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r15891@tombo: nickm | 2008-01-12 19:20:24 -0500
Basic hacks to get TLS handshakes working: remove dead code; fix post-handshake logic; keep servers from writing while the client is supposed to be renegotiating. This may work. Needs testing. svn:r13122
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
+6
-184
@@ -461,10 +461,8 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
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for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
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uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
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if (v == 1 || v == 2) {
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if (v > highest_supported_version)
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highest_supported_version = v;
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}
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if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
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highest_supported_version = v;
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}
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if (!highest_supported_version) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
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@@ -476,20 +474,15 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
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conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
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#if 0
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/*XXXX020 not right; references dead functions */
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if (highest_supported_version >= 2) {
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if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0 ||
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connection_or_send_cert(conn) < 0) {
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if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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return;
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}
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if (conn->handshake_state->started_here)
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connection_or_send_link_auth(conn);
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} else {
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/* XXXX020 finish v1 verification. */
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/* Should be impossible. */
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tor_fragile_assert();
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}
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#endif
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}
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/** Process a 'netinfo' cell. DOCDOC say more. */
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@@ -577,7 +570,7 @@ connection_or_act_on_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
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if (!conn->handshake_state)
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return -1;
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tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->authenticated != 0);
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tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->received_versions != 0);
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delta = conn->handshake_state->apparent_skew;
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/*XXXX020 magic number 3600 */
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@@ -607,174 +600,3 @@ connection_or_act_on_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
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return 0;
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}
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#if 0
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/*DOCDOC*/
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static void
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command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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int n_certs = 0;
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uint16_t conn_cert_len = 0, id_cert_len = 0;
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const char *conn_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
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const char *cp, *end;
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int done = 0;
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got CERT cell when not handshaking. "
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"Ignoring.");
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return;
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}
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tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
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if (!conn->handshake_state->received_versions ||
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!conn->handshake_state->received_netinfo) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got CERT cell before VERSIONS and "
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"NETINFO. Closing the connection.");
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goto err;
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}
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if (conn->handshake_state->received_certs) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got duplicate CERT cell. "
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"Closing the connection.");
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goto err;
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}
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cp = cell->payload;
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end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
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while (cp < end) {
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uint16_t len;
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if (end-cp == 1)
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goto err;
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len = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
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cp += 2;
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if (end-cp < len)
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goto err;
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if (n_certs == 0) {
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id_cert = cp;
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id_cert_len = len;
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} else if (n_certs == 1) {
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conn_cert = id_cert;
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conn_cert_len = id_cert_len;
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id_cert = cp;
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id_cert_len = len;
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} else {
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goto err;
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}
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cp += len;
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++n_certs;
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}
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/* Now we have 0, 1, or 2 certs. */
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if (n_certs == 0) {
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/* The other side is unauthenticated. */
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done = 1;
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} else {
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int r;
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r = tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, conn->tls,
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conn_cert, conn_cert_len,
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id_cert, id_cert_len,
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&conn->handshake_state->signing_key,
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(conn->handshake_state->started_here ?
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conn->handshake_state->server_cert_digest :
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conn->handshake_state->client_cert_digest),
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&conn->handshake_state->identity_key,
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conn->handshake_state->cert_id_digest);
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if (r < 0)
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goto err;
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if (r == 1) {
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done = 1;
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conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
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}
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}
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conn->handshake_state->received_certs = 1;
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if (done) {
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if (connection_or_finish_or_handshake(conn) < 0)
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goto err;
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}
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if (! conn->handshake_state->signing_key)
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goto err;
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return;
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err:
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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}
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#define LINK_AUTH_STRING "Tor initiator certificate verification"
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/** DOCDOC */
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static void
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command_process_link_auth_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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or_handshake_state_t *s;
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char hmac[DIGEST_LEN];
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uint16_t len;
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size_t sig_len;
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const char *sig;
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char *checked = NULL;
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int checked_len;
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tor_assert(conn);
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if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
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"Received a LINK_AUTH cell on connection in the wrong state; "
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"dropping.");
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return;
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}
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s = conn->handshake_state;
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tor_assert(s);
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if (s->started_here) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
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"Got a LINK_AUTH cell from a server; closing the connection.");
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goto err;
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}
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if (!s->received_netinfo || !s->received_versions || !s->received_certs) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got a LINK_AUTH cell too early; "
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"closing the connection");
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goto err;
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}
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len = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload));
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if (len < 2 || len > CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 2) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad length field (%d) on LINK_AUTH cell;"
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" closing the connection", (int)len);
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goto err;
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}
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if (cell->payload[2] != 0x00) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Unrecognized LINK_AUTH signature "
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"version; closing the connection");
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goto err;
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}
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connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(conn, hmac);
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tor_assert(s->signing_key);
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sig = cell->payload+3;
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sig_len = len-1;
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checked = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(s->signing_key));
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checked_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(s->signing_key,checked,sig,sig_len);
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if (checked_len < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad signature on LINK_AUTH cell; "
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"closing the connection");
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goto err;
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}
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if (checked_len != DIGEST_LEN) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad length (%d) of signed material in "
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"LINK_AUTH cell; closing the connection", checked_len);
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goto err;
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}
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if (memcmp(checked, hmac, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad signed data in LINK_AUTH cell; "
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"closing the connection.");
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goto err;
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}
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s->authenticated = 1;
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if (connection_or_finish_or_handshake(conn)<0)
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goto err;
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tor_free(checked);
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return;
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err:
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tor_free(checked);
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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}
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#endif
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