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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-12-06 19:41:15 +01:00
hs: Render obsolete Tor2web
Remove support for Tor2web in the code and build system. At this commit, tor doesn't have Tor2web support anymore. Ref: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-July/013295.html Close #26367 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet
committed by
Nick Mathewson
Nick Mathewson
parent
f8766e8878
commit
4976eca826
@@ -1882,13 +1882,6 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan)
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if (!get_options()->ConnectionPadding) {
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/* Disable if torrc disabled */
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channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
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} else if (get_options()->Tor2webMode &&
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!networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
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CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM,
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CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1)) {
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/* Disable if we're using tor2web and the consensus disabled padding
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* for tor2web */
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channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
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} else if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) &&
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!networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
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CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM,
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@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static int consensus_nf_conntimeout_clients;
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static int consensus_nf_pad_before_usage;
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/** Should we pad relay-to-relay connections? */
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static int consensus_nf_pad_relays;
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/** Should we pad tor2web connections? */
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static int consensus_nf_pad_tor2web;
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/** Should we pad rosos connections? */
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static int consensus_nf_pad_single_onion;
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@@ -141,11 +139,6 @@ channelpadding_new_consensus_params(networkstatus_t *ns)
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consensus_nf_pad_relays =
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networkstatus_get_param(ns, "nf_pad_relays", 0, 0, 1);
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consensus_nf_pad_tor2web =
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networkstatus_get_param(ns,
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CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM,
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CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1);
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consensus_nf_pad_single_onion =
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networkstatus_get_param(ns,
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CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM,
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@@ -740,15 +733,6 @@ channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(channel_t *chan)
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return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD;
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}
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if (options->Tor2webMode && !consensus_nf_pad_tor2web) {
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/* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still
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* think padding is enabled. Negotiate it off. */
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if (chan->padding_enabled)
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channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan);
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return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD;
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}
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if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
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!consensus_nf_pad_single_onion) {
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/* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still
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@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
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#include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h"
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#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM "nf_pad_tor2web"
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#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT 1
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#define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM "nf_pad_single_onion"
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#define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_DEFAULT 1
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@@ -408,10 +408,10 @@ onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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* edge cases. */
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tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ));
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if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) {
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/* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to
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* rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol
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* does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients
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* and Single Onion Services. */
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/* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to rend
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* points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol does
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* not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Single Onion
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* Services. */
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -824,7 +824,6 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ)
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* accordingly.
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* Note that TAP handshakes in CREATE cells are only used for direct
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* connections:
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* - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and
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* - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus.
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* This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */
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static void
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@@ -1985,98 +1984,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags)
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return NULL;
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}
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#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
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/* The config option Tor2webRendezvousPoints has been set and we need
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* to pick an RP out of that set. Make sure that the RP we choose is
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* alive, and return it. Return NULL if no usable RP could be found in
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* Tor2webRendezvousPoints. */
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STATIC const node_t *
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pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
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const or_options_t *options)
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{
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const node_t *rp_node = NULL;
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const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0;
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const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0;
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const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0;
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smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_rps = smartlist_new();
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smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new();
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tor_assert(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints);
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/* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */
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router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes,
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0, 0, 0,
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need_desc,
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pref_addr,
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direct_conn);
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/* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted RPs to
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* the list whitelisted_live_rps. */
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) {
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if (routerset_contains_node(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, live_node)) {
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smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_rps, live_node);
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node);
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/* Honor ExcludeNodes */
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if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
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routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_rps, options->ExcludeNodes);
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}
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/* Now pick randomly amongst the whitelisted RPs. No need to waste time
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doing bandwidth load balancing, for most use cases
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'whitelisted_live_rps' contains a single OR anyway. */
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rp_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_rps);
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if (!rp_node) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not find a Rendezvous Point that suits "
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"the purposes of Tor2webRendezvousPoints. Choosing random one.");
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}
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smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_rps);
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smartlist_free(all_live_nodes);
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return rp_node;
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}
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#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
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/* Pick a Rendezvous Point for our HS circuits according to <b>flags</b>. */
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static const node_t *
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pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags)
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{
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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/* We want to connect directly to the node if we can */
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router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags;
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direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR;
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direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
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/* The user wants us to pick specific RPs. */
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if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) {
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const node_t *tor2web_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(direct_flags,
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options);
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if (tor2web_rp) {
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return tor2web_rp;
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}
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}
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/* Else, if no direct, preferred tor2web RP was found, fall back to choosing
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* a random direct node */
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const node_t *node = router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes,
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direct_flags);
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/* Return the direct node (if found), or log a message and fall back to an
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* indirect connection. */
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if (node) {
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return node;
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} else {
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log_info(LD_REND,
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"Unable to find a random rendezvous point that is reachable via "
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"a direct connection, falling back to a 3-hop path.");
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}
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#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
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return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
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}
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@@ -93,14 +93,10 @@ STATIC int
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onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei,
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int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit);
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#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
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enum router_crn_flags_t;
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STATIC const node_t *pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(
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enum router_crn_flags_t flags,
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const or_options_t *options);
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#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS)
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unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr);
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#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
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#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
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#endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */
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@@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void)
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* 2. If the torrc option LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is false.
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* 3. If we are a directory authority
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* 4. If we fail to write circuit build time history to our state file.
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* 5. If we are compiled or configured in Tor2web mode
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* 6. If we are configured in Single Onion mode
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* 5. If we are configured in Single Onion mode
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*/
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int
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circuit_build_times_disabled(const or_options_t *options)
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@@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
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int config_disabled = !options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout;
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int dirauth_disabled = authdir_mode(options);
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int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0;
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/* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Tor2web/Single Onion Services are
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/* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Single Onion Services are
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* incompatible in two ways:
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*
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* - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout results in a low CBT, which
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@@ -148,12 +147,11 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
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*
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* If we fix both of these issues someday, we should test
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* these modes with LearnCircuitBuildTimeout on again. */
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int tor2web_disabled = rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options);
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int single_onion_disabled = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
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options);
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if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled ||
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state_disabled || tor2web_disabled || single_onion_disabled) {
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state_disabled || single_onion_disabled) {
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#if 0
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,
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"CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. "
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@@ -863,8 +863,7 @@ static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0;
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/**
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* As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop
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* circuits we have around that have been there for at least <b>age</b>
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* seconds. Log a few of them.
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* Ignores Single Onion Service intro and Tor2web redezvous circuits, they are
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* seconds. Log a few of them. Ignores Single Onion Service intro, it is
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* expected to be long-term one-hop circuits.
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*/
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void
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@@ -889,10 +888,8 @@ circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age)
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(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO ||
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circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED))
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continue;
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/* Tor2web deliberately makes long term one-hop rend connections,
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* particularly when Tor2webRendezvousPoints is used. We only ignore
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* active rend point connections, if we take a long time to rendezvous,
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* that's worth logging. */
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/* We only ignore active rend point connections, if we take a long time
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* to rendezvous, that's worth logging. */
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if (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
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circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
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continue;
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@@ -1999,7 +1996,7 @@ circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose)
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* Return true for the set of conditions for which it is OK to use
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* a cannibalized circuit.
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*
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* Don't cannibalize for onehops, or tor2web, or certain purposes.
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* Don't cannibalize for onehops, or certain purposes.
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*/
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static int
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circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build,
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@@ -2008,8 +2005,7 @@ circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build,
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int need_specific_rp)
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{
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/* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit, or
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* is a tor2web/special rp. */
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/* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */
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if (onehop_tunnel || need_specific_rp) {
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -2075,14 +2071,6 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
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return NULL;
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}
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/* If Tor2webRendezvousPoints is enabled and we are dealing with an
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RP circuit, we want a specific RP node so we shouldn't canibalize
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an already existing circuit. */
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if (get_options()->Tor2webRendezvousPoints &&
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
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need_specific_rp = 1;
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}
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/* If we can/should cannibalize another circuit to build this one,
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* then do so. */
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if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose,
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@@ -2485,16 +2473,6 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
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else
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new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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/* If tor2Web is on, then hidden service requests should be one-hop.
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*/
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if (options->Tor2webMode &&
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(new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND ||
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new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)) {
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want_onehop = 1;
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}
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#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
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/* Determine what kind of a circuit to launch, and actually launch it. */
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{
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int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
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@@ -1835,18 +1835,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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/* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion
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* addresses. */
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if (options->Tor2webMode) {
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log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname "
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"or IP address %s because tor2web mode is enabled.",
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safe_str_client(socks->address));
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
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return -1;
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}
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#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */
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/* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address.
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* If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection.
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* If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection.
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@@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t;
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#define cell_t tor_cell_t
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1
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#endif
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/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */
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#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_))
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