[flagday] handle nicknames and connection init properly; go to cert chains. something still odd w/tls

svn:r1658
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2004-04-17 18:15:00 +00:00
parent 7172c1fcd0
commit 0393db76e0
3 changed files with 43 additions and 25 deletions
+38 -22
View File
@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ struct tor_tls_st {
};
static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
const char *nickname);
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
const char *cname,
const char *cname_sign);
/* global tls context, keep it here because nobody else needs to touch it */
static tor_tls_context *global_tls_context = NULL;
@@ -132,24 +133,26 @@ static int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
/* Generate a self-signed certificate with the private key 'rsa' and
* identity key 'identity and commonName 'nickname'. Return a certificate
* on success, NULL on failure.
* DOCDOC
*/
X509 *
tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
const char *nickname)
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
const char *cname,
const char *cname_sign)
{
time_t start_time, end_time;
EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
int nid;
tor_tls_init();
start_time = time(NULL);
assert(rsa && nickname);
if (!(id_pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(identity,1)))
assert(rsa && cname && rsa_sign && cname_sign);
if (!(sign_pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa_sign,1)))
goto error;
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,0)))
goto error;
@@ -167,12 +170,21 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
"TOR", -1, -1, 0))) goto error;
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
(char*)nickname, -1, -1, 0))) goto error;
if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name)))
goto error;
(char*)cname, -1, -1, 0))) goto error;
if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
goto error;
if (!(name_issuer = X509_NAME_new()))
goto error;
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("organizationName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name_issuer, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
"TOR", -1, -1, 0))) goto error;
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name_issuer, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
(char*)cname_sign, -1, -1, 0))) goto error;
if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
goto error;
if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
goto error;
end_time = start_time + CERT_LIFETIME;
@@ -180,7 +192,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
goto error;
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
goto error;
if (!X509_sign(x509, id_pkey, EVP_sha1()))
if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha1()))
goto error;
goto done;
@@ -190,12 +202,14 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
x509 = NULL;
}
done:
if (id_pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
if (sign_pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (name)
X509_NAME_free(name);
if (name_issuer)
X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
return x509;
}
@@ -228,7 +242,9 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
tor_tls_context *result = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL;
char nn2[1024];
sprintf(nn2, "%s <identity>", nickname);
tor_tls_init();
@@ -237,8 +253,9 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
goto error;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0)
goto error;
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname);
if (!cert) {
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2);
idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nn2, nn2);
if (!cert || !idcert) {
log(LOG_WARN, "Error creating certificate");
goto error;
}
@@ -260,6 +277,8 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
goto error;
if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
goto error;
if (idcert && !SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(result->ctx,idcert))
goto error;
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
if (isServer) {
assert(rsa);
@@ -303,7 +322,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
SSL_CTX_free(result->ctx);
if (result)
free(result);
/* leak certs XXXX ? */
return -1;
}
@@ -531,7 +550,6 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
time_t now, t;
int r = -1;
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
@@ -563,8 +581,6 @@ tor_tls_verify(tor_tls *tls, crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key)
X509_free(cert);
if (id_pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
if (rsa)
RSA_free(rsa);
return r;
}
@@ -217,13 +217,14 @@ static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", router->nickname, c->s, conn->s);
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
if (conn->nickname && strcmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
log_fn(options.DirPort ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO,
"Other side claims to be '%s', but we expected '%s'",
"Other side is '%s', but we tried to connect to '%s'",
nickname, conn->nickname);
return -1;
}
connection_or_init_conn_from_router(conn,router);
if (!options.ORPort) { /* If I'm an OP... */
conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
}
+1
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ int has_completed_circuit=0;
****************************************************************************/
int connection_add(connection_t *conn) {
assert(conn);
if(nfds >= options.MaxConn-1) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failing because nfds is too high.");