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channel: Continue refactor NETINFO process function

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In the spirit of reducing technical debt. Move code that marks a channel as a
client into its own function and document it properly.

No behavior change, only code movement.

Related to #40022

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet
2020-07-06 09:06:22 -04:00
parent 789beca783
commit 78bc52c47c
1 changed files with 50 additions and 23 deletions
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src/core/or/channeltls.c
+50 -23
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@@ -1723,6 +1723,50 @@ can_process_netinfo_cell(const channel_tls_t *chan)
return true;
}
/** Mark the given channel endpoint as a client (which means either a tor
* client or a tor bridge).
*
* This MUST be done on an _unauthenticated_ channel. It is a mistake to mark
* an authenticated channel as a client.
*
* The following is done on the channel:
*
* 1. Marked as a client.
* 2. Type of circuit ID type is set.
* 3. The underlying OR connection is initialized with the address of the
* endpoint.
*/
static void
mark_channel_tls_endpoint_as_client(channel_tls_t *chan)
{
/* Ending up here for an authenticated link is a mistake. */
if (BUG(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
return;
}
tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
/* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
* relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
* there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
&(chan->conn->base_.addr),
chan->conn->base_.port,
/* zero, checked above */
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
0);
}
/**
* Process a 'netinfo' cell
*
@@ -1768,30 +1812,13 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
return;
}
} else {
/* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have
some housekeeping to do.*/
/* We're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have some
* housekeeping to do.
*
* It's a tor client or bridge relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND
* requests (nor could we, as there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
/* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
* relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
* there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
&(chan->conn->base_.addr),
chan->conn->base_.port,
/* zero, checked above */
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
0);
mark_channel_tls_endpoint_as_client(chan);
}
}
}