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Merge branch 'bug16034_no_more_openssl_098_squashed'

Browse Source 
Conflicts:
	src/test/testing_common.c
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2015-05-20 15:33:22 -04:00
parent 32bd533dda e9677c8f8d
commit ed02a409cf
12 changed files with 191 additions and 225 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/common/aes.c
+2 -26
View File
@@ -32,11 +32,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "crypto.h"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
/* See comments about which counter mode implementation to use below. */
#include <openssl/modes.h>
#define CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
#endif
#include "compat.h"
#include "aes.h"
#include "util.h"
@@ -189,11 +185,9 @@ struct aes_cnt_cipher {
* we're testing it or because we have hardware acceleration configured */
static int should_use_EVP = 0;
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
/** True iff we have tested the counter-mode implementation and found that it
* doesn't have the counter-mode bug from OpenSSL 1.0.0. */
static int should_use_openssl_CTR = 0;
#endif
/** Check whether we should use the EVP interface for AES. If <b>force_val</b>
* is nonnegative, we use use EVP iff it is true. Otherwise, we use EVP
@@ -235,7 +229,6 @@ evaluate_evp_for_aes(int force_val)
int
evaluate_ctr_for_aes(void)
{
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
/* Result of encrypting an all-zero block with an all-zero 128-bit AES key.
* This should be the same as encrypting an all-zero block with an all-zero
* 128-bit AES key in counter mode, starting at position 0 of the stream.
@@ -268,10 +261,6 @@ evaluate_ctr_for_aes(void)
"mode; using it.");
should_use_openssl_CTR = 1;
}
#else
log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "This version of OpenSSL has a slow implementation of "
"counter mode; not using it.");
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -356,11 +345,9 @@ aes_set_key(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *key, int key_bits)
cipher->pos = 0;
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
if (should_use_openssl_CTR)
memset(cipher->buf, 0, sizeof(cipher->buf));
else
#endif
aes_fill_buf_(cipher);
}
@@ -386,7 +373,6 @@ aes_cipher_free(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher)
#define UPDATE_CTR_BUF(c, n)
#endif
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
/* Helper function to use EVP with openssl's counter-mode wrapper. */
static void
evp_block128_fn(const uint8_t in[16],
@@ -397,7 +383,6 @@ evp_block128_fn(const uint8_t in[16],
int inl=16, outl=16;
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, in, inl);
}
#endif
/** Encrypt <b>len</b> bytes from <b>input</b>, storing the result in
* <b>output</b>. Uses the key in <b>cipher</b>, and advances the counter
@@ -407,7 +392,6 @@ void
aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
char *output)
{
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
if (should_use_openssl_CTR) {
if (cipher->using_evp) {
/* In openssl 1.0.0, there's an if'd out EVP_aes_128_ctr in evp.h. If
@@ -431,9 +415,7 @@ aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
&cipher->pos);
}
return;
} else
#endif
{
} else {
int c = cipher->pos;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!len)) return;
@@ -466,13 +448,10 @@ aes_crypt(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *input, size_t len,
void
aes_crypt_inplace(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, char *data, size_t len)
{
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
if (should_use_openssl_CTR) {
aes_crypt(cipher, data, len, data);
return;
} else
#endif
{
} else {
int c = cipher->pos;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!len)) return;
@@ -512,11 +491,8 @@ aes_set_iv(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *iv)
cipher->pos = 0;
memcpy(cipher->ctr_buf.buf, iv, 16);
#ifdef CAN_USE_OPENSSL_CTR
if (!should_use_openssl_CTR)
#endif
aes_fill_buf_(cipher);
}
#endif
src/common/crypto.c
+16 -32
View File
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "sandbox.h"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8)
#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0"
#endif
#ifdef ANDROID
@@ -300,16 +300,9 @@ crypto_early_init(void)
SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
}
if (SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) {
log_notice(LD_CRYPTO,
"Your OpenSSL version seems to be %s. We recommend 1.0.0 "
"or later.",
crypto_openssl_get_version_str());
}
crypto_force_rand_ssleay();
if (crypto_seed_rng(1) < 0)
if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0)
return -1;
if (crypto_init_siphash_key() < 0)
return -1;
@@ -391,7 +384,7 @@ crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
}
if (crypto_force_rand_ssleay()) {
if (crypto_seed_rng(1) < 0)
if (crypto_seed_rng() < 0)
return -1;
}
@@ -405,7 +398,11 @@ crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
void
crypto_thread_cleanup(void)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
#else
ERR_remove_state(0);
#endif
}
/** used by tortls.c: wrap an RSA* in a crypto_pk_t. */
@@ -2246,15 +2243,6 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_t *dh)
* work for us too. */
#define ADD_ENTROPY 32
/** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup.
*
* Versions of OpenSSL prior to 0.9.7k and 0.9.8c had a bug where RAND_poll
* would allocate an fd_set on the stack, open a new file, and try to FD_SET
* that fd without checking whether it fit in the fd_set. Thus, if the
* system has not just been started up, it is unsafe to call */
#define RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE \
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'c'))
/** Set the seed of the weak RNG to a random value. */
void
crypto_seed_weak_rng(tor_weak_rng_t *rng)
@@ -2324,7 +2312,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
* have not yet allocated a bunch of fds. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
crypto_seed_rng(int startup)
crypto_seed_rng(void)
{
int rand_poll_ok = 0, load_entropy_ok = 0;
uint8_t buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
@@ -2332,11 +2320,9 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup)
/* OpenSSL has a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of
* entropy than we do. We'll try calling that, *and* calling our own entropy
* functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */
if (startup || RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE) {
rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll();
if (rand_poll_ok == 0)
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed.");
}
rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll();
if (rand_poll_ok == 0)
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed.");
load_entropy_ok = !crypto_strongest_rand(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (load_entropy_ok) {
@@ -3058,13 +3044,11 @@ openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *v,
tor_free(v);
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
static void
tor_set_openssl_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *threadid)
{
CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(threadid, tor_get_thread_id());
}
#endif
/** @{ */
/** Helper: Construct mutexes, and set callbacks to help OpenSSL handle being
@@ -3079,11 +3063,7 @@ setup_openssl_threading(void)
for (i=0; i < n; ++i)
openssl_mutexes_[i] = tor_mutex_new();
CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(openssl_locking_cb_);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
CRYPTO_set_id_callback(tor_get_thread_id);
#else
CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(tor_set_openssl_thread_id);
#endif
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(openssl_dynlock_create_cb_);
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(openssl_dynlock_lock_cb_);
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_);
@@ -3096,7 +3076,11 @@ int
crypto_global_cleanup(void)
{
EVP_cleanup();
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
#else
ERR_remove_state(0);
#endif
ERR_free_strings();
if (dh_param_p)
src/common/crypto.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len);
/* random numbers */
int crypto_seed_rng(int startup);
int crypto_seed_rng(void);
MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
src/common/tortls.c
+151 -151
View File
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@
#include "container.h"
#include <string.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8)
#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0"
#endif
/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake.
@@ -93,10 +93,8 @@
#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || \
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && \
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')))
/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8s/1.0.0f. It does not have
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
* the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
* SSL3 safely at the same time.
*/
@@ -114,13 +112,6 @@
#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
#endif
/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
* SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 0;
/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
* SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 0;
/** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */
struct tor_cert_t {
X509 *cert;
@@ -485,56 +476,6 @@ tor_tls_init(void)
version = SSLeay();
/* OpenSSL 0.9.8l introduced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
* here, but without thinking too hard about it: it turns out that the
* flag in question needed to be set at the last minute, and that it
* conflicted with an existing flag number that had already been added
* in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 betas. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully replaced
* the flag with an option and (it seems) broke anything that used
* SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need to know how to do both,
* and we mustn't use the SSL3_FLAGS option with anything besides
* OpenSSL 0.9.8l.
*
* No, we can't just set flag 0x0010 everywhere. It breaks Tor with
* OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3 and later. On the other hand, we might be able to
* set option 0x00040000L everywhere.
*
* No, we can't simply detect whether the flag or the option is present
* in the headers at build-time: some vendors (notably Apple) like to
* leave their headers out of sync with their libraries.
*
* Yes, it _is_ almost as if the OpenSSL developers decided that no
* program should be allowed to use renegotiation unless it first passed
* a test of intelligence and determination.
*/
if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k') && version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l, but "
"some vendors have backported renegotiation code from "
"0.9.8m without updating the version number. "
"I will try SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP to enable renegotation.",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; "
"I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else if (version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k')) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s [%lx] looks like it's older than "
"0.9.8l, but some vendors have backported 0.9.8l's "
"renegotiation code to earlier versions, and some have "
"backported the code from 0.9.8m or 0.9.8n. I'll set both "
"SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP just to be safe.",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else {
/* this is dead code, yes? */
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s has version %lx",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
}
#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
@@ -1327,24 +1268,6 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
}
#endif
/* XXX This block is now obsolete. */
if (
#ifdef DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
1 ||
#endif
SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') ||
(SSLeay() >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) &&
SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) {
/* And not SSL3 if it's subject to CVE-2011-4576. */
log_info(LD_NET, "Disabling SSLv3 because this OpenSSL version "
"might otherwise be vulnerable to CVE-2011-4576 "
"(compile-time version %08lx (%s); "
"runtime version %08lx (%s))",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
(unsigned long)SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
}
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
@@ -1355,16 +1278,21 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*/
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
{
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */
if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
#endif
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
@@ -1399,8 +1327,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, crypto_dh_get_dh_(dh));
crypto_dh_free(dh);
}
#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
if (! is_client) {
int nid;
EC_KEY *ec_key;
@@ -1512,10 +1439,23 @@ static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
* return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
static int
find_cipher_by_id(const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,2)
{
unsigned char cipherid[3];
tor_assert(ssl);
set_uint16(cipherid, htons(cipher));
cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
* with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
* cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
if (c)
tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
return c != NULL;
}
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
unsigned char cipherid[3];
set_uint16(cipherid, htons(cipher));
@@ -1528,6 +1468,7 @@ find_cipher_by_id(const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
return c != NULL;
} else
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
/* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
* removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a
@@ -1541,23 +1482,24 @@ find_cipher_by_id(const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
}
}
return 0;
} else {
return 1; /* No way to search */
}
#endif
(void) ssl;
return 1; /* No way to search */
}
/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
* comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
* result. */
static void
prune_v2_cipher_list(void)
prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
{
uint16_t *inp, *outp;
const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
while (*inp) {
if (find_cipher_by_id(m, *inp)) {
if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
*outp++ = *inp++;
} else {
inp++;
@@ -1579,7 +1521,7 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
int i, res;
tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
prune_v2_cipher_list();
prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
@@ -1613,7 +1555,7 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
uint16_t id = cipher->id & 0xffff;
uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
continue;
if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
@@ -1657,13 +1599,39 @@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
static int
tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
{
SSL_SESSION *session;
if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
return CIPHERS_ERR;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, session->ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
{
SSL_SESSION *session;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *c1;
int i;
if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
return CIPHERS_ERR;
}
c1 = session->ciphers;
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(c1) != sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Whoops. session->ciphers doesn't "
"match SSL_get_ciphers()");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(c1); ++i) {
SSL_CIPHER *a = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
SSL_CIPHER *b = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(c1, i);
unsigned long a_id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(a);
unsigned long b_id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(b);
if (a_id != b_id) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Cipher mismatch between session->ciphers and "
"SSL_get_ciphers() at %d: %lx vs %lx", i,
a_id, b_id);
}
}
}
#endif
return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
}
/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
@@ -1676,14 +1644,17 @@ static void
tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
{
tor_tls_t *tls;
int ssl_state;
(void) val;
tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
return;
if ((ssl->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) &&
(ssl->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B))
ssl_state = SSL_state(ssl);
if ((ssl_state != SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) &&
(ssl_state != SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B))
return;
tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
@@ -1714,10 +1685,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
if (tls) {
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag)
tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
#endif
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
}
@@ -1725,7 +1692,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
}
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
* the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
*
@@ -1763,9 +1729,6 @@ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
}
#else
#define tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tls) STMT_NIL
#endif
/** Explain which ciphers we're missing. */
static void
@@ -1791,21 +1754,46 @@ log_unsupported_ciphers(smartlist_t *unsupported)
tor_free(joined);
}
/** Replace *<b>ciphers</b> with a new list of SSL ciphersuites: specifically,
* a list designed to mimic a common web browser. We might not be able to do
* that if OpenSSL doesn't support all the ciphers we want. Some of the
* ciphers in the list won't actually be implemented by OpenSSL: that's okay
* so long as the server doesn't select them.
static void
set_ssl_ciphers_to_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *stack)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
int r, i;
/* #1: ensure that the ssl object has its own list of ciphers. Otherwise we
* might be about to stomp the SSL_CTX ciphers list. */
r = SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "HIGH");
tor_assert(r);
/* #2: Grab ssl_ciphers and clear it. */
ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
tor_assert(ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
/* #3: Copy the elements from stack. */
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(stack); ++i) {
SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(stack, i);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, c);
}
}
/** Replace the ciphers on <b>ssl</b> with a new list of SSL ciphersuites:
* specifically, a list designed to mimic a common web browser. We might not
* be able to do that if OpenSSL doesn't support all the ciphers we want.
* Some of the ciphers in the list won't actually be implemented by OpenSSL:
* that's okay so long as the server doesn't select them.
*
* [If the server <b>does</b> select a bogus cipher, we won't crash or
* anything; we'll just fail later when we try to look up the cipher in
* ssl->cipher_list_by_id.]
*/
static void
rectify_client_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **ciphers)
rectify_client_ciphers(SSL *ssl)
{
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)) {
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
/* We need to set CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK to an array of the ciphers
* we want to use/advertise. */
int i = 0, j = 0;
@@ -1826,32 +1814,33 @@ rectify_client_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **ciphers)
tor_assert(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
log_debug(LD_NET, "List was: %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST);
for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers); ++j) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
log_debug(LD_NET, "Cipher %d: %lx %s", j, cipher->id, cipher->name);
for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); ++j) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
log_debug(LD_NET, "Cipher %d: %lx %s", j,
SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
}
/* Then copy as many ciphers as we can from the good list, inserting
* dummies as needed. Let j be an index into list of ciphers we have
* (*ciphers) and let i be an index into the ciphers we want
* (ciphers) and let i be an index into the ciphers we want
* (CLIENT_INFO_CIPHER_LIST). We are building a list of ciphers in
* CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK.
*/
for (i = j = 0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
if (j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers))
cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
if (cipher && ((cipher->id >> 24) & 0xff) != 3) {
if (j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers))
cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
if (cipher && ((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) >> 24) & 0xff) != 3) {
/* Skip over non-v3 ciphers entirely. (This should no longer be
* needed, thanks to saying !SSLv2 above.) */
log_debug(LD_NET, "Skipping v%d cipher %s",
(int)((cipher->id>>24) & 0xff),
cipher->name);
(int)((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher)>>24) & 0xff),
SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
++j;
} else if (cipher &&
(cipher->id & 0xffff) == CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id) {
(SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff) == CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id) {
/* "cipher" is the cipher we expect. Put it on the list. */
log_debug(LD_NET, "Found cipher %s", cipher->name);
log_debug(LD_NET, "Found cipher %s", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, cipher);
++j;
++i;
@@ -1877,12 +1866,10 @@ rectify_client_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **ciphers)
smartlist_free(unsupported);
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*ciphers);
*ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
tor_assert(*ciphers);
set_ssl_ciphers_to_list(ssl, CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
#else
(void)ciphers;
(void)ciphers;
#endif
}
@@ -1926,7 +1913,7 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
goto err;
}
if (!isServer)
rectify_client_ciphers(&result->ssl->cipher_list);
rectify_client_ciphers(result->ssl);
result->socket = sock;
bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (! bio) {
@@ -2019,13 +2006,8 @@ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
}
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
@@ -2035,21 +2017,19 @@ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
void
tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
#else
(void) tls;
#endif
}
/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
void
tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
tor_assert(0 != (tls->ssl->s3->flags &
SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
@@ -2180,7 +2160,7 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
check_no_tls_errors();
oldstate = tls->ssl->state;
oldstate = SSL_state(tls->ssl);
if (tls->isServer) {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
@@ -2190,7 +2170,7 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
}
if (oldstate != tls->ssl->state)
if (oldstate != SSL_state(tls->ssl))
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
/* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
@@ -2209,6 +2189,14 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
return r;
}
/* SSL_clear_mode was introduced in 0.9.8m */
#ifndef SSL_clear_mode
static void SSL_clear_mode(SSL *s, unsigned long m)
{
s->mode &= ~m;
}
#endif
/** Perform the final part of the intial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
* should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
* or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
@@ -2225,8 +2213,7 @@ tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
if (tls->isServer) {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
/* There doesn't seem to be a clear OpenSSL API to clear mode flags. */
tls->ssl->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
/* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
@@ -2851,12 +2838,23 @@ tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
* Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
* buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
* Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
* buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used. */
void
* buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
int
tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
(void)tls;
(void)rbuf_capacity;
(void)rbuf_bytes;
(void)wbuf_capacity;
(void)wbuf_bytes;
return -1;
#else
if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
*rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
else
@@ -2867,6 +2865,8 @@ tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
*wbuf_capacity = 0;
*rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
*wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
return 0;
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
src/common/tortls.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ size_t tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls);
void tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls,
size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written);
void tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
int tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes);
src/or/main.c
+8 -7
View File
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
if (time_to.add_entropy < now) {
if (time_to.add_entropy) {
/* We already seeded once, so don't die on failure. */
crypto_seed_rng(0);
crypto_seed_rng();
}
/** How often do we add more entropy to OpenSSL's RNG pool? */
#define ENTROPY_INTERVAL (60*60)
@@ -2333,12 +2333,13 @@ dumpstats(int severity)
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
if (or_conn->tls) {
tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(or_conn->tls, &rbuf_cap, &rbuf_len,
&wbuf_cap, &wbuf_len);
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
"Conn %d: %d/%d bytes used on OpenSSL read buffer; "
"%d/%d bytes used on write buffer.",
i, (int)rbuf_len, (int)rbuf_cap, (int)wbuf_len, (int)wbuf_cap);
if (tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(or_conn->tls, &rbuf_cap, &rbuf_len,
&wbuf_cap, &wbuf_len) == 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
"Conn %d: %d/%d bytes used on OpenSSL read buffer; "
"%d/%d bytes used on write buffer.",
i, (int)rbuf_len, (int)rbuf_cap, (int)wbuf_len, (int)wbuf_cap);
}
}
}
}
src/test/bench.c
+2 -3
View File
@@ -502,8 +502,7 @@ bench_dh(void)
" %f millisec each.\n", NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e6);
}
#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
&& OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
#define HAVE_EC_BENCHMARKS
static void
bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name)
@@ -625,7 +624,7 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
reset_perftime();
crypto_seed_rng(1);
crypto_seed_rng();
crypto_init_siphash_key();
options = options_new();
init_logging(1);
src/test/test_crypto.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ test_crypto_rng(void *arg)
/* Try out RNG. */
(void)arg;
tt_assert(! crypto_seed_rng(0));
tt_assert(! crypto_seed_rng());
crypto_rand(data1, 100);
crypto_rand(data2, 100);
tt_mem_op(data1,OP_NE, data2,100);
src/test/test_workqueue.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
init_logging(1);
crypto_global_init(1, NULL, NULL);
crypto_seed_rng(1);
crypto_seed_rng();
rq = replyqueue_new(as_flags);
tor_assert(rq);
src/test/testing_common.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ main(int c, const char **v)
return 1;
}
crypto_set_tls_dh_prime();
crypto_seed_rng(1);
crypto_seed_rng();
rep_hist_init();
network_init();
setup_directory();
src/tools/tor-gencert.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't initialize crypto library.\n");
return 1;
}
if (crypto_seed_rng(1)) {
if (crypto_seed_rng()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't seed RNG.\n");
goto done;
}