Try to extract as many descriptors as possible from truncated http responses. (when DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_ROUTERDESC)

svn:r5249
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2005-10-14 02:26:13 +00:00
parent 11b76b9ca5
commit 998cf8d622
6 changed files with 43 additions and 16 deletions
+8 -3
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@@ -788,13 +788,16 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
* - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1.
* (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len,
* _even if_ we're planning to discard them.)
* - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the
* content has arrived.
*
* Else, change nothing and return 0.
*/
int
fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen)
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
int force_complete)
{
char *headers, *body, *p;
size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen;
@@ -840,8 +843,10 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
/* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
if (bodylen < contentlen) {
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"body not all here yet.");
return 0; /* not all there yet */
if (!force_complete) {
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"body not all here yet.");
return 0; /* not all there yet */
}
}
if (bodylen > contentlen) {
bodylen = contentlen;
+1 -1
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@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ connection_or_read_proxy_response(connection_t *conn)
switch (fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf,
&headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE,
NULL, NULL, 10000)) {
NULL, NULL, 10000, 0)) {
case -1: /* overflow */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Your https proxy sent back an oversized response. Closing.");
return -1;
+8 -4
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@@ -806,10 +806,12 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(connection_t *conn)
int compression;
int plausible;
int skewed=0;
int allow_partial = conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC;
switch (fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf,
&headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE,
&body, &body_len, MAX_DIR_SIZE)) {
&body, &body_len, MAX_DIR_SIZE,
allow_partial)) {
case -1: /* overflow */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"'fetch' response too large (server '%s:%d'). Closing.", conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
@@ -878,11 +880,13 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(connection_t *conn)
}
/* Try declared compression first if we can. */
if (compression > 0)
tor_gzip_uncompress(&new_body, &new_len, body, body_len, compression, 1);
tor_gzip_uncompress(&new_body, &new_len, body, body_len, compression,
allow_partial);
/* Okay, if that didn't work, and we think that it was compressed
* differently, try that. */
if (!new_body && guessed > 0 && compression != guessed)
tor_gzip_uncompress(&new_body, &new_len, body, body_len, guessed, 1);
tor_gzip_uncompress(&new_body, &new_len, body, body_len, guessed,
allow_partial);
/* If we're pretty sure that we have a compressed directory, and
* we didn't manage to uncompress it, then warn and bail. */
if (!plausible && !new_body) {
@@ -1510,7 +1514,7 @@ directory_handle_command(connection_t *conn)
switch (fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf,
&headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE,
&body, &body_len, MAX_BODY_SIZE)) {
&body, &body_len, MAX_BODY_SIZE, 0)) {
case -1: /* overflow */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Invalid input from address '%s'. Closing.", conn->address);
return -1;
+3 -3
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@@ -580,9 +580,9 @@ run_connection_housekeeping(int i, time_t now)
/* This check is temporary; it's to let us know whether we should consider
* parsing partial serverdesc responses. */
if (conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC &&
buf_datalen(conn->inbuf)>=(24*1024)) {
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE, "Expired a wedged directory connection that had already downloaded %d bytes of descriptors. If this happens often, please file a bug report.",
(int)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf));
buf_datalen(conn->inbuf)>=1024) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Trying to extract information from wedged server desc downoad");
connection_dir_reached_eof(conn);
}
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return;
+2 -1
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@@ -1362,7 +1362,8 @@ int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf);
int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf);
int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen);
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
int force_complete);
int fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req);
int fetch_from_buf_control0(buf_t *buf, uint32_t *len_out, uint16_t *type_out,
char **body_out, int check_for_v1);
+21 -4
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@@ -636,13 +636,14 @@ check_directory_signature(const char *digest,
/** Given a string *<b>s</b> containing a concatenated sequence of router
* descriptors, parses them and stores the result in <b>dest</b>. All routers
* are marked running and verified. Advances *s to a point immediately
* following the last router entry. Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure.
* following the last router entry. Ignore any trailing router entries that
* are not complete. Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure.
*/
int
router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, smartlist_t *dest)
{
routerinfo_t *router;
const char *end;
const char *end, *cp;
tor_assert(s);
tor_assert(*s);
@@ -654,20 +655,36 @@ router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, smartlist_t *dest)
if (strcmpstart(*s, "router ")!=0)
break;
if ((end = strstr(*s+1, "\nrouter "))) {
cp = end;
end++;
} else if ((end = strstr(*s+1, "\ndirectory-signature"))) {
cp = end;
end++;
} else {
end = *s+strlen(*s);
cp = end = *s+strlen(*s);
}
while (cp > *s && (!*cp || TOR_ISSPACE(*cp)))
--cp;
/* cp now points to the last non-space character in this descriptor. */
while (cp > *s && *cp != '\n')
--cp;
/* cp now points to the first \n before the last non-bank line in this
* descriptor */
if (strcmpstart(cp, "\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n")) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Ignoring truncated router descriptor.");
continue;
}
router = router_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end);
*s = end;
if (!router) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Error reading router; skipping");
continue;
}
smartlist_add(dest, router);
}