mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-12-06 19:41:15 +01:00
Proposal 152 implementation from Josh Albrecht, with tweaks.
svn:r16983
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1197,6 +1197,8 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime,
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connections = get_connection_array();
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/* XXXX021 Respect ExcludeSingleHopRelays here. */
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/* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
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* We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
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*/
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@@ -2458,6 +2460,8 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
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consider_exit_family = 1;
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}
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/* XXXX021 Respect ExcludeSingleHopRelays here. */
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if (!entry_guards)
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entry_guards = smartlist_create();
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@@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
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V(Address, STRING, NULL),
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V(AllowInvalidNodes, CSV, "middle,rendezvous"),
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V(AllowNonRFC953Hostnames, BOOL, "0"),
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V(AllowSingleHopCircuits, BOOL, "0"),
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V(AllowSingleHopExits, BOOL, "0"),
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V(AlternateBridgeAuthority, LINELIST, NULL),
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V(AlternateDirAuthority, LINELIST, NULL),
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V(AlternateHSAuthority, LINELIST, NULL),
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@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
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V(TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime, INTERVAL, "10 minutes"),
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V(ExcludeNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL),
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V(ExcludeExitNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL),
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V(ExcludeSingleHopRelays, BOOL, "1"),
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V(ExitNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL),
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V(ExitPolicy, LINELIST, NULL),
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V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "1"),
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@@ -2498,8 +2498,10 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
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tor_free(address);
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return 0;
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}
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if (or_circ && or_circ->is_first_hop) {
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/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy; it attracts attackers
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if (or_circ && or_circ->is_first_hop &&
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!get_options()->AllowSingleHopExits) {
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/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
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* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
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* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
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*/
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log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
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+18
-3
@@ -2324,11 +2324,26 @@ handle_control_attachstream(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
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conn);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Is this a single hop circuit? */
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if (circ && (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ)<2 || hop==1)) {
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connection_write_str_to_buf(
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"551 Can't attach stream to one-hop circuit.\r\n", conn);
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return 0;
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routerinfo_t *r = NULL;
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char* exit_digest;
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if (circ->build_state &&
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circ->build_state->chosen_exit &&
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circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest) {
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exit_digest = circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest;
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r = router_get_by_digest(exit_digest);
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}
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/* Do both the client and relay allow one-hop exit circuits? */
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if (!r || !r->allow_single_hop_exits ||
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!get_options()->AllowSingleHopCircuits) {
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connection_write_str_to_buf(
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"551 Can't attach stream to this one-hop circuit.\r\n", conn);
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return 0;
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}
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ap_conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(hex_str(exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
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}
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if (circ && hop>0) {
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/* find this hop in the circuit, and set cpath */
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cpath = circuit_get_cpath_hop(circ, hop);
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+12
@@ -1357,6 +1357,8 @@ typedef struct {
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* dnsworker code. */
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unsigned int caches_extra_info:1; /**< Whether the router caches and serves
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* extrainfo documents. */
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unsigned int allow_single_hop_exits:1; /**< Whether the router allows
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* single hop exits. */
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/* local info */
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unsigned int is_running:1; /**< As far as we know, is this OR currently
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@@ -2420,6 +2422,16 @@ typedef struct {
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* if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
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int DownloadExtraInfo;
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/** If true, and we are acting as a relay, allow exit circuits even when
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* we are the first hop of a circuit. */
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int AllowSingleHopExits;
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/** If true, don't allow relays with AllowSingleHopExits=1 to be used in
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* circuits that we build. */
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int ExcludeSingleHopRelays;
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/** If true, and the controller tells us to use a one-hop circuit, and the
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* exit allows it, we use it. */
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int AllowSingleHopCircuits;
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/** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
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* to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
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* Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
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+3
-2
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router,
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"opt extra-info-digest %s\n%s"
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"onion-key\n%s"
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"signing-key\n%s"
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"%s%s%s",
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"%s%s%s%s",
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router->nickname,
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router->address,
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router->or_port,
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@@ -1704,7 +1704,8 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router,
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onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
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family_line,
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we_are_hibernating() ? "opt hibernating 1\n" : "",
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options->HidServDirectoryV2 ? "opt hidden-service-dir\n" : "");
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options->HidServDirectoryV2 ? "opt hidden-service-dir\n" : "",
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options->AllowSingleHopExits ? "opt allow-single-hop-exits\n" : "");
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tor_free(family_line);
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tor_free(onion_pkey);
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@@ -1767,6 +1767,16 @@ router_choose_random_node(const char *preferred,
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excludednodes = smartlist_create();
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/* Exclude relays that allow single hop exit circuits, if the user
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* wants to (such relays might be risky) */
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if (get_options()->ExcludeSingleHopRelays) {
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routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
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if (r->allow_single_hop_exits) {
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smartlist_add(excludednodes, r);
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});
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}
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if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
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smartlist_add(excludednodes, r);
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routerlist_add_family(excludednodes, r);
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@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ typedef enum {
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K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST,
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K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO,
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K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR,
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K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS,
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K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATE_VERSION,
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K_DIR_IDENTITY_KEY,
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@@ -239,6 +240,7 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = {
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T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
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T01("extra-info-digest", K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
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T01("hidden-service-dir", K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
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T01("allow-single-hop-exits",K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
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T01("family", K_FAMILY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
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T01("caches-extra-info", K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
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@@ -1363,6 +1365,9 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
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if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO)))
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router->caches_extra_info = 1;
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if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS)))
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router->allow_single_hop_exits = 1;
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if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST))) {
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tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
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if (strlen(tok->args[0]) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
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