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Write a few subsections
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@@ -433,32 +433,131 @@ during the bootstrapping phase of the network, where the first few
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widely publicized uses of the network can dictate the types of users it
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attracts next.
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\subsection{Usability and bandwidth and sustainability and incentives}
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%% "outside of academia, jap has just lost, permanently". (That is,
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%% even though the crime detection issues are resolved and are unlikely
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%% to go down the same way again, public perception has not been kind.)
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low-pain-threshold users go away until all users are willing to use it
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\subsection{Sustainability and incentives}
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One of the (arguably) unsolved problems in low-latency anonymity designs is
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how to keep the servers running. Zero-Knowledge Systems's Freedom network
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depended on paying third parties to run its servers; the JAP project's
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bandwidth is dependent on grants from ???? to pay for its bandwidth and
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administrative expenses. In Tor, bandwidth and administrative costs are
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distributed across the volunteers who run Tor nodes, so at least we have
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reason to think that the Tor network could survive without continued research
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funding.\footnote{It also helps that Tor is implemented with free and open
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source software that can be maintained by anybody with the ability and
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inclination.} But why are these volunteers running nodes, and what can we
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do to encourage more volunteers to do so?
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Sustainability. Previous attempts have been commercial which we think
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adds a lot of unnecessary complexity and accountability. Freedom didn't
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collect enough money to pay its servers; JAP bandwidth is supported by
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continued money, and they periodically ask what they will do when it
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dries up.
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We have not surveyed Tor operators to learn why they are running ORs, but
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from the information they have provided, it seems that many of them run Tor
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nodes for reasons of personal interest in privacy issues. It is possible
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that others are running Tor for anonymity reasons, but of course they are
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hardly likely to tell us if they are.
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"outside of academia, jap has just lost, permanently"
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Significantly, Tor's threat model changes the anonymity incentives for running
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a server. In a high-latency mix network, users can receive additional
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anonymity by running their own server, since doing so obscures when they are
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injecting messages into the network. But in Tor, anybody observing a Tor
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server can tell when the server is generating traffic that corresponds to
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none of its incoming traffic, and therefore originating traffic itself.
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Still, anonymity and privacy incentives do remain for server operators:
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\begin{tightlist}
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\item Against a hostile website, running a Tor exit node can provide a degree
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of ``deniaibility'' for traffic that originates at that exit node. For
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example, it is likely in practise that HTTP requests from a Tor server's IP
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will be assumed to have left the Tor network.
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\item Local Tor entry and exit servers allow users on a network to run in an
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`enclave' configuration. [XXXX say more]
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\end{tightlist}
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[nick will write this section]
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First, we try to make the costs of running a Tor server easily minimized.
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Since Tor is run by volunteers, the most crucial software usability issue is
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usability by operators: when an operator leaves, the network becomes less
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usable by everybody. To keep operators pleased, we must try to keep Tor's
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resource and administrative demands as low as possible. [XXXX say mroe]
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Because of ISP billing structures, many Tor operators have underused capacity
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that they are willing to donate to the network, at no additional monetary
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cost to them. Features to limit bandwidth have been essential to adoption.
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Also useful has been a ``hibernation'' feature that allows a server that
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wants to provide high bandwidth, but no more than a certain amount in a
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giving billing cycle, to become dormant once its bandwidth is exhausted, and
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to reawaken at a random offset into the next billing cycle. This feature has
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interesting policy implications, however; see
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section~\ref{subsec:bandwidth-and-usability} below.
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[XXXX say more. Why else would you run a server? What else can we do/do we
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already do to make running a server more attractive?]
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\subsection{Bandwidth and usability}
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\label{subsec:bandwidth-and-usability}
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Once users have configured their applications to work with Tor, the largest
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remaining usability issue is bandwidth. When websites ``feel slow,'' users
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begin to suffer.
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Clients currently try to build their connections through servers that they
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guess will have enough bandwidth. But even if capacity is allocated
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optimally, it seems unlikely that the current network architecture will have
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enough capacity to provide every user with as much bandwidth as she would
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receive if she weren't using Tor, unless far more servers join the network
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(see above).
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Limited capacity does not destroy the network, however. Instead, usage tends
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towards an equilibrium: when performance suffers, users who value performance
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over anonymity tend to leave the system, thus freeing capacity until the
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remaining users on the network are exactly those willing to use that capacity
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there is.
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XXXX hibernation vs rate-limiting: do we want diversity or throughput? i
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think we're shifting back to wanting diversity.
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\subsection{Tor and file-sharing}
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One potentially problematical area with deploying Tor has been our response
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to file-sharing applications. These applications make up an enormous
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fraction of the traffic on the Internet today, and provide two challenges to
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any anonymizing network: their intensive bandwidth requirement, and the
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degree to which they are associated (correctly or not) with copyright
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violation.
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[nick will write this section]
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As noted above, high-bandwidth protocols can make the network unresponsive,
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but tend to be somewhat self-correcting. Issues of copyright violation,
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however, are more interesting. Typical exit node operators want to help
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people achieve privacy and anonymous speech, not to help people (say) host
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Vin Diesel movies for illegal download; and typical ISPs would rather not
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deal with customers who incur them the overhead of getting menacing letters
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from the MPAA. While it is quite likely that the operators are doing nothing
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illegal, many ISPs have policies of dropping users who get repeated legal
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threats regardless of the merits of those threats, and many operators would
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prefer to avoid receiving legal threats even if those threats have little
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merit. So when the letters arrive, operators are likely to face
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pressure to block filesharing applications entirely, in order to avoid the
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hassle.
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Bittorrent and dmca. Should we add an IDS to autodetect protocols and
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snipe them?
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But blocking filesharing would not necessarily be easy; most popular
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protocols have evolved to run on a variety of non-standard ports in order to
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get around other port-based bans. Thus, exit node operators who wanted to
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block filesharing would have to find some way to integrate Tor with a
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protocol-aware exit filter. This could be a technically expensive
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undertaking, and one with poor prospects: it is unlikely that Tor exit nodes
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would succeed where so many institutional firewalls have failed. Another
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possibility for sensitive operators is to run a very restrictive server that
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only permits exit connections to a very restricted range of ports which are
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not frequently associated with file sharing. There are increasingly few such
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ports.
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because only at the exit is it evident what port or protocol a given
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tor stream is, you can't choose not to carry file-sharing traffic.
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For the moment, it seems that Tor's bandwidth issues have rendered it
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unattractive for bulk file-sharing traffic; this may continue to be so in the
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future. Nevertheless, Tor will likely remain attractive for limited use in
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filesharing protocols that have separate control and data channels.
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[xxxx We should say more -- but what? That we'll see a similar
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equilibriating effect as with bandwidth, where sensitive ops switch to
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middleman, and we become less useful for filesharing, so the filesharing
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people back off, so we get more ops since there's less filesharing, so the
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filesharers come back, etc.]
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hibernation vs rate-limiting: do we want diversity or throughput? i
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think we're shifting back to wanting diversity.
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\subsection{Tor and blacklists}
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