Add logic in routerparse to not read overlong private keys

I am not at all sure that it is possible to trigger a bug here,
but better safe than sorry.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
2011-01-10 12:07:34 -05:00
parent 045e6ebd31
commit 729f404efe
4 changed files with 13 additions and 11 deletions
+8 -6
View File
@@ -439,21 +439,23 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
return 0;
}
/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the string <b>s</b> into <b>env</b>.
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b>
* into <b>env</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1,
* the string is nul-terminated.
*/
/* Used here, and used for testing. */
int
crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *s)
const char *s, ssize_t len)
{
BIO *b;
tor_assert(env);
tor_assert(s);
tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SIZE_T_CEILING);
/* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the NUL-terminated string 's' */
b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, -1);
/* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the string 's' */
b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, (int)len);
if (env->key)
RSA_free(env->key);
@@ -487,7 +489,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
}
/* Try to parse it. */
r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents);
r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1);
tor_free(contents);
if (r)
return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
int crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *src, size_t len);
int crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *s);
const char *s, ssize_t len);
int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *fname);