Update remaining trac.tpo wiki urls

configure.ac

@@ -2642,7 +2642,7 @@ other kinds of attacks easier. A Tor instance build with this option will be
 somewhat less vulnerable to remote code execution, arithmetic overflow, or
 out-of-bounds read/writes... but at the cost of becoming more vulnerable to
 denial of service attacks. For more information, see
-https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFragileHardening
+https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/team/-/wikis/TorFragileHardening
 ============
   ])
 fi

doc/HACKING/CircuitPaddingDevelopment.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ might be recognized on the wire.
 The problem of differentiating Tor traffic from non-Tor traffic based on
 TCP/TLS packet sizes, initial handshake patterns, and DPI characteristics is the
 domain of [pluggable
-transports](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports),
+transports](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/team/-/wikis/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports),
 which may optionally be used in conjunction with this framework (or without
 it).
 

src/core/proto/proto_socks.c

@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address,
              "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves "
              "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A "
              "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, "
-             "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/"
-             "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s",
+             "please see https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en"
+             "#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks.%s",
              socks_protocol,
              (int)port,
              safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : "");