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Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into release-0.3.5

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teor
2019-08-12 13:09:36 +10:00
parent 1d9e1da6ee d253b31cec
commit 13d2a46621
43 changed files with 313 additions and 133 deletions
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changes/29241_diagnostic
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor features (NSS, diagnostic):
- Try to log an error from NSS (if there is any) and a more useful
description of our situation if we are using NSS and a call to
SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial() fails. Diagnostic for ticket 29241.
changes/bug22619
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
o Minor bugfixes (circuit isolation):
- Fix a logic error that prevented the SessionGroup sub-option from
being accepted. Fixes bug 22619; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
changes/bug29034
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Major bugfixes (Onion service reachability):
- Properly clean up the introduction point map when circuits change purpose
from onion service circuits to pathbias, measurement, or other circuit types.
This should fix some service-side instances of introduction point failure.
Fixes bug 29034; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
changes/bug29241
+6
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Major bugfixes (NSS, relay):
- When running with NSS, disable TLS 1.2 ciphersuites that use SHA384
for their PRF. Due to an NSS bug, the TLS key exporters for these
ciphersuites don't work -- which caused relays to fail to handshake
with one another when these ciphersuites were enabled.
Fixes bug 29241; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
changes/bug29670
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (configuration, proxies):
- Fix a bug that prevented us from supporting SOCKS5 proxies that want
authentication along with configued (but unused!)
ClientTransportPlugins. Fixes bug 29670; bugfix on 0.2.6.1-alpha.
changes/bug29875
+11
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
o Major bugfixes (bridges):
- Do not count previously configured working bridges towards our total of
working bridges. Previously, when Tor's list of bridges changed, it
would think that the old bridges were still usable, and delay fetching
router descriptors for the new ones. Fixes part of bug 29875; bugfix
on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
- Consider our directory information to have changed when our list of
bridges changes. Previously, Tor would not re-compute the status of its
directory information when bridges changed, and therefore would not
realize that it was no longer able to build circuits. Fixes part of bug
29875.
changes/bug30040
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
o Minor bugfixes (security):
- Fix a potential double free bug when reading huge bandwidth files. The
issue is not exploitable in the current Tor network because the
vulnerable code is only reached when directory authorities read bandwidth
files, but bandwidth files come from a trusted source (usually the
authorities themselves). Furthermore, the issue is only exploitable in
rare (non-POSIX) 32-bit architectures which are not used by any of the
current authorities. Fixes bug 30040; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. Bug found
and fixed by Tobias Stoeckmann.
changes/bug30148
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (memory leak):
- Avoid a minor memory leak that could occur on relays when
creating a keys directory failed. Fixes bug 30148; bugfix on
0.3.3.1-alpha.
changes/bug30189
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (compilation, unusual configuration):
- Avoid failures when building with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FAILED due to
missing declarations of abort(), and prevent other such failures
in the future. Fixes bug 30189; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha.
changes/bug30190
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
o Minor bugfixes (lib):
do not log a warning for OpenSSL versions that should be compatible
Fixes bug 30190; bugfix on 0.2.4.2-alpha
changes/bug30316
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (directory authority):
- Move the "bandwidth-file-headers" line in directory authority votes
so that it conforms to dir-spec.txt. Fixes bug 30316; bugfix on
0.3.5.1-alpha.
changes/bug30452
+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
o Minor features (compile-time modules):
- Add a --list-modules command to print a list of which compile-time
modules are enabled. Closes ticket 30452.
changes/cid1444119
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
o Minor bugfixes (C correctness):
- Fix an unlikely memory leak in consensus_diff_apply(). Fixes bug 29824;
bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. This is Coverity warning CID 1444119.
changes/ticket29617
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor bugfixes (out-of-memory handler):
- When purging the DNS cache because of an out-of-memory condition,
try purging just the older entries at first. Previously, we would
purge the whole thing. Fixes bug 29617; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
changes/ticket30454
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
o Major bugfixes (hidden service v3):
- An intro point could try to send an INTRODUCE_ACK with a status code
that it wasn't able to encode leading to a hard assert() of the relay.
Fortunately, that specific code path can not be reached thus this issue
can't be triggered. We've consolidated the ABI values into trunnel now.
Fixes bug 30454; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
- HSv3 client will now be able to properly handle unknown status code from
a INTRODUCE_ACK cell (nack) even if they do not know it. The NACK
behavior will stay the same. This will allow us to extend status code if
we want in the future without breaking the normal client behavior.
doc/tor.1.txt
+11 -6
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS
List all valid options that are scheduled to become obsolete in a
future version. (This is a warning, not a promise.)
[[opt-list-modules]] **--list-modules**::
For each optional module, list whether or not it has been compiled
into Tor. (Any module not listed is not optional in this version of Tor.)
[[opt-version]] **--version**::
Display Tor version and exit.
@@ -1849,15 +1853,16 @@ is non-zero):
[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
exit according to the ExitPolicy option (or the default ExitPolicy if
none is specified). +
exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option,
or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). +
+
If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to
exit, and the ExitPolicy option is ignored. +
exit, and the ExitPolicy and ReducedExitPolicy options are ignored. +
+
If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor behaves as if it were set to 1, but
warns the user if this would cause traffic to exit. In a future version,
the default value will be 0. (Default: auto)
If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy and
ReducedExitPolicy options. If either is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay
were set to 1. If neither exit policy option is set, Tor behaves as if
ExitRelay were set to 0. (Default: auto)
[[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
src/app/config/config.c
+16 -2
View File
@@ -2412,7 +2412,8 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
if (!bool_eq(directory_fetches_dir_info_early(options),
directory_fetches_dir_info_early(old_options)) ||
!bool_eq(directory_fetches_dir_info_later(options),
directory_fetches_dir_info_later(old_options))) {
directory_fetches_dir_info_later(old_options)) ||
!config_lines_eq(old_options->Bridges, options->Bridges)) {
/* Make sure update_router_have_minimum_dir_info() gets called. */
router_dir_info_changed();
/* We might need to download a new consensus status later or sooner than
@@ -2474,6 +2475,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "--quiet", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--hush", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--version", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--list-modules", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--library-versions", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "-h", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--help", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
@@ -2695,6 +2697,13 @@ list_deprecated_options(void)
}
}
/** Print all compile-time modules and their enabled/disabled status. */
static void
list_enabled_modules(void)
{
printf("%s: %s\n", "dirauth", have_module_dirauth() ? "yes" : "no");
}
/** Last value actually set by resolve_my_address. */
static uint32_t last_resolved_addr = 0;
@@ -5198,6 +5207,11 @@ options_init_from_torrc(int argc, char **argv)
return 1;
}
if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--list-modules")) {
list_enabled_modules();
return 1;
}
if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--library-versions")) {
printf("Tor version %s. \n", get_version());
printf("Library versions\tCompiled\t\tRuntime\n");
@@ -7080,7 +7094,7 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
if (!strcasecmpstart(elt, "SessionGroup=")) {
int group = (int)tor_parse_long(elt+strlen("SessionGroup="),
10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, NULL);
if (!ok || !allow_no_stream_options) {
if (!ok || allow_no_stream_options) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Invalid %sPort option '%s'",
portname, escaped(elt));
goto err;
src/app/main/main.c
+1
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@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ tor_init(int argc, char *argv[])
if (!strcmp(cl->key, "--version") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--digests") ||
!strcmp(cl->key, "--list-torrc-options") ||
!strcmp(cl->key, "--library-versions") ||
!strcmp(cl->key, "--list-modules") ||
!strcmp(cl->key, "--hash-password") ||
!strcmp(cl->key, "-h") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--help")) {
if (quiet < 1)
src/config/torrc.sample.in
+16 -5
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 22 December 2017 for Tor 0.3.2.8-rc.
## Last updated 28 February 2019 for Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
@@ -172,14 +172,25 @@
## Note: do not use MyFamily on bridge relays.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## Uncomment this if you do *not* want your relay to allow any exit traffic.
## (Relays allow exit traffic by default.)
#ExitRelay 0
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with the default
## exit policy (or whatever exit policy you set below).
## (If ReducedExitPolicy or ExitPolicy are set, relays are exits.
## If neither exit policy option is set, relays are non-exits.)
#ExitRelay 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to allow IPv6 exit traffic.
## (Relays only allow IPv4 exit traffic by default.)
## You must also set ExitRelay, ReducedExitPolicy, or ExitPolicy to make your
## relay into an exit.
## (Relays do not allow any exit traffic by default.)
#IPv6Exit 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with a reduced set
## of exit ports.
#ReducedExitPolicy 1
## Uncomment these lines if you want your relay to be an exit, with the
## specified set of exit IPs and ports.
##
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins.
##
src/core/mainloop/connection.c
+21 -12
View File
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static const char *connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state);
static int connection_read_https_proxy_response(connection_t *conn);
static void connection_send_socks5_connect(connection_t *conn);
static const char *proxy_type_to_string(int proxy_type);
static int get_proxy_type(void);
static int conn_get_proxy_type(const connection_t *conn);
const tor_addr_t *conn_get_outbound_address(sa_family_t family,
const or_options_t *options, unsigned int conn_type);
static void reenable_blocked_connection_init(const or_options_t *options);
@@ -2260,18 +2260,27 @@ connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state)
return states[state];
}
/** Returns the global proxy type used by tor. Use this function for
* logging or high-level purposes, don't use it to fill the
/** Returns the proxy type used by tor for a single connection, for
* logging or high-level purposes. Don't use it to fill the
* <b>proxy_type</b> field of or_connection_t; use the actual proxy
* protocol instead.*/
static int
get_proxy_type(void)
conn_get_proxy_type(const connection_t *conn)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (options->ClientTransportPlugin)
return PROXY_PLUGGABLE;
else if (options->HTTPSProxy)
if (options->ClientTransportPlugin) {
/* If we have plugins configured *and* this addr/port is a known bridge
* with a transport, then we should be PROXY_PLUGGABLE. */
const transport_t *transport = NULL;
int r;
r = get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port, &transport);
if (r == 0 && transport)
return PROXY_PLUGGABLE;
}
/* In all other cases, we're using a global proxy. */
if (options->HTTPSProxy)
return PROXY_CONNECT;
else if (options->Socks4Proxy)
return PROXY_SOCKS4;
@@ -2358,7 +2367,7 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type)
arguments to transmit. If we do, compress all arguments to
a single string in 'socks_args_string': */
if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) {
if (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) {
socks_args_string =
pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port);
if (socks_args_string)
@@ -2418,7 +2427,7 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type)
Socks5ProxyUsername or if we want to pass arguments to our
pluggable transport proxy: */
if ((options->Socks5ProxyUsername) ||
(get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE &&
(conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE &&
(get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)))) {
/* number of auth methods */
buf[1] = 2;
@@ -2611,16 +2620,16 @@ connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn)
const char *user, *pass;
char *socks_args_string = NULL;
if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) {
if (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) {
socks_args_string =
pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port);
if (!socks_args_string) {
log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not create SOCKS args string.");
log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not create SOCKS args string for PT.");
ret = -1;
break;
}
log_debug(LD_NET, "SOCKS5 arguments: %s", socks_args_string);
log_debug(LD_NET, "PT SOCKS5 arguments: %s", socks_args_string);
tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0);
tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL);
src/core/or/circuituse.c
+6
View File
@@ -3066,6 +3066,12 @@ circuit_change_purpose(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t new_purpose)
circ->purpose,
circuit_purpose_to_string(new_purpose),
new_purpose);
/* Take specific actions if we are repurposing a hidden service circuit. */
if (circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(circ->purpose) &&
!circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(new_purpose)) {
hs_circ_cleanup(circ);
}
}
old_purpose = circ->purpose;
src/ext/getdelim.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ compat_getdelim_(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp)
char *nbuf;
size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2;
ssize_t d = ptr - *buf;
if ((nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL)
if (nbufsiz < *bufsiz ||
(nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL)
return -1;
*buf = nbuf;
*bufsiz = nbufsiz;
src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
+3
View File
@@ -3300,6 +3300,9 @@ num_bridges_usable,(int use_maybe_reachable))
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
/* Not a bridge, or not one we are configured to be able to use. */
if (! guard->is_filtered_guard)
continue;
/* Definitely not usable */
if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
continue;
src/feature/dirauth/authmode.h
+4
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options)
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V3AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
#define have_module_dirauth() (1)
#else /* HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH */
#define authdir_mode(options) (((void)(options)),0)
@@ -37,6 +39,8 @@ authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options)
#define authdir_mode_bridge(options) (((void)(options)),0)
#define authdir_mode_v3(options) (((void)(options)),0)
#define have_module_dirauth() (0)
#endif /* HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH */
#endif /* TOR_MODE_H */
src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c
+3 -4
View File
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key,
"known-flags %s\n"
"flag-thresholds %s\n"
"params %s\n"
"%s" /* bandwidth file headers */
"dir-source %s %s %s %s %d %d\n"
"contact %s\n"
"%s" /* shared randomness information */
"%s" /* bandwidth file headers */
,
v3_ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE ? "vote" : "opinion",
methods,
@@ -338,13 +338,12 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key,
flags,
flag_thresholds,
params,
bw_headers_line ? bw_headers_line : "",
voter->nickname, fingerprint, voter->address,
fmt_addr32(addr), voter->dir_port, voter->or_port,
voter->contact,
shared_random_vote_str ?
shared_random_vote_str : "",
bw_headers_line ?
bw_headers_line : "");
shared_random_vote_str : "");
tor_free(params);
tor_free(flags);
src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ consensus_diff_apply(const char *consensus,
r1 = consensus_compute_digest_as_signed(consensus, &d1);
if (BUG(r1 < 0))
return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
goto done;
lines1 = smartlist_new();
lines2 = smartlist_new();
src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c
+9 -7
View File
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ parse_introduce2_encrypted(const uint8_t *decrypted_data,
}
if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell) !=
HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key type is invalid. Got %u but "
"expected %u on circuit %u for service %s",
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell),
HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR,
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
goto err;
}
@@ -258,7 +259,7 @@ introduce1_set_encrypted_onion_key(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *cell,
tor_assert(onion_pk);
/* There is only one possible key type for a non legacy cell. */
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_onion_key_type(cell,
HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR);
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR);
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_onion_key_len(cell, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_setlen_onion_key(cell, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
memcpy(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getarray_onion_key(cell), onion_pk,
@@ -442,7 +443,8 @@ introduce1_set_auth_key(trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell,
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(data);
/* There is only one possible type for a non legacy cell. */
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(cell, HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(cell,
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_len(cell, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
trn_cell_introduce1_setlen_auth_key(cell, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
memcpy(trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_auth_key(cell),
@@ -515,7 +517,7 @@ hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce,
/* Set AUTH_KEY_TYPE: 2 means ed25519 */
trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_type(cell,
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
/* Set AUTH_KEY and AUTH_KEY_LEN field. Must also set byte-length of
* AUTH_KEY to match */
@@ -882,9 +884,9 @@ hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
* do a special case. */
if (payload_len <= 1) {
if (payload_len == 0) {
ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS;
ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE;
ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
}
goto end;
}
src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h
-13
View File
@@ -16,19 +16,6 @@
* 3.2.2 of the specification). Below this value, the cell must be padded. */
#define HS_CELL_INTRODUCE1_MIN_SIZE 246
/* Status code of an INTRODUCE_ACK cell. */
typedef enum {
HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS = 0x0000, /* Cell relayed to service. */
HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE = 0x0001, /* Service ID not recognized */
HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT = 0x0002, /* Bad message format */
HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY = 0x0003, /* Can't relay cell to service */
} hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t;
/* Onion key type found in the INTRODUCE1 cell. */
typedef enum {
HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR = 1,
} hs_cell_onion_key_type_t;
/* This data structure contains data that we need to build an INTRODUCE1 cell
* used by the INTRODUCE1 build function. */
typedef struct hs_cell_introduce1_data_t {
src/feature/hs/hs_client.c
+9 -9
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
* public key to hs_client_service_authorization_t *. */
static digest256map_t *client_auths = NULL;
#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h"
/* Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */
static const char *
fetch_status_to_string(hs_client_fetch_status_t status)
@@ -1067,23 +1069,21 @@ handle_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
status = hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(payload, payload_len);
switch (status) {
case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS:
ret = 0;
handle_introduce_ack_success(circ);
goto end;
case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE:
case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT:
case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT:
/* It is possible that the intro point can send us an unknown status code
* for the NACK that we do not know about like a new code for instance.
* Just fallthrough so we can note down the NACK and re-extend. */
default:
handle_introduce_ack_bad(circ, status);
/* We are going to see if we have to close the circuits (IP and RP) or we
* can re-extend to a new intro point. */
ret = close_or_reextend_intro_circ(circ);
break;
default:
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unknown INTRODUCE_ACK status code %u from %s",
status,
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)));
break;
}
end:
src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c
+14 -13
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ verify_establish_intro_cell(const trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell,
/* We only reach this function if the first byte of the cell is 0x02 which
* means that auth_key_type is of ed25519 type, hence this check should
* always pass. See hs_intro_received_establish_intro(). */
if (BUG(cell->auth_key_type != HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519)) {
if (BUG(cell->auth_key_type != TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519)) {
return -1;
}
@@ -318,10 +318,10 @@ hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
* ESTABLISH_INTRO and pass it to the appropriate cell handler */
const uint8_t first_byte = request[0];
switch (first_byte) {
case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0:
case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1:
return rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(circ, request, request_len);
case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519:
case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519:
return handle_establish_intro(circ, request, request_len);
default:
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
* Return 0 on success else a negative value on error which will close the
* circuit. */
static int
send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, hs_intro_ack_status_t status)
send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t status)
{
int ret = -1;
uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL;
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell)
/* The auth key of an INTRODUCE1 should be of type ed25519 thus leading to a
* known fixed length as well. */
if (trn_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_type(cell) !=
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519) {
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell auth key type. "
"Responding with NACK.");
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request,
int ret = -1;
or_circuit_t *service_circ;
trn_cell_introduce1_t *parsed_cell;
hs_intro_ack_status_t status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
uint16_t status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
tor_assert(client_circ);
tor_assert(request);
@@ -451,14 +451,14 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request,
"Rejecting %s INTRODUCE1 cell. Responding with NACK.",
cell_size == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated");
/* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has a bad format. */
status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
goto send_ack;
}
/* Once parsed validate the cell format. */
if (validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(parsed_cell) < 0) {
/* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has bad format. */
status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT;
goto send_ack;
}
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request,
"Responding with NACK.",
safe_str(b64_key), client_circ->p_circ_id);
/* Inform the client that we don't know the requested service ID. */
status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
goto send_ack;
}
}
@@ -486,13 +486,14 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request,
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2,
(char *) request, request_len, NULL)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to the service.");
/* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. */
status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY;
/* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. Use the unknown ID
* status code since it means that we do not know the service. */
status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID;
goto send_ack;
}
/* Success! Send an INTRODUCE_ACK success status onto the client circuit. */
status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS;
ret = 0;
send_ack:
src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h
-15
View File
@@ -12,21 +12,6 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
/* Authentication key type in an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */
typedef enum {
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 = 0x00,
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1 = 0x01,
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02,
} hs_intro_auth_key_type_t;
/* INTRODUCE_ACK status code. */
typedef enum {
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0000,
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001,
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002,
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY = 0x0003,
} hs_intro_ack_status_t;
/* Object containing introduction point common data between the service and
* the client side. */
typedef struct hs_intropoint_t {
src/feature/relay/dns.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2130,7 +2130,8 @@ dns_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes)
current_size -= bytes_removed;
total_bytes_removed += bytes_removed;
time_inc += 3600; /* Increase time_inc by 1 hour. */
/* Increase time_inc by a reasonable fraction. */
time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 4);
} while (total_bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes);
return total_bytes_removed;
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
/* Check/Create the key directory */
if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
return -1;
goto err;
char *fname;
if (options->master_key_fname) {
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c
+8
View File
@@ -213,6 +213,14 @@ crypto_openssl_early_init(void)
!strcmp(version_str, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) {
log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "OpenSSL version matches version from headers "
"(%lx: %s).", version_num, version_str);
} else if ((version_num & 0xffff0000) ==
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0xffff0000)) {
log_notice(LD_CRYPTO,
"We compiled with OpenSSL %lx: %s and we "
"are running with OpenSSL %lx: %s. "
"These two versions should be binary compatible.",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
version_num, version_str);
} else {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "OpenSSL version from headers does not match the "
"version we're running with. If you get weird crashes, that "
src/lib/log/util_bug.c
+14
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "lib/string/printf.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
static void (*failed_assertion_cb)(void) = NULL;
@@ -120,6 +121,19 @@ tor_bug_occurred_(const char *fname, unsigned int line,
#endif
}
/**
* Call the abort() function to kill the current process with a fatal
* error.
*
* (This is a separate function so that we declare it in util_bug.h without
* including stdlib in all the users of util_bug.h)
**/
void
tor_abort_(void)
{
abort();
}
#ifdef _WIN32
/** Take a filename and return a pointer to its final element. This
* function is called on __FILE__ to fix a MSVC nit where __FILE__
src/lib/log/util_bug.h
+5 -3
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
if (ASSERT_PREDICT_LIKELY_(expr)) { \
} else { \
tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, #expr); \
abort(); \
tor_abort_(); \
} STMT_END
#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) && defined(DISABLE_ASSERTS_IN_UNIT_TESTS) */
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
STMT_BEGIN { \
tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, \
"line should be unreached"); \
abort(); \
tor_abort_(); \
} STMT_END
/* Non-fatal bug assertions. The "unreached" variants mean "this line should
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
#define BUG(cond) \
(ASSERT_PREDICT_UNLIKELY_(cond) ? \
(tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__,__LINE__,__func__,"!("#cond")"), \
abort(), 1) \
tor_abort_(), 1) \
: 0)
#elif defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) && defined(DISABLE_ASSERTS_IN_UNIT_TESTS)
#define tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached() STMT_NIL
@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ void tor_bug_occurred_(const char *fname, unsigned int line,
const char *func, const char *expr,
int once);
void tor_abort_(void) ATTR_NORETURN;
#ifdef _WIN32
#define SHORT_FILE__ (tor_fix_source_file(__FILE__))
const char *tor_fix_source_file(const char *fname);
src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
+40
View File
@@ -152,6 +152,32 @@ we_like_auth_type(SSLAuthType at)
}
}
/**
* Return true iff this ciphersuite will be hit by a mozilla bug 1312976,
* which makes TLS key exporters not work with TLS 1.2 non-SHA256
* ciphersuites.
**/
static bool
ciphersuite_has_nss_export_bug(const SSLCipherSuiteInfo *info)
{
/* For more information on the bug, see
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1312976 */
/* This bug only exists in TLS 1.2. */
if (info->authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any)
return false;
/* Sadly, there's no way to get this information from the
* CipherSuiteInfo object itself other than by looking at the
* name. */
if (strstr(info->cipherSuiteName, "_SHA384") ||
strstr(info->cipherSuiteName, "_SHA512")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
tor_tls_context_t *
tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client)
@@ -256,6 +282,12 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
!we_like_mac_algorithm(info.macAlgorithm) ||
!we_like_auth_type(info.authType)/* Requires NSS 3.24 */;
if (ciphersuite_has_nss_export_bug(&info)) {
/* SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial will fail; we can't use this cipher.
*/
disable = 1;
}
s = SSL_CipherPrefSet(ctx->ctx, ciphers[i],
disable ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE);
if (s != SECSuccess)
@@ -726,10 +758,18 @@ tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
tor_assert(context_len <= UINT_MAX);
SECStatus s;
/* Make sure that the error code is set here, so that we can be sure that
* any error code set after a failure was in fact caused by
* SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial. */
PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
s = SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(tls->ssl,
label, (unsigned)strlen(label),
PR_TRUE, context, (unsigned)context_len,
secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN);
if (s != SECSuccess) {
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO,
"exporting key material for a TLS handshake");
}
return (s == SECSuccess) ? 0 : -1;
}
src/test/test_config.c
+5 -7
View File
@@ -4568,16 +4568,14 @@ test_config_parse_port_config__ports__ports_given(void *data)
"127.0.0.44", 0, CL_PORT_NO_STREAM_OPTIONS);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
// TODO: this seems wrong. Shouldn't it be the other way around?
// Potential bug.
// Test failure for a SessionGroup argument with valid value but with stream
// options allowed
// Test failure for a SessionGroup argument with valid value but with no
// stream options allowed
config_free_lines(config_port_invalid); config_port_invalid = NULL;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(slout,port_cfg_t *,pf,port_cfg_free(pf));
smartlist_clear(slout);
config_port_invalid = mock_config_line("DNSPort", "42 SessionGroup=123");
ret = parse_port_config(slout, config_port_invalid, "DNS", 0,
"127.0.0.44", 0, 0);
"127.0.0.44", 0, CL_PORT_NO_STREAM_OPTIONS);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
// Test failure for more than one SessionGroup argument
@@ -4587,7 +4585,7 @@ test_config_parse_port_config__ports__ports_given(void *data)
config_port_invalid = mock_config_line("DNSPort", "42 SessionGroup=123 "
"SessionGroup=321");
ret = parse_port_config(slout, config_port_invalid, "DNS", 0,
"127.0.0.44", 0, CL_PORT_NO_STREAM_OPTIONS);
"127.0.0.44", 0, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
// Test success with a sessiongroup options
@@ -4596,7 +4594,7 @@ test_config_parse_port_config__ports__ports_given(void *data)
smartlist_clear(slout);
config_port_valid = mock_config_line("DNSPort", "42 SessionGroup=1111122");
ret = parse_port_config(slout, config_port_valid, "DNS", 0,
"127.0.0.44", 0, CL_PORT_NO_STREAM_OPTIONS);
"127.0.0.44", 0, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(slout), OP_EQ, 1);
port_cfg = (port_cfg_t *)smartlist_get(slout, 0);
src/test/test_hs_cell.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ test_gen_establish_intro_cell(void *arg)
/* Check the contents of the cell */
{
/* First byte is the auth key type: make sure its correct */
tt_int_op(buf[0], OP_EQ, HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
tt_int_op(buf[0], OP_EQ, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
/* Next two bytes is auth key len */
tt_int_op(ntohs(get_uint16(buf+1)), OP_EQ, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* Skip to the number of extensions: no extensions */
src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ helper_create_introduce1_cell(void)
{
size_t auth_key_len = sizeof(auth_key_kp.pubkey);
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(cell,
HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_len(cell, auth_key_len);
trn_cell_introduce1_setlen_auth_key(cell, auth_key_len);
uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = trn_cell_introduce1_getarray_auth_key(cell);
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ test_introduce1_validation(void *arg)
ret = validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(cell);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
/* Reset is to correct value and make sure it's correct. */
cell->auth_key_type = HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519;
cell->auth_key_type = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519;
ret = validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(cell);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c
+17 -27
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_new(void)
trn_cell_introduce1_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(trn_cell_introduce1_t));
if (NULL == val)
return NULL;
val->auth_key_type = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519;
return val;
}
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_type(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *inp)
int
trn_cell_introduce1_set_auth_key_type(trn_cell_introduce1_t *inp, uint8_t val)
{
if (! ((val == 0 || val == 1 || val == 2))) {
if (! ((val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 || val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 || val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1))) {
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_check(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *obj)
return "Object was NULL";
if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
return "A set function failed on this object";
if (! (obj->auth_key_type == 0 || obj->auth_key_type == 1 || obj->auth_key_type == 2))
if (! (obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 || obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 || obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1))
return "Integer out of bounds";
if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->auth_key) != obj->auth_key_len)
return "Length mismatch for auth_key";
@@ -319,7 +320,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_encoded_len(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *obj)
/* Length of u8 legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN] */
result += TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN;
/* Length of u8 auth_key_type IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Length of u8 auth_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1] */
result += 1;
/* Length of u16 auth_key_len */
@@ -367,7 +368,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const trn_cell_i
memcpy(ptr, obj->legacy_key_id, TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN);
written += TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN;
/* Encode u8 auth_key_type IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Encode u8 auth_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < 1)
goto truncated;
@@ -451,11 +452,11 @@ trn_cell_introduce1_parse_into(trn_cell_introduce1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input,
memcpy(obj->legacy_key_id, ptr, TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN);
remaining -= TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN;
/* Parse u8 auth_key_type IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Parse u8 auth_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1] */
CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
obj->auth_key_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
if (! (obj->auth_key_type == 0 || obj->auth_key_type == 1 || obj->auth_key_type == 2))
if (! (obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 || obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 || obj->auth_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1))
goto fail;
/* Parse u16 auth_key_len */
@@ -550,10 +551,6 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_get_status(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *inp)
int
trn_cell_introduce_ack_set_status(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *inp, uint16_t val)
{
if (! ((val == 0 || val == 1 || val == 2))) {
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
inp->status = val;
return 0;
}
@@ -587,8 +584,6 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_check(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj)
return "Object was NULL";
if (obj->trunnel_error_code_)
return "A set function failed on this object";
if (! (obj->status == 0 || obj->status == 1 || obj->status == 2))
return "Integer out of bounds";
{
const char *msg;
if (NULL != (msg = trn_cell_extension_check(obj->extensions)))
@@ -606,7 +601,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj)
return -1;
/* Length of u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Length of u16 status */
result += 2;
/* Length of struct trn_cell_extension extensions */
@@ -638,7 +633,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const trn_cel
trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0);
#endif
/* Encode u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Encode u16 status */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < 2)
goto truncated;
@@ -687,12 +682,10 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_parse_into(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj, const uint8_t *
ssize_t result = 0;
(void)result;
/* Parse u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */
/* Parse u16 status */
CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated);
obj->status = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr));
remaining -= 2; ptr += 2;
if (! (obj->status == 0 || obj->status == 1 || obj->status == 2))
goto fail;
/* Parse struct trn_cell_extension extensions */
result = trn_cell_extension_parse(&obj->extensions, ptr, remaining);
@@ -708,9 +701,6 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_parse_into(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj, const uint8_t *
relay_fail:
trunnel_assert(result < 0);
return result;
fail:
result = -1;
return result;
}
ssize_t
@@ -733,7 +723,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_new(void)
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t));
if (NULL == val)
return NULL;
val->onion_key_type = 1;
val->onion_key_type = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR;
return val;
}
@@ -837,7 +827,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(const trn_cell_introduce_encrypt
int
trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_set_onion_key_type(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *inp, uint8_t val)
{
if (! ((val == 1))) {
if (! ((val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR))) {
TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp);
return -1;
}
@@ -1079,7 +1069,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_check(const trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *obj)
if (NULL != (msg = trn_cell_extension_check(obj->extensions)))
return msg;
}
if (! (obj->onion_key_type == 1))
if (! (obj->onion_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR))
return "Integer out of bounds";
if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->onion_key) != obj->onion_key_len)
return "Length mismatch for onion_key";
@@ -1112,7 +1102,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_encoded_len(const trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *o
/* Length of struct trn_cell_extension extensions */
result += trn_cell_extension_encoded_len(obj->extensions);
/* Length of u8 onion_key_type IN [1] */
/* Length of u8 onion_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR] */
result += 1;
/* Length of u16 onion_key_len */
@@ -1176,7 +1166,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const t
goto fail; /* XXXXXXX !*/
written += result; ptr += result;
/* Encode u8 onion_key_type IN [1] */
/* Encode u8 onion_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR] */
trunnel_assert(written <= avail);
if (avail - written < 1)
goto truncated;
@@ -1280,11 +1270,11 @@ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_parse_into(trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *obj, con
trunnel_assert((size_t)result <= remaining);
remaining -= result; ptr += result;
/* Parse u8 onion_key_type IN [1] */
/* Parse u8 onion_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR] */
CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated);
obj->onion_key_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr));
remaining -= 1; ptr += 1;
if (! (obj->onion_key_type == 1))
if (! (obj->onion_key_type == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR))
goto fail;
/* Parse u16 onion_key_len */
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h
+7
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ struct trn_cell_extension_st;
struct link_specifier_st;
#define TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN 20
#define TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN 20
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS 0
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID 1
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT 2
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 0
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1 1
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 2
#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR 1
#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_TRN_CELL_INTRODUCE1)
struct trn_cell_introduce1_st {
uint8_t legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN];
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel
+18 -3
View File
@@ -12,13 +12,28 @@ extern struct link_specifier;
const TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN = 20;
const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20;
/* Introduce ACK status code. */
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0000;
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001;
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002;
/* Authentication key type. */
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 = 0x00;
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1 = 0x01;
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02;
/* Onion key type. */
const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR = 0x01;
/* INTRODUCE1 payload. See details in section 3.2.1. */
struct trn_cell_introduce1 {
/* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitly by the caller. */
u8 legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN];
/* Authentication key material. */
u8 auth_key_type IN [0x00, 0x01, 0x02];
u8 auth_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0,
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1,
TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519];
u16 auth_key_len;
u8 auth_key[auth_key_len];
@@ -32,7 +47,7 @@ struct trn_cell_introduce1 {
/* INTRODUCE_ACK payload. See details in section 3.2.2. */
struct trn_cell_introduce_ack {
/* Status of introduction. */
u16 status IN [0x0000, 0x0001, 0x0002];
u16 status;
/* Extension(s). Reserved fields. */
struct trn_cell_extension extensions;
@@ -47,7 +62,7 @@ struct trn_cell_introduce_encrypted {
struct trn_cell_extension extensions;
/* Onion key material. */
u8 onion_key_type IN [0x01];
u8 onion_key_type IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR];
u16 onion_key_len;
u8 onion_key[onion_key_len];