From f3fdbadfdfeea0fff981303355c3b07f4b1bc718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2003 04:46:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] randomize the initial circ_id and stream_id, so an adversary
 who breaks in part-way through can't learn how many circs/streams have been
 made

svn:r960
---
 src/or/circuit.c    | 2 ++
 src/or/connection.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/or/circuit.c b/src/or/circuit.c
index f26bb95a5e..1b785958db 100644
--- a/src/or/circuit.c
+++ b/src/or/circuit.c
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ circuit_t *circuit_new(uint16_t p_circ_id, connection_t *p_conn) {
   circ->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
   circ->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
 
+  circ->next_stream_id = crypto_pseudo_rand_int(1<<16);
+
   circuit_add(circ);
 
   return circ;
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index 19be1e8a6f..5299e8965c 100644
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ connection_t *connection_new(int type) {
     conn->socks_request = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t));
   }
 
+  conn->next_circ_id = crypto_pseudo_rand_int(1<<15);
+
   conn->timestamp_created = now;
   conn->timestamp_lastread = now;
   conn->timestamp_lastwritten = now;