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Reduce log level for someone else sending us weak DH keys.

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See task 1114. The most plausible explanation for someone sending us weak
DH keys is that they experiment with their Tor code or implement a new Tor
client. Usually, we don't care about such events, especially not on warn
level. If we really care about someone not following the Tor protocol, we
can set ProtocolWarnings to 1.
This commit is contained in:
Karsten Loesing
2009-10-25 23:47:05 -07:00
parent fa23430496
commit d2b4b49ff0
6 changed files with 23 additions and 19 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/or/onion.c
+6 -4
View File
@@ -253,8 +253,9 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin, /*ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN*/
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
key_material, key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
goto err;
@@ -304,8 +305,9 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(handshake_state, handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN,
key_material, key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
key_material_len);
if (len < 0)
goto err;
src/or/rendclient.c
+3 -2
View File
@@ -621,8 +621,9 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, request, DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, hop->dh_handshake_state,
request, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
goto err;
}
src/or/rendservice.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;