https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
There are two problems in this bug:
1. When an OP makes a .exit request specifying itself as the exit, and the exit
is not yet listed, Tor gets all the routerinfos needed for the circuit but
discovers in circuit_is_acceptable() that its own routerinfo is not in the
routerdigest list and cannot be used. Tor then gets locked in a cycle of
repeating these two steps. When gathering the routerinfos for a circuit,
specifically when the exit has been chosen by .exit notation, Tor needs to
apply the same rules it uses later on when deciding if it can build a
circuit with those routerinfos.
2. A different bug arises in the above situation when the Tor instance's
routerinfo *is* listed in the routerlist, it shares its nickname with a
number of other Tor nodes, and it does not have 'Named' rights to its
nickname.
So for example, if (i) there are five nodes named Bob in the network, (ii) I
am running one of them but am flagged as 'Unnamed' because someone else
claimed the 'Bob' nickname first, and (iii) I run my Tor as both client
and exit the following can happen to me:
- I go to www.evil.com
- I click on a link www.evil.com.bob.exit
- My request will exit through my own Tor node rather than the 'Named'
node Bob or any of the others.
- www.evil.com now knows I am actually browsing from the same computer
that is running my 'Bob' node
So to solve both issues we need to ensure:
- When fulfilling a .exit request we only choose a routerinfo if it exists in
the routerlist, even when that routerinfo is ours.
- When getting a router by nickname we only return our own router information
if it is not going to be used for building a circuit.
We ensure this by removing the special treatment afforded our own router in
router_get_by_nickname(). This means the function will only return the
routerinfo of our own router if it is in the routerlist built from authority
info and has a unique nickname or is bound to a non-unique nickname.
There are some uses of router_get_by_nickname() where we are looking for the
router by name because of a configuration directive, specifically local
declaration of NodeFamilies and EntryNodes and other routers' declaration of
MyFamily. In these cases it is not at first clear if we need to continue
returning our own routerinfo even if our router is not listed and/or has a
non-unique nickname with the Unnamed flag.
The patch treats each of these cases as follows:
Other Routers' Declaration of MyFamily
This happens in routerlist_add_family(). If another router declares our router
in its family and our router has the Unnamed flag or is not in the routerlist
yet, should we take advantage of the fact that we know our own routerinfo to
add us in anyway? This patch says 'no, treat our own router just like any
other'. This is a safe choice because it ensures our client has the same view
of the network as other clients. We also have no good way of knowing if our
router is Named or not independently of the authorities, so we have to rely on
them in this.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, we have no way of knowing if the declaration 'NodeFamilies
Bob,Alice,Ringo' refers to our router Bob or the Named router Bob, so we have
to defer to the authorities and treat our own router like any other.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, same as above. There's also no good reason we would want our client to
choose it's own router as an entry guard if it does not meet the requirements
expected of any other router on the network.
In order to reduce the possibility of error, the patch also replaces two
instances where we were using router_get_by_nickname() with calls to
router_get_by_hexdigest() where the identity digest of the router
is available.
Sending a log message to a control port can cause Tor to allocate a buffer,
thereby changing the length of the freelist behind buf_shrink_freelists's back,
thereby causing an assertion to fail.
Fixes bug #1125.
We would never actually enforce multiplicity rules when parsing
annotations, since the counts array never got entries added to it for
annotations in the token list that got added by earlier calls to
tokenize_string.
Found by piebeer.
When we introduced the code to close non-open OR connections after
KeepalivePeriod had passed, we replaced some code that said
if (!connection_is_open(conn)) {
/* let it keep handshaking forever */
} else if (do other tests here) {
...
with new code that said
if (!connection_is_open(conn) && past_keepalive) {
/* let it keep handshaking forever */
} else if (do other tests here) {
...
This was a mistake, since it made all the other tests start applying
to non-open connections, thus causing bug 1840, where non-open
connections get closed way early.
Fixes bug 1840. Bugfix on 0.2.1.26 (commit 67b38d50).
If the voting interval was short enough, the two-minutes delay
of CONSENSUS_MIN_SECONDS_BEFORE_CACHING would confuse bridges
to the point where they would assert before downloading a consensus.
It it was even shorter (<4 minutes, I think), caches would
assert too. This patch fixes that by having replacing the
two-minutes value with MIN(2 minutes, interval/16).
Bugfix for 1141; the cache bug could occur since 0.2.0.8-alpha, so
I'm calling this a bugfix on that. Robert Hogan diagnosed this.
Done as a patch against maint-0.2.1, since it makes it hard to
run some kinds of testing networks.
Our code assumed that any version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8l could not
possibly require SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION. This is
so... except that many vendors have backported the flag from later
versions of openssl when they backported the RFC5476 renegotiation
feature.
The new behavior is particularly annoying to detect. Previously,
leaving SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION unset meant that
clients would fail to renegotiate. People noticed that one fast!
Now, OpenSSL's RFC5476 support means that clients will happily talk to
any servers there are, but servers won't accept renegotiation requests
from unpatched clients unless SSL_OP_ALLOW_etc is set. More fun:
servers send back a "no renegotiation for you!" error, which unpatched
clients respond to by stalling, and generally producing no useful
error message.
This might not be _the_ cause of bug 1346, but it is quite likely _a_
cause for bug 1346.
From http://archives.seul.org/tor/relays/Mar-2010/msg00006.html :
As I understand it, the bug should show up on relays that don't set
Address to an IP address (so they need to resolve their Address
line or their hostname to guess their IP address), and their
hostname or Address line fails to resolve -- at that point they'll
pick a random 4 bytes out of memory and call that their address. At
the same time, relays that *do* successfully resolve their address
will ignore the result, and only come up with a useful address if
their interface address happens to be a public IP address.
Treat strings returned from signed_descriptor_get_body_impl() as not
NUL-terminated. Since the length of the strings is available, this is
not a big problem.
Discovered by rieo.
Another dereference-then-NULL-check sequence. No reports of this bug
triggered in the wild. Fixes bugreport 1256.
Thanks to ekir for discovering and reporting this bug.
Fix a dereference-then-NULL-check sequence. This bug wasn't triggered
in the wild, but we should fix it anyways in case it ever happens.
Also make sure users get a note about this being a bug when they
see it in their log.
Thanks to ekir for discovering and reporting this bug.
We used to only zero the first ptrsize bytes of the cipher. Since
cipher is large enough, we didn't zero too many bytes. Discovered
and fixed by ekir. Fixes bug 1254.
This time, set the SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION flag on every
version before OpenSSL 0.9.8l. I can confirm that the option value (0x0010)
wasn't reused until OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3.
Tor has tor_lookup_hostname(), which prefers ipv4 addresses automatically.
Bug 1244 occured because gethostbyname() returned an ipv6 address, which
Tor cannot handle currently. Fixes bug 1244; bugfix on 0.0.2pre25.
Reported by Mike Mestnik.
The problem was that we didn't allocate enough memory on 32-bit
platforms with 64-bit time_t. The memory leak occured every time
we fetched a hidden service descriptor we've fetched before.
In brief: you mustn't use the SSL3_FLAG solution with anything but 0.9.8l,
and you mustn't use the SSL_OP solution with anything before 0.9.8m, and
you get in _real_ trouble if you try to set the flag in 1.0.0beta, since
they use it for something different.
For the ugly version, see my long comment in tortls.c
We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
[backported]
We were checking for msg==NULL, but not lib or proc. This case can
only occur if we have an error whose string we somehow haven't loaded,
but it's worth coding defensively here.
Spotted by rieo on IRC.
Robert Hogan
Robert Ransom
Roger Dingledine
Nick Mathewson
Karsten Loesing
Sebastian Hahn
Peter Palfrader