This commit refactors the existing decryption code to make it compatible with
a new logic for when the client authorization is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously, we encrypted the descriptor without the descriptor cookie. This
commit, when the client auth is enabled, the descriptor cookie is always used.
I also removed the code that is used to generate fake auth clients because it
will not be used anymore.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit tests that the descriptor building result, when the client
authorization is enabled, includes everything that is needed.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The OpenSSL "RSA" object is currently 408 bytes compares to the ASN.1 encoding
which is 140 for a 1024 RSA key.
We save 268 bytes per descriptor (routerinfo_t) *and* microdescriptor
(microdesc_t). Scaling this to 6000 relays, and considering client usually
only have microdescriptors, we save 1.608 MB of RAM which is considerable for
mobile client.
This commit makes it that we keep the RSA onion public key (used for TAP
handshake) in ASN.1 format instead of an OpenSSL RSA object.
Changes is done in both routerinfo_t and microdesc_t.
Closes#27246
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
No behaviour change.
A previous fix to chutney removed v3 onion services from the
mixed+hs-v23 network, so seeing "mixed+hs-v23" in tests is
confusing.
Fixes bug 27345; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
Part of #27215, we need to call the ed_key_init_from_file function during
option_validate() which is before the global_options variable is set.
This commit make ed_key_init_from_file() stop using get_options() and instead
now has a or_options_t parameter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Bug description: For each descriptor, its revision counter is the OPE
ciphertext of the number of seconds since the start time of its SRV value.
This bug caused us to confuse the SRV start time in the middle of the lifetime
of a descriptor in some edge-cases, which caused descriptor rejects.
Bug cause: The bug occurs when we fetch a 23:00 consensus after
midnight (e.g. at 00:08 when not all dirauths have fetched the latest 00:00
consensus). In that case, the voting schedule (which was used for SRV start
time calculation) would return a valid-after past-midnight, whereas our
consensus would be pre-midnight, and that would confuse the SRV start time
computation which is used by HS revision counters (because we would reset the
start time of SRV, without rotating descriptors).
Bug fix: We now use our local consensus time to calculate the SRV start time,
instead of the voting schedule. The voting schedule does not work as originally
envisioned in this case, because it was created for voting by dirauths and not
for scheduling stuff on clients.
Unlike the old test, this test no will no longer mess around with
the forbidden internals of any openssl data structures.
Additionally, it verifies several other behaviors of
tor_tls_cert_matches_key() that we had wanted to verify, such as
the possibility of the certificate's key not matching.
Fixes bug 27226; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
Suphanat Chunhapanya
Nick Mathewson
David Goulet
teor
George Kadianakis
Neel Chauhan
cypherpunks