hs-v3: Disallow single hop client to post/get a descriptor

Closes #24964

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet
2019-06-19 12:02:41 -04:00
parent fdbd139495
commit ef2123c7c7
5 changed files with 102 additions and 8 deletions
+69
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
#include "feature/dircache/dircache.h"
#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
@@ -15,6 +19,10 @@
#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
#include "lib/compress/compress.h"
#include "core/or/circuit_st.h"
#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
@@ -167,6 +175,67 @@ connection_dir_is_encrypted(const dir_connection_t *conn)
return TO_CONN(conn)->linked;
}
/** Return true iff the given directory connection <b>dir_conn</b> is
* anonymous, that is, it is on a circuit via a public relay and not directly
* from a client or bridge.
*
* For client circuits via relays: true for 2-hop+ paths.
* For client circuits via bridges: true for 3-hop+ paths.
*
* This first test if the connection is encrypted since it is a strong
* requirement for anonymity. */
bool
connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *dir_conn)
{
const connection_t *conn, *linked_conn;
const edge_connection_t *edge_conn;
const circuit_t *circ;
tor_assert(dir_conn);
if (!connection_dir_is_encrypted(dir_conn)) {
return false;
}
/*
* Buckle up, we'll do a deep dive into the connection in order to get the
* final connection channel of that connection in order to figure out if
* this is a client or relay link.
*
* We go: dir_conn -> linked_conn -> edge_conn -> on_circuit -> p_chan.
*/
conn = TO_CONN(dir_conn);
linked_conn = conn->linked_conn;
/* The dir connection should be connected to an edge connection. It can not
* be closed or marked for close. */
if (linked_conn == NULL || linked_conn->magic != EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC ||
conn->linked_conn_is_closed || conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not linked to edge");
return false;
}
edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN((connection_t *) linked_conn);
circ = edge_conn->on_circuit;
/* Can't be a circuit we initiated and without a circuit, no channel. */
if (circ == NULL || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not on OR circuit");
return false;
}
/* Get the previous channel to learn if it is a client or relay link. */
if (BUG(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL)) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: no p_chan");
return false;
}
/* Will be true if the channel is an unauthenticated peer which is only true
* for clients and bridges. */
return !channel_is_client(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan);
}
/** Parse an HTTP request line at the start of a headers string. On failure,
* return -1. On success, set *<b>command_out</b> to a copy of the HTTP
* command ("get", "post", etc), set *<b>url_out</b> to a copy of the URL, and
+1
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int parse_http_command(const char *headers,
char *http_get_header(const char *headers, const char *which);
int connection_dir_is_encrypted(const dir_connection_t *conn);
bool connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *conn);
int connection_dir_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn);
int connection_dir_process_inbuf(dir_connection_t *conn);
int connection_dir_finished_flushing(dir_connection_t *conn);