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Various minor improvements after David's review.

Browse Source 
- Fix a wrong log message
- Introduce a cap for the nickname size
- Change some 'if' statements to 'switch'.
This commit is contained in:
George Kadianakis
2019-08-05 15:44:18 +03:00
parent ce422a9d4a
commit 97fd75169d
2 changed files with 26 additions and 11 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/feature/control/control_hs.c
+23 -11
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ parse_private_key_from_control_port(const char *client_privkey_str,
if (base64_decode((char*)privkey->secret_key, sizeof(privkey->secret_key),
key_blob,
strlen(key_blob)) != sizeof(privkey->secret_key)) {
control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Failed to decode ED25519-V3 key");
control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Failed to decode x25519 private key");
goto err;
}
@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@ handle_control_onion_client_auth_add(control_connection_t *conn,
/* Now let's parse the remaining arguments (variable size) */
for (const config_line_t *line = args->kwargs; line; line = line->next) {
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "ClientName")) {
/* XXX apply length restriction? */
if (strlen(line->value) > HS_CLIENT_AUTH_MAX_NICKNAME_LENGTH) {
control_write_endreply(conn, 512, "Too big 'ClientName' argument");
goto err;
}
creds->nickname = tor_strdup(line->value);
} else if (!strcasecmpstart(line->key, "Flags")) {
@@ -137,16 +140,21 @@ handle_control_onion_client_auth_add(control_connection_t *conn,
hs_client_register_auth_status_t register_status;
/* Register the credential (register func takes ownership of cred.) */
register_status = hs_client_register_auth_credentials(creds);
if (BUG(register_status == REGISTER_FAIL_BAD_ADDRESS)) {
switch (register_status) {
case REGISTER_FAIL_BAD_ADDRESS:
/* It's a bug because the service addr has already been validated above */
control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Invalid v3 address \"%s\"", hsaddress);
} else if (register_status == REGISTER_SUCCESS_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
break;
case REGISTER_SUCCESS_ALREADY_EXISTS:
control_printf_endreply(conn, 251,"Client for onion existed and replaced");
} else if (register_status == REGISTER_SUCCESS_ALSO_DECRYPTED) {
break;
case REGISTER_SUCCESS_ALSO_DECRYPTED:
control_printf_endreply(conn, 252,"Registered client and decrypted desc");
} else if (register_status == REGISTER_SUCCESS) {
break;
case REGISTER_SUCCESS:
control_printf_endreply(conn, 250, "OK");
} else {
break;
default:
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
}
@@ -195,14 +203,18 @@ handle_control_onion_client_auth_remove(control_connection_t *conn,
hs_client_removal_auth_status_t removal_status;
removal_status = hs_client_remove_auth_credentials(hsaddress);
if (BUG(removal_status == REMOVAL_BAD_ADDRESS)) {
switch (removal_status) {
case REMOVAL_BAD_ADDRESS:
/* It's a bug because the service addr has already been validated above */
control_printf_endreply(conn, 512, "Invalid v3 address \"%s\"",hsaddress);
} else if (removal_status == REMOVAL_SUCCESS_NOT_FOUND) {
break;
case REMOVAL_SUCCESS_NOT_FOUND:
control_printf_endreply(conn, 251, "No credentials for \"%s\"",hsaddress);
} else if (removal_status == REMOVAL_SUCCESS) {
break;
case REMOVAL_SUCCESS:
control_printf_endreply(conn, 250, "OK");
} else {
break;
default:
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
}
src/feature/hs/hs_client.h
+3
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ typedef enum {
/** Flag to set when a client auth is permanent (saved on disk). */
#define CLIENT_AUTH_FLAG_IS_PERMANENT (1<<0)
/** Max length of a client auth nickname */
#define HS_CLIENT_AUTH_MAX_NICKNAME_LENGTH 255
/** Client-side configuration of client authorization */
typedef struct hs_client_service_authorization_t {
/** An curve25519 secret key used to compute decryption keys that