Files
tor/src/feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.c
T
David Goulet 15860c8846 addr: Use tor_addr_t instead of uint32_t for IPv4
This changes a LOT of code but in the end, behavior is the same.
Unfortunately, many functions had to be changed to accomodate but in majority
of cases, to become simpler.

Functions are also removed specifically those that were there to convert an
IPv4 as a host format to a tor_addr_t. Those are not needed anymore.

The IPv4 address field has been standardized to "ipv4_addr", the ORPort to
"ipv4_orport" (currently IPv6 uses ipv6_orport) and DirPort to "ipv4_dirport".

This is related to Sponsor 55 work that adds IPv6 support for relays and this
work is needed in order to have a common interface between IPv4 and IPv6.

Closes #40043.

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2020-07-14 10:36:08 -04:00

218 lines
7.0 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* @file authcert_parse.c
* @brief Authority certificate parsing.
**/
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/parsecommon.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/sigcommon.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/unparseable.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
#include "lib/memarea/memarea.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_members.h"
/** List of tokens recognized in V3 authority certificates. */
// clang-format off
static token_rule_t dir_key_certificate_table[] = {
AUTHCERT_MEMBERS,
T1("fingerprint", K_FINGERPRINT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
END_OF_TABLE
};
// clang-format on
/** Parse a key certificate from <b>s</b>; point <b>end-of-string</b> to
* the first character after the certificate. */
authority_cert_t *
authority_cert_parse_from_string(const char *s, size_t maxlen,
const char **end_of_string)
{
/** Reject any certificate at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an
* attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */
#define MAX_CERT_SIZE (128*1024)
authority_cert_t *cert = NULL, *old_cert;
smartlist_t *tokens = NULL;
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
directory_token_t *tok;
char fp_declared[DIGEST_LEN];
const char *eos;
size_t len;
int found;
memarea_t *area = NULL;
const char *end_of_s = s + maxlen;
const char *s_dup = s;
s = eat_whitespace_eos(s, end_of_s);
eos = tor_memstr(s, end_of_s - s, "\ndir-key-certification");
if (! eos) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No signature found on key certificate");
return NULL;
}
eos = tor_memstr(eos, end_of_s - eos, "\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n");
if (! eos) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No end-of-signature found on key certificate");
return NULL;
}
eos = memchr(eos+2, '\n', end_of_s - (eos+2));
tor_assert(eos);
++eos;
len = eos - s;
if (len > MAX_CERT_SIZE) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Certificate is far too big (at %lu bytes long); "
"rejecting", (unsigned long)len);
return NULL;
}
tokens = smartlist_new();
area = memarea_new();
if (tokenize_string(area,s, eos, tokens, dir_key_certificate_table, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing key certificate");
goto err;
}
if (router_get_hash_impl(s, eos - s, digest, "dir-key-certificate-version",
"\ndir-key-certification", '\n', DIGEST_SHA1) < 0)
goto err;
tok = smartlist_get(tokens, 0);
if (tok->tp != K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATE_VERSION || strcmp(tok->args[0], "3")) {
log_warn(LD_DIR,
"Key certificate does not begin with a recognized version (3).");
goto err;
}
cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(authority_cert_t));
memcpy(cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_SIGNING_KEY);
tor_assert(tok->key);
cert->signing_key = tok->key;
tok->key = NULL;
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(cert->signing_key, cert->signing_key_digest))
goto err;
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_IDENTITY_KEY);
tor_assert(tok->key);
cert->identity_key = tok->key;
tok->key = NULL;
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_FINGERPRINT);
tor_assert(tok->n_args);
if (base16_decode(fp_declared, DIGEST_LEN, tok->args[0],
strlen(tok->args[0])) != DIGEST_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode key certificate fingerprint %s",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(cert->identity_key,
cert->cache_info.identity_digest))
goto err;
if (tor_memneq(cert->cache_info.identity_digest, fp_declared, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Digest of certificate key didn't match declared "
"fingerprint");
goto err;
}
tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_ADDRESS);
if (tok) {
struct in_addr in;
char *address = NULL;
tor_assert(tok->n_args);
/* XXX++ use some tor_addr parse function below instead. -RD */
if (tor_addr_port_split(LOG_WARN, tok->args[0], &address,
&cert->ipv4_dirport) < 0 ||
tor_inet_aton(address, &in) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse dir-address in certificate");
tor_free(address);
goto err;
}
tor_addr_from_in(&cert->ipv4_addr, &in);
tor_free(address);
}
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_KEY_PUBLISHED);
if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &cert->cache_info.published_on) < 0) {
goto err;
}
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_KEY_EXPIRES);
if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &cert->expires) < 0) {
goto err;
}
tok = smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-1);
if (tok->tp != K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATION) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Certificate didn't end with dir-key-certification.");
goto err;
}
/* If we already have this cert, don't bother checking the signature. */
old_cert = authority_cert_get_by_digests(
cert->cache_info.identity_digest,
cert->signing_key_digest);
found = 0;
if (old_cert) {
/* XXXX We could just compare signed_descriptor_digest, but that wouldn't
* buy us much. */
if (old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len == len &&
old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body &&
tor_memeq(s, old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, len)) {
log_debug(LD_DIR, "We already checked the signature on this "
"certificate; no need to do so again.");
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found) {
if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, cert->identity_key, 0,
"key certificate")) {
goto err;
}
tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_KEY_CROSSCERT);
if (check_signature_token(cert->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN,
tok,
cert->signing_key,
CST_NO_CHECK_OBJTYPE,
"key cross-certification")) {
goto err;
}
}
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = len;
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(len+1);
memcpy(cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, s, len);
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body[len] = 0;
cert->cache_info.saved_location = SAVED_NOWHERE;
if (end_of_string) {
*end_of_string = eat_whitespace(eos);
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_free(tokens);
if (area) {
DUMP_AREA(area, "authority cert");
memarea_drop_all(area);
}
return cert;
err:
dump_desc(s_dup, "authority cert");
authority_cert_free(cert);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
smartlist_free(tokens);
if (area) {
DUMP_AREA(area, "authority cert");
memarea_drop_all(area);
}
return NULL;
}