Add Ed25519 support, wrappers, and tests.

Taken from earlier ed25519 branch based on floodyberry's
ed25519-donna.  Tweaked so that it applies to ref10 instead.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2013-09-29 13:30:24 -04:00
parent b2acd3580c
commit 87ba033cd5
8 changed files with 483 additions and 14 deletions
+30 -12
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@@ -63,6 +63,34 @@ curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
}
/**
* Generate CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN random bytes in <b>out</b>. If
* <b>extra_strong</b> is true, this key is possibly going to get used more
* than once, so use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on
* failure.
*
* This function does not adjust the output of the RNG at all; the will caller
* will need to clear or set the appropriate bits to make curve25519 work.
*/
int
curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
{
uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
if (crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
return -1;
if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
* just in case the extra-strong entropy is less amazing than we hoped. */
crypto_hmac_sha256((char*) out,
(const char *)k_tmp, sizeof(k_tmp),
(const char *)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
}
memwipe(k_tmp, 0, sizeof(k_tmp));
return 0;
}
/** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
* is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
* use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
@@ -70,19 +98,9 @@ int
curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
int extra_strong)
{
uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
if (crypto_rand((char*)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
if (curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(key_out->secret_key, extra_strong) < 0)
return -1;
if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
* just in case the extra-strong entropy is less amazing than we hoped. */
crypto_hmac_sha256((char *)key_out->secret_key,
(const char *)k_tmp, sizeof(k_tmp),
(const char *)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
}
memwipe(k_tmp, 0, sizeof(k_tmp));
key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
+2
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@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ int curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
char **tag_out,
const char *fname);
int curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong);
#ifdef CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
STATIC int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
const uint8_t *basepoint);
+181
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@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* Wrapper code for an ed25519 implementation. */
#include "orconfig.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include "crypto.h"
#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
#include "torlog.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h"
int
ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
int extra_strong)
{
(void) extra_strong;
if (ed25519_ref10_seckey(seckey_out->seckey) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
{
if (ed25519_ref10_pubkey(pubkey_out->pubkey, seckey->seckey) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** Generate a new ed25519 keypair in <b>keypair_out</b>. If
* <b>extra_strong</b> is set, try to mix some system entropy into the key
* generation process. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
int
ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
{
(void) extra_strong;
if (ed25519_ref10_keygen(keypair_out->pubkey.pubkey,
keypair_out->seckey.seckey)<0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/**
* Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
* <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
*/
int
ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair)
{
uint8_t keys[64];
uint8_t *tmp;
uint64_t tmplen;
/* XXXX Make crypto_sign in ref10 friendlier so we don't need this stupid
* copying. */
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
tmplen = ((uint64_t)len) + 64;
tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
memcpy(keys, keypair->seckey.seckey, 32);
memcpy(keys+32, keypair->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
if (ed25519_ref10_sign(tmp, &tmplen, msg, len, keys) < 0) {
tor_free(tmp);
return -1;
}
memcpy(signature_out->sig, tmp, 64);
memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
tor_free(tmp);
return 0;
}
/**
* Check whether if <b>signature</b> is a valid signature for the
* <b>len</b>-byte message in <b>msg</b> made with the key <b>pubkey</b>.
*
* Return 0 if the signature is valid; -1 if it isn't.
*/
int
ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
{
uint8_t *smtmp;
uint8_t *tmp;
uint64_t tmplen;
int r;
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
tmplen = len + 64;
tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
smtmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
memcpy(smtmp, signature->sig, 64);
memcpy(smtmp+64, msg, len);
r = ed25519_ref10_open(tmp, &tmplen, smtmp, tmplen, pubkey->pubkey);
tor_free(tmp);
tor_free(smtmp);
return r;
}
/** Validate every signature among those in <b>checkable</b>, which contains
* exactly <b>n_checkable</b> elements. If <b>okay_out</b> is non-NULL, set
* the i'th element of <b>okay_out</b> to 1 if the i'th element of
* <b>checkable</b> is valid, and to 0 otherwise. Return 0 if every signature
* was valid. Otherwise return -N, where N is the number of invalid
* signatures.
*/
int
ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
int n_checkable)
{
int res, i;
res = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i];
int r = ed25519_checksig(&ch->signature, ch->msg, ch->len, ch->pubkey);
if (r < 0)
--res;
if (okay_out)
okay_out[i] = (r == 0);
}
#if 0
const uint8_t **ms;
size_t *lens;
const uint8_t **pks;
const uint8_t **sigs;
int *oks;
ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable);
pks = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
sigs = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
oks = okay_out ? okay_out : tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*n_checkable);
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
ms[i] = checkable[i].msg;
lens[i] = checkable[i].len;
pks[i] = checkable[i].pubkey->pubkey;
sigs[i] = checkable[i].signature.sig;
oks[i] = 0;
}
ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
res = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
if (!oks[i])
--res;
}
tor_free(ms);
tor_free(lens);
tor_free(pks);
if (! okay_out)
tor_free(oks);
#endif
return res;
}
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#ifndef TOR_CRYPTO_ED25519_H
#define TOR_CRYPTO_ED25519_H
#include "testsupport.h"
#include "torint.h"
#define ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN 32
#define ED25519_SECKEY_LEN 32
#define ED25519_SIG_LEN 64
/** An Ed25519 signature. */
typedef struct {
uint8_t sig[ED25519_SIG_LEN];
} ed25519_signature_t;
/** An Ed25519 public key */
typedef struct {
uint8_t pubkey[ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
} ed25519_public_key_t;
/** An Ed25519 secret key */
typedef struct {
uint8_t seckey[ED25519_SECKEY_LEN];
} ed25519_secret_key_t;
/** An Ed25519 keypair. */
typedef struct {
ed25519_public_key_t pubkey;
ed25519_secret_key_t seckey;
} ed25519_keypair_t;
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
int ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
int extra_strong);
int ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey);
int ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong);
int ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_keypair_t *key);
int ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey);
/**
* A collection of information necessary to check an Ed25519 signature. Used
* for batch verification.
*/
typedef struct {
/** The public key that supposedly generated the signature. */
ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey;
/** The signature to check. */
ed25519_signature_t signature;
/** The message that the signature is supposed to have been applied to. */
const uint8_t *msg;
/** The length of the message. */
size_t len;
} ed25519_checkable_t;
int ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
int n_checkable);
#endif
/* XXXX write secret keys to disk, load secret keys from disk, read encrypted,
* write encrypted. serialize public. parse public. */
#endif
+6 -1
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@@ -52,8 +52,12 @@ LIBDONNA=
endif
endif
LIBDONNA += $(LIBED25519_REF10)
if CURVE25519_ENABLED
libcrypto_extra_source=src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
libcrypto_extra_source = \
src/common/crypto_curve25519.c \
src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
endif
LIBOR_A_SOURCES = \
@@ -110,6 +114,7 @@ COMMONHEADERS = \
src/common/container.h \
src/common/crypto.h \
src/common/crypto_curve25519.h \
src/common/crypto_ed25519.h \
src/common/di_ops.h \
src/common/memarea.h \
src/common/linux_syscalls.inc \