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log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation
debug-level since it will be quite common. logged at both client and server side. this step should help us track what's going on with people filtering tor connections by our ssl habits.
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@@ -929,13 +929,16 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
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if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
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if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
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if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
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// log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING.");
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log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). "
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"Requesting renegotiation.");
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conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
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goto again;
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}
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// log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state);
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} else {
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/* improved handshake, but not a client. */
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log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
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"Expecting renegotiation.");
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tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
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connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
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conn);
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