337 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
337 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
Welcome to darkproxy...
|
||
|
||
## Production hardening defaults
|
||
|
||
The stack now uses safer defaults for production:
|
||
|
||
* Service admin/web passwords are loaded from Docker secrets instead of inline values.
|
||
* Admin/monitoring ports are bound to `127.0.0.1` on the host.
|
||
* 3proxy SOCKS auth is currently disabled (`auth none`) for trusted/internal use.
|
||
* Pi-hole ARP cache parsing is disabled in Docker (`FTLCONF_database_network_parseARPcache=false`) to prevent recurring netlink `neigh`/ARP errors.
|
||
|
||
Before starting in production, set these secret files:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
printf 'YOUR_STRONG_PIHOLE_PASSWORD\n' > secrets/pihole_webpassword.txt
|
||
printf 'YOUR_STRONG_GRAFANA_PASSWORD\n' > secrets/grafana_admin_password.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
SOCKS auth note:
|
||
|
||
* Current default is `auth none` in `3proxy/first-instanse.cfg`.
|
||
* `secrets/3proxy_users.txt` is not used in this mode.
|
||
* Only re-add `PROXY_USERS` compose wiring if you intentionally switch back to `auth strong`.
|
||
|
||
Pi-hole note: disabling ARP parsing avoids noisy `Failed to read ARP cache`
|
||
messages in containerized setups where neighbor-table netlink operations are not
|
||
supported. This only affects Pi-hole's network-table enrichment, not DNS
|
||
blocking/forwarding behavior.
|
||
|
||
This container runs the following vontainers in the stack.
|
||
|
||
dark3proxy - SOCKS5/http proxy with hostname-preserving router
|
||
- DNS
|
||
- pihole - ad blocking and metrics
|
||
- PopuraDNS - non-recursive DNS forwards requests to the following:
|
||
Alfis - Blockchain based yggdrasil resolver
|
||
EmerCoin - Resolves EMC domains
|
||
UnBound - Recursive DNS for Clearnet domains
|
||
* .onion and .i2p domain names are now resolved via the stack (see DNS section below)
|
||
- I2PD over Yggdrasil container (`container_name: darki2p`)
|
||
* Yggdrasil IP network stack
|
||
* Socks5 server for I2P
|
||
- Tor container
|
||
|
||
## SOCKS ports on host
|
||
|
||
Proxy access is exposed on a single host port:
|
||
|
||
* `<host-ip>:2000` -> `dark3proxy` SOCKS (`dark3proxy:1080`), externally reachable.
|
||
- Intended as the single client entrypoint for clearnet, onion, and Ygg/I2P routing rules.
|
||
|
||
Router internals for `:2000`:
|
||
|
||
* Front-end process: `3proxy/socks_router.py` (SOCKS5), keeps destination hostnames intact.
|
||
* Upstream dispatch:
|
||
- `*.onion` -> Tor SOCKS (`10.5.0.7:9050`)
|
||
- `*.i2p` -> i2pd SOCKS (`10.5.0.2:4447`)
|
||
- `*.ygg`, `*.meshname`, `*.meship`, and `200::/7` -> local Ygg-guarded SOCKS (`127.0.0.1:1085`)
|
||
- all other targets -> Tor SOCKS (`10.5.0.7:9050`)
|
||
* Existing 3proxy primary instance still runs for admin/legacy rules, with SOCKS moved to internal port `1088` to avoid collision.
|
||
|
||
Additional non-proxy endpoint:
|
||
|
||
* `127.0.0.1:2006/udp` -> Tor DNSPort (`darktor:9053`).
|
||
|
||
Quick checks:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
# Onion over the only published proxy port
|
||
curl --socks5-hostname <host-ip>:2000 -I http://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion
|
||
|
||
# Clearnet over the only published proxy port
|
||
curl --socks5-hostname <host-ip>:2000 -I https://example.com
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The system offers a DNS that resolves many darknet and clearnet IP's. The
|
||
stack now handles:
|
||
|
||
Local resolution model (important):
|
||
|
||
* DNS queries are resolved inside this Docker stack on your host (`pihole -> CoreDNS -> local resolver services`).
|
||
* The stack does not forward DNS queries to public DNS providers for supported darknet/blockchain TLDs.
|
||
* Some namespaces still require blockchain RPC data sources for authoritative records (see limitations below).
|
||
|
||
* `*.onion` – forwarded to Tor's DNSPort running in the `darktor` container at
|
||
10.5.0.7:9053.
|
||
* `*.i2p` – served by the built-in DNS server inside the `darki2p` container
|
||
(10.5.0.2:53) which is enabled via the `[dns]` section in `i2pd.conf`.
|
||
|
||
You can query these directly from any container on the `darkproxy` network, for
|
||
example:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
# Tor .onion domains
|
||
docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 facebookcorewwwi.onion
|
||
|
||
# I2P .i2p domains
|
||
docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 stats.i2p
|
||
|
||
# Ethereum Name Service (.eth) via local ensdns service
|
||
docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 vitalik.eth
|
||
|
||
# ENS address/content hash records (TXT)
|
||
docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 TXT vitalik.eth
|
||
|
||
# Other supported TLDs: .bit, .alt, .loki, .zil, .web3, .exit, .onion4, .onion6
|
||
docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 example.bit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
> **Note:** the CoreDNS service at `10.5.0.4` no longer enforces an ACL for
|
||
> the root zone – it will happily perform recursive lookups for any client.
|
||
> Queries from your host should now work without the “refused to do a recursive
|
||
> query” error. If you later reintroduce an ACL, update this note accordingly.
|
||
|
||
### Host-side quick tests (no extra images)
|
||
|
||
Run DNS queries from your host by executing `dig` in the existing `darkpihole`
|
||
container:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 TXT vitalik.eth +short
|
||
docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A vitalik.eth +short
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Expected behavior:
|
||
|
||
* `TXT` includes `address=` and (if present) `contenthash=`.
|
||
* `A` returns a CNAME fallback like `<name>.eth.limo.`.
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Supported TLDs and resolvers
|
||
|
||
The stack now provides DNS resolution for a comprehensive set of alternative TLDs:
|
||
|
||
| TLD | Resolver | Purpose |
|
||
|-----|----------|---------|
|
||
| `.onion`, `.exit`, `.onion4`, `.onion6` | Tor DNSPort (10.5.0.7:9053) | Tor hidden services |
|
||
| `.i2p` | i2pd DNS (10.5.0.2:53) | I2P eepsite names |
|
||
| `.eth` | ensdns (10.5.0.11) via CoreDNS | Ethereum Name Service (local resolver) |
|
||
| `.bit` | namecoindns (10.5.0.12) via CoreDNS | Namecoin names (local resolver service) |
|
||
| `.alt` | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | Alternative DNS root (local-only fallback mode) |
|
||
| `.loki` | local lokinet (10.5.0.14) via CoreDNS | Lokinet privacy network (no Cloudflare/public DNS forwarder dependency) |
|
||
| `.zil` | zildns (10.5.0.15) via CoreDNS | Zilliqa blockchain (local resolver service; no Cloudflare DNS dependency) |
|
||
| `.web3` | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | General blockchain namespace (local-only fallback mode) |
|
||
| Alfis TLDs | Alfis (10.5.0.3) | `.anon`, `.btn`, `.conf`, `.index`, `.merch`, `.mirror`, `.mob`, `.screen`, `.srv`, `.ygg` |
|
||
| EmerCoin TLDs | EmerCoin (10.5.0.9) | `.emc`, `.coin`, `.lib`, `.bazar`, `.enum` |
|
||
| OpenNIC TLDs | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | `.bbs`, `.chan`, `.cyb`, `.dyn`, `.epic`, `.geek`, `.gopher`, `.indy`, `.libre`, `.neo`, `.null`, `.o`, `.oss`, `.oz`, `.parody`, `.pirate`, `.fur`, `.ku`, `.rm`, `.te`, `.ti`, `.uu`, `.ko` (local-only fallback mode) |
|
||
| Clearnet | Unbound (10.5.0.5) | All other domains via recursive resolution |
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Local-only DNS mode limitations
|
||
|
||
Darkproxy now avoids direct public DNS forwarders for `.alt`, `.zil`, `.web3`, OpenNIC TLDs, and Lokinet fallback DNS.
|
||
|
||
Resolution still happens locally in this stack. The remaining external dependency
|
||
surface is blockchain RPC/data access for record lookup, not public DNS
|
||
forwarding.
|
||
|
||
Important limitations still apply for authoritative data:
|
||
|
||
* `.eth` requires an Ethereum JSON-RPC backend. By default this stack uses `https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com` in `ensdns`.
|
||
* `.alt`, OpenNIC TLDs, and `.web3` are not in the ICANN root. In local-only fallback mode they are sent to local Unbound, so they usually return `NXDOMAIN` unless you provide your own authoritative/local resolver backend for those namespaces.
|
||
* `.zil` is resolved through local `zildns`, which queries ZNS using `https://api.zilliqa.com` by default. This is a Zilliqa RPC lookup path (on-chain resolution), not a Cloudflare DNS forwarder path. You can override the RPC endpoint with `ZILDNS_ZNS_URL` in `docker-compose.yml`.
|
||
* `zildns` supports `ZILDNS_CACHE_SECONDS` (record cache duration) and `ZILDNS_PREWARM_DOMAIN` (startup warm-up query) to reduce first-query latency.
|
||
* For browser convenience, `A` lookups may return a CNAME to a public IPFS gateway when a `.zil` content hash exists. That gateway alias is separate from DNS resolution itself.
|
||
* `.loki` is resolved by local Lokinet, and Lokinet fallback DNS points to local Unbound (no Cloudflare/public DNS forwarder dependency).
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Configuration validation and drift tests
|
||
|
||
A simple automation is included to help detect accidental changes to the
|
||
compose and DNS configuration:
|
||
|
||
1. **Local check** – run `scripts/validate-config.sh` (or its PowerShell equivalent).
|
||
- The script requires `docker` to be installed; it will generate a normalized
|
||
manifest and compare it against `docker-compose.lock.yml`.
|
||
- If the baseline file does not exist it will be created; commit the file after
|
||
review.
|
||
- CoreDNS syntax is also validated using either a local `coredns` binary or a
|
||
container.
|
||
|
||
2. **CI workflow** – `.github/workflows/config-validation.yml` is triggered on
|
||
pushes or pull requests affecting `docker-compose.yml` or `PopuraDNS/`.
|
||
The job executes the same `docker compose config` comparison and runs the
|
||
Corefile check inside a container.
|
||
|
||
3. **Updating the baseline** – when intentional changes are made to the
|
||
compose file, regenerate the baseline:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
scripts/validate-config.sh # fails with drift
|
||
cp generated.yml docker-compose.lock.yml
|
||
git add docker-compose.lock.yml
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
These steps ensure that configuration drift is caught early and reviewers can
|
||
see what has changed.
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Local ENS (.eth) client
|
||
|
||
If you want to resolve Ethereum ENS names locally from the host, use the
|
||
standalone client script:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
python3 -m venv .venv-ens
|
||
source .venv-ens/bin/activate
|
||
pip install -r scripts/requirements-ens.txt
|
||
python3 scripts/resolve_ens.py vitalik.eth --pretty
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Options:
|
||
|
||
* `--rpc <url>` to set a custom Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint.
|
||
* `--include-text` to include common ENS text records.
|
||
|
||
Example:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
python3 scripts/resolve_ens.py ens.eth --include-text --pretty
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Local Namecoin (.bit) resolver (true on-chain)
|
||
|
||
`.bit` lookups are routed through a local blockchain-backed resolver path:
|
||
|
||
* CoreDNS forwards `bit.:53` to `10.5.0.12:53` (`namecoindns`).
|
||
* `namecoindns` queries local `namecoind` JSON-RPC (`10.5.0.13:8336`).
|
||
* `namecoind` syncs the Namecoin blockchain and serves on-chain records.
|
||
|
||
Quick test:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A id.bit
|
||
docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 TXT id.bit
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If your environment returns `NXDOMAIN` for `.bit`, configure Namecoin-capable
|
||
records in Namecoin itself and wait for local `namecoind` sync completion.
|
||
|
||
> **Important:** initial blockchain sync can take significant time. During sync,
|
||
> `.bit` responses may be empty or incomplete.
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Local Lokinet (.loki) resolver
|
||
|
||
`.loki` lookups are resolved by a local Lokinet daemon path:
|
||
|
||
* CoreDNS forwards `loki.:53` to `10.5.0.14:53` (`lokinet`).
|
||
* `lokinet` resolves `.loki` names through the Lokinet network.
|
||
|
||
Quick test:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A oxen.loki
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
> **Note:** Lokinet may need a short bootstrap period after startup before
|
||
> `.loki` names resolve.
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Monitoring the proxy
|
||
|
||
A lightweight Prometheus/Grafana stack is included to expose 3proxy metrics
|
||
and give you visibility into traffic volumes, connected sessions, etc.
|
||
|
||
### how it works
|
||
|
||
* `3proxy` is configured with `monitor -p6800`, which sets up a plain-text
|
||
status socket. Samples look like `PROXY CONNS 12` or `SOCKS IN 345`.
|
||
* `monitor/exporter.py` polls that socket every few seconds and exports
|
||
the counters on HTTP port **9100** in Prometheus format.
|
||
* The `docker-compose.yml` file now defines three new services:
|
||
`3proxy_exporter`, `prometheus` and `grafana`.
|
||
Prometheus scrapes the exporter and Grafana points at Prometheus as a data
|
||
source.
|
||
|
||
### building & running
|
||
|
||
The exporter lives in `monitor/`; build the image and start the stack:
|
||
|
||
```sh
|
||
# build everything including the new services
|
||
docker-compose build 3proxy_exporter prometheus grafana
|
||
|
||
docker-compose up -d
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Prometheus will be accessible on port **9090**, Grafana on **3000** (admin
|
||
password `secret`). Use Grafana to create or import dashboards – a simple
|
||
example JSON is provided in `monitor/3proxy-dashboard.json`. You can import
|
||
that file directly or build your own panels using metrics such as
|
||
`proxy_conns` and `proxy_bytes_in`.
|
||
|
||
### tips
|
||
|
||
* Alerts can be added in Prometheus rules, e.g. fire when `proxy_conns`
|
||
exceeds a threshold for several minutes.
|
||
* If you don’t want the full stack, you can still query the monitor port
|
||
directly with `nc`; nothing in the proxy depends on the exporter.
|
||
* The `scripts/validate-config.sh` script warns if a 3proxy config lacks a
|
||
`monitor` line.
|
||
|
||
## Production readiness checklist
|
||
|
||
Make sure you never commit real secrets. The `secrets/` directory is now
|
||
included in `.gitignore`; both timezone and Yggdrasil key files live there and
|
||
are mounted into containers at runtime.
|
||
|
||
Before deploying to a live environment, run the validation script and resolve
|
||
any warnings or errors. The script covers:
|
||
|
||
* YAML syntax and drift against the committed baseline
|
||
* CoreDNS/PopuraDNS Corefile syntax
|
||
* Unbound configuration syntax
|
||
* Presence of required secret files
|
||
* Simple 3proxy configuration sanity (presence of `socks`/`proxy` rules)
|
||
* Detection of `:latest` image tags (pin to fixed versions)
|
||
* Verification that restart policies exist
|
||
|
||
The GitHub Actions workflow also includes a **smoke test** job that spins up
|
||
all services in `docker-compose.yml` using a Docker‑in‑Docker service and
|
||
waits for each container’s healthcheck to report `healthy`. This gives an
|
||
additional layer of confidence that the stack can be built and started
|
||
successfully.
|
||
|
||
You can also extend the script with additional service-specific checks such as
|
||
running `docker run ...` commands to exercise the images, scanning the
|
||
`3proxy` config more deeply, or linting other mounted configuration files.
|
||
|
||
Run the script locally via `./scripts/validate-config.sh` (or
|
||
`.scripts/validate-config.ps1` on Windows) and review the output carefully.
|
||
CI will execute the same validations automatically on pull requests.
|
||
|
||
|