawn_background_process, so that all future calls to
* tor_spawn_background are guaranteed to fail.
**/
void
tor_disable_spawning_background_processes(void)
{
may_spawn_background_process = 0;
}
/** Start a program in the background. If <b>filename</b> contains a '/', then
* it will be treated as an absolute or relative path. Otherwise, on
* non-Windows systems, the system path will be searched for <b>filename</b>.
@@ -4166,6 +4180,12 @@ tor_spawn_background(const char *const filename, const char **argv,
process_environment_t *env,
process_handle_t **process_handle_out)
{
if (BUG(may_spawn_background_process == 0)) {
/* We should never reach this point if we're forbidden to spawn
* processes. Instead we should have caught the attempt earlier. */
return PROCESS_STATUS_ERROR;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
HANDLE stdout_pipe_read = NULL;
HANDLE stdout_pipe_write = NULL;
+2
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@@ -396,6 +396,8 @@ void tor_check_port_forwarding(const char *filename,
struct smartlist_t *ports_to_forward,
time_t now);
void tor_disable_spawning_background_processes(void);
typedef struct process_handle_t process_handle_t;
typedef struct process_environment_t process_environment_t;
int tor_spawn_background(const char *const filename, const char **argv,
+24
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@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
OBSOLETE("PredictedPortsRelevanceTime"),
OBSOLETE("WarnUnsafeSocks"),
VAR("NodeFamily", LINELIST, NodeFamilies, NULL),
V(NoExec, BOOL, "0"),
V(NumCPUs, UINT, "0"),
V(NumDirectoryGuards, UINT, "0"),
V(NumEntryGuards, UINT, "0"),
@@ -1595,6 +1596,10 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
const int transition_affects_guards =
old_options && options_transition_affects_guards(old_options, options);
if (options->NoExec || options->Sandbox) {
tor_disable_spawning_background_processes();
}
/* disable ptrace and later, other basic debugging techniques */
{
/* Remember if we already disabled debugger attachment */
@@ -3570,6 +3575,10 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
REJECT("PortForwarding is not compatible with Sandbox; at most one can "
"be set");
}
if (options->PortForwarding && options->NoExec) {
COMPLAIN("Both PortForwarding and NoExec are set; PortForwarding will "
"be ignored.");
}
if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->BandwidthRate,
"BandwidthRate", msg) < 0)
@@ -4447,6 +4456,12 @@ options_transition_allowed(const or_options_t *old,
return -1;
}
if (old->NoExec && !new_val->NoExec) {
*msg = tor_strdup("While Tor is running, disabling "
"NoExec is not allowed.");
return -1;
}
if (sandbox_is_active()) {
#define SB_NOCHANGE_STR(opt) \
do { \
@@ -5726,6 +5741,15 @@ parse_transport_line(const or_options_t *options,
goto err;
}
if (is_managed && options->NoExec) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
"Managed proxies are not compatible with NoExec mode; ignoring."
"(%sTransportPlugin line was %s)",
server ? "Server" : "Client", escaped(line));
r = 0;
goto done;
}
if (is_managed) {
/* managed */
+2 -1
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@@ -2036,7 +2036,8 @@ check_fw_helper_app_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
{
if (net_is_disabled() ||
! server_mode(options) ||
! options->PortForwarding) {
! options->PortForwarding ||
options->NoExec) {
return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE;
}
/* 11. check the port forwarding app */
+4
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@@ -4596,6 +4596,10 @@ typedef struct {
* consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0,
* use the default. */
int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs;
/** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program.
*/
int NoExec;
} or_options_t;
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */