When we close a connection via connection_close_immediately, we kill
its events immediately. But if it had been blocked on bandwidth
read/write, we could try to re-add its (nonexistent) events later
from connection_bucket_refill -- if we got to that callback before
we swept the marked connections.
Fixes bug 24167. Fortunately, this hasn't been a crash bug since we
introduced connection_check_event in 0.2.9.10, and backported it.
This is a bugfix on commit 89d422914a, I believe, which
appeared in Tor 0.1.0.1-rc.
Commit 56c5e282a7 suppressed that same log
statement in directory_info_has_arrived() for microdescriptors so do the same
for the descriptors. As the commit says, we already have the bootstrap
progress for this.
Fixes#23861
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
evdns is allowed to give us unrecognized object types; it is allowed
to give us non-IPv4 answer types, and it is (even) allowed to give
us empty answers without an error.
Closes ticket 24097.
Due to #23662 this can happen under natural causes and does not disturb
the functionality of the service. This is a simple 0.3.2 fix for now,
and we plan to fix this properly in 0.3.3.
This function -- a mock replacement used only for fuzzing -- would
have a buffer overflow if it got an RSA key whose modulus was under
20 bytes long.
Fortunately, Tor itself does not appear to have a bug here.
Fixes bug 24247; bugfix on 0.3.0.3-alpha when fuzzing was
introduced. Found by OSS-Fuzz; this is OSS-Fuzz issue 4177.
On failure to upload, the HS_DESC event would report "UPLOAD_FAILED" as the
Action but it should have reported "FAILED" according to the spec.
Fixes#24230
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Commit e67f4441eb introduced a safeguard against
using an uninitialized voting schedule object. However, the dirvote_act() code
was looking roughly at the same thing to know if it had to compute the timings
before voting with this condition:
if (!voting_schedule.voting_starts) {
...
dirvote_recalculate_timing(options, now);
}
The sr_init() function is called very early and goes through the safeguard
thus the voting schedule is always initilized before the first vote.
That first vote is a crucial one because we need to have our voting schedule
aligned to the "now" time we are about to use for voting. Then, the schedule
is updated when we publish our consensus or/and when we set a new consensus.
From that point on, we only want to update the voting schedule through that
code flow.
This "created_on_demand" is indicating that the timings have been recalculated
on demand by another subsystem so if it is flagged, we know that we need to
ignore its values before voting.
Fixes#24186
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When we have fewer than 15 descriptors to fetch, we will delay the
fetch for a little while. That's fine, if we can go ahead and build
circuits... but if not, it's a poor choice indeed.
Fixes bug 23985; bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha.
In 0.3.0.3-alpha, when we made primary guard descriptors necessary
for circuit building, this situation got worse.
When calculating the fraction of nodes that have descriptors, and all
all nodes in the network have zero bandwidths, count the number of nodes
instead.
Fixes bug 23318; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha.
Back in 0.2.4.3-alpha (e106812a77), when we switched from using
double to using uint64 for selecting by bandwidth, I got the math
wrong: I should have used llround(x), or (uint64_t)(x+0.5), but
instead I wrote llround(x+0.5). That means we would always round
up, rather than rounding to the closest integer
Fixes bug 23318; bugfix on 0.2.4.3-alpha.
The flush cells process can close a channel if the connection write fails but
still return that it flushed at least one cell. This is due because the error
is not propagated up the call stack so there is no way of knowing if the flush
actually was successful or not.
Because this would require an important refactoring touching multiple
subsystems, this patch is a bandaid to avoid the KIST scheduler to handle
closed channel in its loop.
Bandaid on #23751.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
dirvote_get_next_valid_after_time() is the only public function that uses the
voting schedule outside of the dirvote subsystem so if it is zeroed,
recalculate its timing if we can that is if a consensus exists.
Part of #24161
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Because the HS and SR subsystems can use the voting schedule early (with the
changes in #23623 making the SR subsystem using the static voting schedule
object), we need to recalculate the schedule very early when setting the new
consensus.
Fixes#24161
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Nick Mathewson
David Goulet
George Kadianakis
Karsten Loesing
teor