Merge commit 'mikeperry/circuitbuildtimeout-final'

This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine
2009-09-16 21:43:31 -04:00
9 changed files with 1077 additions and 95 deletions
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ Filename: 151-path-selection-improvements.txt
Title: Improving Tor Path Selection
Author: Fallon Chen, Mike Perry
Created: 5-Jul-2008
Status: Draft
Status: Implemented
Overview
The performance of paths selected can be improved by adjusting the
CircuitBuildTimeout and avoiding failing guard nodes. This proposal
describes a method of tracking buildtime statistics at the client, and
describes a method of tracking buildtime statistics at the client, and
using those statistics to adjust the CircuitBuildTimeout.
Motivation
@@ -20,121 +20,120 @@ Motivation
Implementation
Storing Build Times
Gathering Build Times
Circuit build times will be stored in the circular array
'circuit_build_times' consisting of uint16_t elements as milliseconds.
The total size of this array will be based on the number of circuits
Circuit build times are stored in the circular array
'circuit_build_times' consisting of uint32_t elements as milliseconds.
The total size of this array is based on the number of circuits
it takes to converge on a good fit of the long term distribution of
the circuit builds for a fixed link. We do not want this value to be
too large, because it will make it difficult for clients to adapt to
moving between different links.
From our initial observations, this value appears to be on the order
of 1000, but will be configurable in a #define NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE.
The exact value for this #define will be determined by performing
goodness of fit tests using measurments obtained from the shufflebt.py
script from TorFlow.
From our observations, the minimum value for a reasonable fit appears
to be on the order of 500 (MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE). However, to keep
a good fit over the long term, we store 5000 most recent circuits in
the array (NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE).
The Tor client will build test circuits at a rate of one per
minute (BUILD_TIMES_TEST_FREQUENCY) up to the point of
MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE. This allows a fresh Tor to have
a CircuitBuildTimeout estimated within 8 hours after install,
upgrade, or network change (see below).
Long Term Storage
The long-term storage representation will be implemented by storing a
histogram with BUILDTIME_BIN_WIDTH millisecond buckets (default 50) when
writing out the statistics to disk. The format of this histogram on disk
is yet to be finalized, but it will likely be of the format
'CircuitBuildTime <bin> <count>', with the total specified as
'TotalBuildTimes <total>'
The long-term storage representation is implemented by storing a
histogram with BUILDTIME_BIN_WIDTH millisecond buckets (default 50) when
writing out the statistics to disk. The format this takes in the
state file is 'CircuitBuildTime <bin-ms> <count>', with the total
specified as 'TotalBuildTimes <total>'
Example:
TotalBuildTimes 100
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1 50
CircuitBuildTimeBin 2 25
CircuitBuildTimeBin 3 13
CircuitBuildTimeBin 25 50
CircuitBuildTimeBin 75 25
CircuitBuildTimeBin 125 13
...
Reading the histogram in will entail multiplying each bin by the
BUILDTIME_BIN_WIDTH and then inserting <count> values into the
circuit_build_times array each with the value of
<bin>*BUILDTIME_BIN_WIDTH. In order to evenly distribute the
values in the circular array, a form of index skipping must
be employed. Values from bin #N with bin count C and total T
will occupy indexes specified by N+((T/C)*k)-1, where k is the
set of integers ranging from 0 to C-1.
For example, this would mean that the values from bin 1 would
occupy indexes 1+(100/50)*k-1, or 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and so on.
The values for bin 2 would occupy positions 1, 5, 9, 13. Collisions
will be inserted at the first empty position in the array greater
than the selected index (which may requiring looping around the
array back to index 0).
Reading the histogram in will entail inserting <count> values
into the circuit_build_times array each with the value of
<bin-ms> milliseconds. In order to evenly distribute the values
in the circular array, the Fisher-Yates shuffle will be performed
after reading values from the bins.
Learning the CircuitBuildTimeout
Based on studies of build times, we found that the distribution of
circuit buildtimes appears to be a Pareto distribution.
circuit buildtimes appears to be a Frechet distribution. However,
estimators and quantile functions of the Frechet distribution are
difficult to work with and slow to converge. So instead, since we
are only interested in the accuracy of the tail, we approximate
the tail of the distribution with a Pareto curve starting at
the mode of the circuit build time sample set.
We will calculate the parameters for a Pareto distribution
fitting the data using the estimators at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation.
The timeout itself will be calculated by solving the CDF for the
a percentile cutoff BUILDTIME_PERCENT_CUTOFF. This value
represents the percentage of paths the Tor client will accept out of
the total number of paths. We have not yet determined a good
cutoff for this mathematically, but 85% seems a good choice for now.
The timeout itself is calculated by using the Quartile function (the
inverted CDF) to give us the value on the CDF such that
BUILDTIME_PERCENT_CUTOFF (80%) of the mass of the distribution is
below the timeout value.
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Definition,
the calculation we need is pow(BUILDTIME_PERCENT_CUTOFF/100.0, k)/Xm.
Thus, we expect that the Tor client will accept the fastest 80% of
the total number of paths on the network.
Detecting Changing Network Conditions
We attempt to detect both network connectivity loss and drastic
changes in the timeout characteristics.
If more than MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_RATE (80%) of the past
RECENT_CIRCUITS (20) time out, we assume the network connection
has changed, and we discard all buildtimes history and compute
a new timeout by estimating a new Pareto curve using the
position on the Pareto Quartile function for the ratio of
timeouts.
Network connectivity loss is detected by recording a timestamp every
time Tor either completes a TLS connection or receives a cell. If
this timestamp is more than CircuitBuildTimeout*RECENT_CIRCUITS/3
seconds in the past, circuit timeouts are no longer counted.
Testing
After circuit build times, storage, and learning are implemented,
the resulting histogram should be checked for consistency by
verifying it persists across successive Tor invocations where
verifying it persists across successive Tor invocations where
no circuits are built. In addition, we can also use the existing
buildtime scripts to record build times, and verify that the histogram
buildtime scripts to record build times, and verify that the histogram
the python produces matches that which is output to the state file in Tor,
and verify that the Pareto parameters and cutoff points also match.
Soft timeout vs Hard Timeout
At some point, it may be desirable to change the cutoff from a
single hard cutoff that destroys the circuit to a soft cutoff and
a hard cutoff, where the soft cutoff merely triggers the building
of a new circuit, and the hard cutoff triggers destruction of the
circuit.
Good values for hard and soft cutoffs seem to be 85% and 65%
respectively, but we should eventually justify this with observation.
When to Begin Calculation
The number of circuits to observe (NCIRCUITS_TO_CUTOFF) before
changing the CircuitBuildTimeout will be tunable via a #define. From
our measurements, a good value for NCIRCUITS_TO_CUTOFF appears to be
on the order of 100.
We will also verify that there are no unexpected large deviations from
node selection, such as nodes from distant geographical locations being
completely excluded.
Dealing with Timeouts
Timeouts should be counted as the expectation of the region of
of the Pareto distribution beyond the cutoff. The proposal will
be updated with this value soon.
Timeouts should be counted as the expectation of the region of
of the Pareto distribution beyond the cutoff. This is done by
generating a random sample for each timeout at points on the
curve beyond the current timeout cutoff.
Also, in the event of network failure, the observation mechanism
should stop collecting timeout data.
Future Work
Client Hints
At some point, it may be desirable to change the cutoff from a
single hard cutoff that destroys the circuit to a soft cutoff and
a hard cutoff, where the soft cutoff merely triggers the building
of a new circuit, and the hard cutoff triggers destruction of the
circuit.
Some research still needs to be done to provide initial values
for CircuitBuildTimeout based on values learned from modem
users, DSL users, Cable Modem users, and dedicated links. A
radiobutton in Vidalia should eventually be provided that
sets CircuitBuildTimeout to one of these values and also
provide the option of purging all learned data, should any exist.
It may also be beneficial to learn separate timeouts for each
guard node, as they will have slightly different distributions.
This will take longer to generate initial values though.
These values can either be published in the directory, or
shipped hardcoded for a particular Tor version.
Issues
Impact on anonymity