Avoid sign-extending when computing rend auth type.

Right-shifting negative values has implementation-defined behavior.
On all the platforms we work on right now, the behavior is to
sign-extend the input.  That isn't what we wanted in

    auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1;

Fix for 6861; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha; reported pseudonymously.

The broken behavior didn't actually hurt anything, I think, since the
only way to get sign-extension to happen would be to have the top bit
of descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] set, which would make the value of
descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4 somewhere between 0b11111111 and
0b11111000 (that is, between -1 and -8).  So auth_type_val would be
between -7 and 0.  And the immediate next line does:

    if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) {

So the incorrectly computed auth_type_val would be rejected as
invalid, just as a correctly computed auth_type_val would be.

Still, this stuff shouldn't sit around the codebase.

changes/bug6861

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+  o Minor bugfixes:
+    - Fix handling of rendezvous client authorization types over 8.
+      Fixes bug 6841; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha.

src/or/rendclient.c

@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
                descriptor_cookie);
       goto err;
     }
-    auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1;
+    auth_type_val = (((uint8_t)descriptor_cookie_tmp[16]) >> 4) + 1;
     if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) {
       log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Authorization cookie has unknown authorization "
                           "type encoded.");