Misc small code cleanups; remove exit_server_mode(); change tor_tls_verify behavior

svn:r2073
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2004-07-21 00:44:04 +00:00
parent 1a23825b42
commit bce447ef62
7 changed files with 51 additions and 25 deletions
+32 -8
View File
@@ -602,19 +602,39 @@ tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(tor_tls *tls, char *buf, int buflen)
}
/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
* certificate that is currently valid and is correctly signed by
* <b>identity_key</b>, return 0. Else, return -1.
* certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set
* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
* 0. Else, return -1.
*/
int
tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key)
tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
RSA *rsa;
time_t now, t;
int r = -1;
int r = -1, i;
*identity_key = NULL;
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
return -1;
goto done;
if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
goto done;
if (sk_X509_num(chain) != 2) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Unexpected number of certificates in chain");
goto done;
}
for (i=0; i<2; ++i) {
id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
break;
}
if (!id_cert) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No distinct identity certificate found");
goto done;
}
now = time(NULL);
t = now + CERT_ALLOW_SKEW;
@@ -628,14 +648,18 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key)
goto done;
}
/* Get the public key. */
if (!(id_pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(identity_key,0)) ||
if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
tls_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"verifying certificate");
goto done;
}
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
if (!rsa)
goto done;
*identity_key = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
r = 0;
done:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ tor_tls *tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer);
void tor_tls_free(tor_tls *tls);
int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls *tls);
int tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(tor_tls *tls, char *buf, int buflen);
int tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity);
int tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
int tor_tls_read(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int len);
int tor_tls_write(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int n);
int tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls *tls);
+3 -1
View File
@@ -114,7 +114,9 @@ void circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circuit_t *circ) {
return;
}
if (server_mode()) {
prev_digest = router_get_my_routerinfo()->identity_digest;
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
tor_assert(me);
prev_digest = me->identity_digest;
}
do {
router = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest);
+11 -2
View File
@@ -155,10 +155,12 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(connection_t *conn,
connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest) {
connection_t *conn;
routerinfo_t *me;
tor_assert(id_digest);
if(server_mode() && 0) { /* XXX008 if I'm an OR and id_digest is my digest */
if(server_mode() && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) &&
!memcmp(me->identity_digest, id_digest,DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Request to connect to myself! Failing.");
return NULL;
}
@@ -267,6 +269,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
routerinfo_t *router;
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
connection_t *c;
crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
connection_watch_events(conn, POLLIN);
@@ -298,12 +301,18 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, router->identity_pkey)<0) {
if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
if(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(identity_rcvd, router->identity_pkey) != 0) {
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for %s", nickname);
return -1;
}
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
/* XXXX008 This isn't right; fix this one we launch by identity digest
* XXXX008 rather than by nickname */
+2 -10
View File
@@ -473,14 +473,6 @@ int advertised_server_mode(void) {
return (options.ORPort != 0);
}
/** Return true iff we are trying to be an exit server.
*/
int exit_server_mode(void) {
/* XXX008 NM: non-exit servers still answer resolve requests, right? How
* is this to be used? */
return (options.ORPort != 0);
}
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a socks proxy. */
int proxy_mode(void) {
return (options.SocksPort != 0);
@@ -747,7 +739,7 @@ static int do_hup(void) {
/* Restart cpuworker and dnsworker processes, so they get up-to-date
* configuration options. */
cpuworkers_rotate();
if (exit_server_mode())
if (server_mode())
dnsworkers_rotate();
/* Rebuild fresh descriptor as needed. */
router_rebuild_descriptor();
@@ -1011,7 +1003,7 @@ int tor_init(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"You are running Tor as root. You don't need to, and you probably shouldn't.");
#endif
if(exit_server_mode()) { /* only spawn dns handlers if we're a router */
if(server_mode()) { /* only spawn dns handlers if we're a router */
dns_init(); /* initialize the dns resolve tree, and spawn workers */
}
if(proxy_mode()) {
-1
View File
@@ -1198,7 +1198,6 @@ int authdir_mode(void);
int clique_mode(void);
int server_mode(void);
int advertised_server_mode(void);
int exit_server_mode(void);
int proxy_mode(void);
int main(int argc, char *argv[]);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -516,8 +516,8 @@ int router_rebuild_descriptor(void) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't dump router to string.");
return -1;
}
ri->is_trusted_dir = ri->dir_port &&
router_digest_is_trusted_dir(ri->identity_digest);
ri->is_trusted_dir = (ri->dir_port &&
router_digest_is_trusted_dir(ri->identity_digest));
return 0;
}