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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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Add Ed25519 support, wrappers, and tests.
Taken from earlier ed25519 branch based on floodyberry's ed25519-donna. Tweaked so that it applies to ref10 instead.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -63,6 +63,34 @@ curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
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return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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}
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/**
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* Generate CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN random bytes in <b>out</b>. If
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* <b>extra_strong</b> is true, this key is possibly going to get used more
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* than once, so use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on
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* failure.
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*
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* This function does not adjust the output of the RNG at all; the will caller
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* will need to clear or set the appropriate bits to make curve25519 work.
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*/
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int
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curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
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{
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uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
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if (crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
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return -1;
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if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
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/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
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* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
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* just in case the extra-strong entropy is less amazing than we hoped. */
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crypto_hmac_sha256((char*) out,
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(const char *)k_tmp, sizeof(k_tmp),
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(const char *)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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}
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memwipe(k_tmp, 0, sizeof(k_tmp));
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return 0;
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}
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/** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
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* is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
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* use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
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@@ -70,19 +98,9 @@ int
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curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN];
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if (crypto_rand((char*)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0)
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if (curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(key_out->secret_key, extra_strong) < 0)
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return -1;
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if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
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/* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an
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* HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly,
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* just in case the extra-strong entropy is less amazing than we hoped. */
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crypto_hmac_sha256((char *)key_out->secret_key,
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(const char *)k_tmp, sizeof(k_tmp),
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(const char *)key_out->secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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}
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memwipe(k_tmp, 0, sizeof(k_tmp));
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key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
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key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
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key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
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@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ int curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
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char **tag_out,
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const char *fname);
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int curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong);
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#ifdef CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
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STATIC int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
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const uint8_t *basepoint);
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@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
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/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* Wrapper code for an ed25519 implementation. */
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#include "orconfig.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
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#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
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#include "torlog.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h"
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int
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ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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(void) extra_strong;
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if (ed25519_ref10_seckey(seckey_out->seckey) < 0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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int
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ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
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const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
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{
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if (ed25519_ref10_pubkey(pubkey_out->pubkey, seckey->seckey) < 0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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/** Generate a new ed25519 keypair in <b>keypair_out</b>. If
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* <b>extra_strong</b> is set, try to mix some system entropy into the key
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* generation process. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
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int
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ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
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{
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(void) extra_strong;
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if (ed25519_ref10_keygen(keypair_out->pubkey.pubkey,
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keypair_out->seckey.seckey)<0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
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* <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
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*/
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int
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ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
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const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
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const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair)
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{
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uint8_t keys[64];
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uint8_t *tmp;
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uint64_t tmplen;
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/* XXXX Make crypto_sign in ref10 friendlier so we don't need this stupid
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* copying. */
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tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
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tmplen = ((uint64_t)len) + 64;
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tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
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memcpy(keys, keypair->seckey.seckey, 32);
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memcpy(keys+32, keypair->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
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if (ed25519_ref10_sign(tmp, &tmplen, msg, len, keys) < 0) {
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tor_free(tmp);
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(signature_out->sig, tmp, 64);
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memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
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tor_free(tmp);
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Check whether if <b>signature</b> is a valid signature for the
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* <b>len</b>-byte message in <b>msg</b> made with the key <b>pubkey</b>.
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*
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* Return 0 if the signature is valid; -1 if it isn't.
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*/
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int
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ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
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const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
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const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
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{
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uint8_t *smtmp;
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uint8_t *tmp;
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uint64_t tmplen;
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int r;
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tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
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tmplen = len + 64;
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tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
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smtmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
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memcpy(smtmp, signature->sig, 64);
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memcpy(smtmp+64, msg, len);
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r = ed25519_ref10_open(tmp, &tmplen, smtmp, tmplen, pubkey->pubkey);
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tor_free(tmp);
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tor_free(smtmp);
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return r;
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}
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/** Validate every signature among those in <b>checkable</b>, which contains
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* exactly <b>n_checkable</b> elements. If <b>okay_out</b> is non-NULL, set
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* the i'th element of <b>okay_out</b> to 1 if the i'th element of
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* <b>checkable</b> is valid, and to 0 otherwise. Return 0 if every signature
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* was valid. Otherwise return -N, where N is the number of invalid
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* signatures.
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*/
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int
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ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
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const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
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int n_checkable)
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{
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int res, i;
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res = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
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const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i];
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int r = ed25519_checksig(&ch->signature, ch->msg, ch->len, ch->pubkey);
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if (r < 0)
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--res;
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if (okay_out)
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okay_out[i] = (r == 0);
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}
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#if 0
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const uint8_t **ms;
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size_t *lens;
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const uint8_t **pks;
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const uint8_t **sigs;
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int *oks;
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ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
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lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable);
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pks = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
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sigs = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
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oks = okay_out ? okay_out : tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*n_checkable);
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for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
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ms[i] = checkable[i].msg;
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lens[i] = checkable[i].len;
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pks[i] = checkable[i].pubkey->pubkey;
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sigs[i] = checkable[i].signature.sig;
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oks[i] = 0;
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}
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ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
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res = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
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if (!oks[i])
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--res;
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}
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tor_free(ms);
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tor_free(lens);
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tor_free(pks);
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if (! okay_out)
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tor_free(oks);
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#endif
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return res;
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
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/* Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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#ifndef TOR_CRYPTO_ED25519_H
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#define TOR_CRYPTO_ED25519_H
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#include "testsupport.h"
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#include "torint.h"
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#define ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN 32
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#define ED25519_SECKEY_LEN 32
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#define ED25519_SIG_LEN 64
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/** An Ed25519 signature. */
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typedef struct {
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uint8_t sig[ED25519_SIG_LEN];
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} ed25519_signature_t;
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/** An Ed25519 public key */
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typedef struct {
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uint8_t pubkey[ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
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} ed25519_public_key_t;
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/** An Ed25519 secret key */
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typedef struct {
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uint8_t seckey[ED25519_SECKEY_LEN];
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} ed25519_secret_key_t;
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/** An Ed25519 keypair. */
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typedef struct {
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ed25519_public_key_t pubkey;
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ed25519_secret_key_t seckey;
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} ed25519_keypair_t;
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#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
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int ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
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int extra_strong);
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int ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
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const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey);
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int ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong);
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int ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
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const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
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const ed25519_keypair_t *key);
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int ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
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const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
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const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey);
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/**
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* A collection of information necessary to check an Ed25519 signature. Used
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* for batch verification.
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*/
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typedef struct {
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/** The public key that supposedly generated the signature. */
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ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey;
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/** The signature to check. */
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ed25519_signature_t signature;
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/** The message that the signature is supposed to have been applied to. */
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const uint8_t *msg;
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/** The length of the message. */
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size_t len;
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} ed25519_checkable_t;
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int ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
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const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
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int n_checkable);
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#endif
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/* XXXX write secret keys to disk, load secret keys from disk, read encrypted,
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* write encrypted. serialize public. parse public. */
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#endif
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@@ -52,8 +52,12 @@ LIBDONNA=
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endif
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endif
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LIBDONNA += $(LIBED25519_REF10)
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if CURVE25519_ENABLED
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libcrypto_extra_source=src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
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libcrypto_extra_source = \
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src/common/crypto_curve25519.c \
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src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
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endif
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LIBOR_A_SOURCES = \
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@@ -110,6 +114,7 @@ COMMONHEADERS = \
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src/common/container.h \
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src/common/crypto.h \
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src/common/crypto_curve25519.h \
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src/common/crypto_ed25519.h \
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src/common/di_ops.h \
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src/common/memarea.h \
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src/common/linux_syscalls.inc \
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