torproject/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-12-06 19:41:15 +01:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

tighten related work

Browse Source 
svn:r3597
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine
2005-02-09 08:47:16 +00:00
parent 10b6f18f30
commit aca8c362bf
1 changed files with 13 additions and 20 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
+13 -20
View File
@@ -114,9 +114,6 @@ compare Tor to other low-latency anonymity designs.
%details on the design, assumptions, and security arguments, we refer
%the reader to the Tor design paper~\cite{tor-design}.
%\medskip
\noindent
{\bf How Tor works.}
Tor provides \emph{forward privacy}, so that users can connect to
Internet sites without revealing their logical or physical locations
to those sites or to observers. It also provides \emph{location-hidden
@@ -362,10 +359,19 @@ don't have built-in encryption and authentication, such as unencrypted
HTTP or chat, and it requires no modification of those services.
\subsection{Related work}
Tor is not the only anonymity system that aims to be practical and useful.
Commercial single-hop proxies~\cite{anonymizer}, as well as unsecured
open proxies around the Internet, can provide good
performance and some security against a weaker attacker. The Java
Tor differs from other deployed systems for traffic analysis resistance
in its security and flexibility. Mix networks such as
Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} or its successor Mixminion~\cite{minion-design}
gain the highest degrees of anonymity at the expense of introducing highly
variable delays, making them unsuitable for applications such as web
browsing. Commercial single-hop
proxies~\cite{anonymizer} can provide good performance, but
a single compromise can expose all users' traffic, and a single-point
eavesdropper can perform traffic analysis on the entire network.
%Also, their proprietary implementations place any infrastructure that
%depends on these single-hop solutions at the mercy of their providers'
%financial health as well as network security.
The Java
Anon Proxy~\cite{web-mix} provides similar functionality to Tor but
handles only web browsing rather than arbitrary TCP\@.
%Some peer-to-peer file-sharing overlay networks such as
@@ -387,19 +393,6 @@ enough to contain a MorphMix experiment.
We direct the interested reader
to~\cite{tor-design} for a more in-depth review of related work.
Tor also differs from other deployed systems for traffic analysis resistance
in its security and flexibility. Mix networks such as
Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} or its successor Mixminion~\cite{minion-design}
gain the highest degrees of anonymity at the expense of introducing highly
variable delays, thus making them unsuitable for applications such as web
browsing. Commercial single-hop
proxies~\cite{anonymizer} present a single point of failure, where
a single compromise can expose all users' traffic, and a single-point
eavesdropper can perform traffic analysis on the entire network.
Also, their proprietary implementations place any infrastructure that
depends on these single-hop solutions at the mercy of their providers'
financial health as well as network security.
%XXXX six-four. crowds. i2p.
%XXXX