Welcome to darkproxy... ## Production hardening defaults The stack now uses safer defaults for production: * Service admin/web passwords are loaded from Docker secrets instead of inline values. * Admin/monitoring ports are bound to `127.0.0.1` on the host. * The published SOCKS entrypoint now requires credentials from a Docker secret. * CoreDNS recursive resolution for the catch-all zone is restricted to trusted/internal networks. * Pi-hole ARP cache parsing is disabled in Docker (`FTLCONF_database_network_parseARPcache=false`) to prevent recurring netlink `neigh`/ARP errors. * Fixed `10.5.0.x` service IPs are retained for the stack's internal routing/DNS design, but host/LAN-specific values now default to portable settings and can be overridden with environment variables. * Optional integrations that need operator-specific credentials, such as Tailscale, are no longer enabled with placeholder defaults in the base stack. Before starting in production, set these secret files: ```sh printf 'YOUR_STRONG_PIHOLE_PASSWORD\n' > secrets/pihole_webpassword.txt printf 'proxyuser:REPLACE_WITH_A_LONG_RANDOM_PASSWORD\n' > secrets/3proxy_users.txt printf 'REPLACE_WITH_A_LONG_RANDOM_NAMECOIN_RPC_PASSWORD\n' > secrets/namecoin_rpc_password.txt ``` Optional Tailscale note: * The `tailscale` service is now behind the Compose `tailscale` profile. * It is not started by default. * To enable it, export a real auth key and start that profile explicitly: ```sh export TS_AUTHKEY=tskey-your-real-key docker compose --profile tailscale up -d tailscale ``` Release default note for `.zil`: * `zildns` now uses explicit public resolvers inside its container so its Zilliqa RPC lookups do not depend on Docker's embedded DNS path. * This change is limited to the `zildns` container; the stack's internal fixed `10.5.0.x` service IP design remains unchanged. SOCKS auth note: * `dark3proxy` now reads credentials from `secrets/3proxy_users.txt`. * Each non-comment line in that secret must be `username:password`. * If you intentionally want an internal-only unauthenticated proxy, set `PROXY_REQUIRE_AUTH=false` for `dark3proxy` and remove the public `2000:1080` port mapping. * The router now defaults to **no auth bypass CIDRs**. If you want trusted subnets to skip SOCKS auth, set `ROUTER_NO_AUTH_CIDRS` in your shell or `.env`, for example `ROUTER_NO_AUTH_CIDRS=192.168.1.0/24`. Pi-hole note: disabling ARP parsing avoids noisy `Failed to read ARP cache` messages in containerized setups where neighbor-table netlink operations are not supported. This only affects Pi-hole's network-table enrichment, not DNS blocking/forwarding behavior. This container runs the following vontainers in the stack. dark3proxy - SOCKS5/http proxy with hostname-preserving router - DNS - pihole - ad blocking and metrics - PopuraDNS - non-recursive DNS forwards requests to the following: Alfis - Blockchain based yggdrasil resolver EmerCoin - Resolves EMC domains UnBound - Recursive DNS for Clearnet domains * .onion and .i2p domain names are now resolved via the stack (see DNS section below) - I2PD over Yggdrasil container (`container_name: darki2p`) * Yggdrasil IP network stack * Socks5 server for I2P - Tor container ## SOCKS ports on host Public proxy access is exposed on a single host port: * `:2000` -> `dark3proxy` SOCKS (`dark3proxy:1080`), externally reachable. - Intended as the single client entrypoint for clearnet, onion, and Ygg/I2P routing rules. Local admin endpoint: * `127.0.0.1:2002` -> 3proxy admin (`dark3proxy:8161`), host-local only. * `127.0.0.1:2003` -> Pi-hole web UI (`darkpihole:80`), host-local by default. * `127.0.0.1:2004` -> status dashboard (`darkstatus:8080`), host-local by default. These host-local admin bindings can be overridden with environment variables when needed: ```sh export PIHOLE_WEB_BIND_HOST=192.168.1.31 export PIHOLE_WEB_BIND_PORT=2003 export STATUS_DASHBOARD_BIND_HOST=192.168.1.31 export STATUS_DASHBOARD_BIND_PORT=2004 ``` Router internals for `:2000`: * Front-end process: `3proxy/socks_router.py` (SOCKS5), keeps destination hostnames intact. * Upstream dispatch: - `*.onion` -> Tor SOCKS (`10.5.0.7:9050`) - `*.i2p` -> i2pd SOCKS (`10.5.0.2:4447`) - `*.ygg`, `*.meshname`, `*.meship`, and `200::/7` -> local Ygg-guarded SOCKS (`127.0.0.1:1085`) - all other targets -> Tor SOCKS (`10.5.0.7:9050`) * The primary 3proxy instance still enforces ACL/parent rules internally, with SOCKS moved to internal port `1088` to avoid collision with the router front-end. Additional non-proxy endpoint: * `127.0.0.1:2006/udp` -> Tor DNSPort (`darktor:9053`). Quick checks: ```sh # Onion over the only published proxy port curl --proxy-user proxyuser:REPLACE_WITH_A_LONG_RANDOM_PASSWORD --socks5-hostname :2000 -I http://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion # Clearnet over the only published proxy port curl --proxy-user proxyuser:REPLACE_WITH_A_LONG_RANDOM_PASSWORD --socks5-hostname :2000 -I https://example.com ``` The system offers a DNS that resolves many darknet and clearnet IP's. The stack now handles: Local resolution model (important): * DNS queries are resolved inside this Docker stack on your host (`pihole -> CoreDNS -> local resolver services`). * The stack does not forward DNS queries to public DNS providers for supported darknet/blockchain TLDs. * Some namespaces still require blockchain RPC data sources for authoritative records (see limitations below). * `*.onion` – forwarded to Tor's DNSPort running in the `darktor` container at 10.5.0.7:9053. * `*.i2p` – resolved by local `i2pdns` bridge service (`10.5.0.16:53`). - `i2pdns` synthesizes deterministic private A records and writes IP<->hostname mappings. - `dark3proxy` consumes that map so synthetic IP requests are translated back to `.i2p` hostnames and routed to i2pd SOCKS (`10.5.0.2:4447`). You can query these directly from any container on the `darkproxy` network, for example: ```sh # Tor .onion domains docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 facebookcorewwwi.onion # I2P .i2p domains docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 stats.i2p # Ethereum Name Service (.eth) via local ensdns service docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 vitalik.eth # ENS address/content hash records (TXT) docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 TXT vitalik.eth # Other supported TLDs: .bit, .alt, .loki, .zil, .web3, .exit, .onion4, .onion6 docker run --rm --network darkproxy infoblox/dig dig @10.5.0.4 example.bit ``` > **Note:** the CoreDNS service at `10.5.0.4` enforces an ACL on the root zone. > Recursive lookups are limited to loopback, RFC1918/private ranges, and the > Yggdrasil/internal subnets used by this stack. ### Host-side quick tests (no extra images) Run DNS queries from your host by executing `dig` in the existing `darkpihole` container: ```sh docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 TXT vitalik.eth +short docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A vitalik.eth +short ``` Expected behavior: * `TXT` includes `address=` and (if present) `contenthash=`. * `A` returns a CNAME fallback like `.eth.limo.`. ## Supported TLDs and resolvers The stack now provides DNS resolution for a comprehensive set of alternative TLDs: | TLD | Resolver | Purpose | |-----|----------|---------| | `.onion`, `.exit`, `.onion4`, `.onion6` | Tor DNSPort (10.5.0.7:9053) | Tor hidden services | | `.i2p` | i2pdns bridge (10.5.0.16:53) + i2pd SOCKS (10.5.0.2:4447) | I2P eepsite names | | `.eth` | ensdns (10.5.0.11) via CoreDNS | Ethereum Name Service (local resolver) | | `.bit` | namecoindns (10.5.0.12) via CoreDNS | Namecoin names (local resolver service) | | `.alt` | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | Alternative DNS root (local-only fallback mode) | | `.loki` | local lokinet (10.5.0.14) via CoreDNS | Lokinet privacy network (no Cloudflare/public DNS forwarder dependency) | | `.zil` | zildns (10.5.0.15) via CoreDNS | Zilliqa blockchain (local resolver service; no Cloudflare DNS dependency) | | `.web3` | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | General blockchain namespace (local-only fallback mode) | | Alfis TLDs | Alfis (10.5.0.3) | `.anon`, `.btn`, `.conf`, `.index`, `.merch`, `.mirror`, `.mob`, `.screen`, `.srv`, `.ygg` | | EmerCoin TLDs | EmerCoin (10.5.0.9) | `.emc`, `.coin`, `.lib`, `.bazar`, `.enum` | | OpenNIC TLDs | local unbound (10.5.0.5) via CoreDNS | `.bbs`, `.chan`, `.cyb`, `.dyn`, `.epic`, `.geek`, `.gopher`, `.indy`, `.libre`, `.neo`, `.null`, `.o`, `.oss`, `.oz`, `.parody`, `.pirate`, `.fur`, `.ku`, `.rm`, `.te`, `.ti`, `.uu`, `.ko` (local-only fallback mode) | | Clearnet | Unbound (10.5.0.5) | All other domains via recursive resolution | ## Local-only DNS mode limitations Darkproxy now avoids direct public DNS forwarders for `.alt`, `.zil`, `.web3`, OpenNIC TLDs, and Lokinet fallback DNS. Resolution still happens locally in this stack. The remaining external dependency surface is blockchain RPC/data access for record lookup, not public DNS forwarding. Important limitations still apply for authoritative data: * `.eth` requires an Ethereum JSON-RPC backend. By default this stack uses `https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com` in `ensdns`. * `.alt`, OpenNIC TLDs, and `.web3` are not in the ICANN root. In local-only fallback mode they are sent to local Unbound, so they usually return `NXDOMAIN` unless you provide your own authoritative/local resolver backend for those namespaces. * `.zil` is resolved through local `zildns`, which queries ZNS using `https://api.zilliqa.com` by default. This is a Zilliqa RPC lookup path (on-chain resolution), not a Cloudflare DNS forwarder path. You can override the RPC endpoint with `ZILDNS_ZNS_URL` in `docker-compose.yml`. * `zildns` supports `ZILDNS_CACHE_SECONDS` (record cache duration) and `ZILDNS_PREWARM_DOMAIN` (startup warm-up query) to reduce first-query latency. * For browser convenience, `A` lookups may return a CNAME to a public IPFS gateway when a `.zil` content hash exists. That gateway alias is separate from DNS resolution itself. * `.loki` is resolved by local Lokinet, and Lokinet fallback DNS points to local Unbound (no Cloudflare/public DNS forwarder dependency). ## Configuration validation and drift tests A simple automation is included to help detect accidental changes to the compose and DNS configuration: 1. **Local check** – run `scripts/validate-config.sh` (or its PowerShell equivalent). - The script requires `docker` to be installed; it will generate a normalized manifest and compare it against `docker-compose.lock.yml`. - If the baseline file does not exist it will be created; commit the file after review. - CoreDNS syntax is validated with the repo's compiled CoreDNS image so the custom `meshname` and `meship` plugins are available during the check. - Unbound syntax is validated with the repo's Unbound image so the chrooted runtime layout matches the stack. 2. **CI workflow** – `.github/workflows/config-validation.yml` is triggered on pushes or pull requests affecting `docker-compose.yml` or `PopuraDNS/`. The job executes the same `docker compose config` comparison and runs the Corefile check inside a container. 3. **Updating the baseline** – when intentional changes are made to the compose file, regenerate the baseline: ```sh docker compose config > docker-compose.lock.yml scripts/validate-config.sh git add docker-compose.lock.yml ``` These steps ensure that configuration drift is caught early and reviewers can see what has changed. ## Local ENS (.eth) client If you want to resolve Ethereum ENS names locally from the host, use the standalone client script: ```sh python3 -m venv .venv-ens source .venv-ens/bin/activate pip install -r scripts/requirements-ens.txt python3 scripts/resolve_ens.py vitalik.eth --pretty ``` Options: * `--rpc ` to set a custom Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint. * `--include-text` to include common ENS text records. Example: ```sh python3 scripts/resolve_ens.py ens.eth --include-text --pretty ``` ## Local Namecoin (.bit) resolver (true on-chain) `.bit` lookups are routed through a local blockchain-backed resolver path: * CoreDNS forwards `bit.:53` to `10.5.0.12:53` (`namecoindns`). * `namecoindns` queries local `namecoind` JSON-RPC (`10.5.0.13:8336`). * `namecoind` syncs the Namecoin blockchain and serves on-chain records. Quick test: ```sh docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A id.bit docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 TXT id.bit ``` If your environment returns `NXDOMAIN` for `.bit`, configure Namecoin-capable records in Namecoin itself and wait for local `namecoind` sync completion. > **Important:** initial blockchain sync can take significant time. During sync, > `.bit` responses may be empty or incomplete. ## Local Lokinet (.loki) resolver `.loki` lookups are resolved by a local Lokinet daemon path: * CoreDNS forwards `loki.:53` to `10.5.0.14:53` (`lokinet`). * `lokinet` resolves `.loki` names through the Lokinet network. Quick test: ```sh LOKI_ADDR="$(docker logs darklokinet 2>&1 | sed -n 's/.*endpoint:\([a-z0-9]\{52\}\.loki\).*/\1/p' | tail -n1)" docker exec darkpihole dig @10.5.0.4 A "$LOKI_ADDR" ``` > **Note:** Lokinet may need a short bootstrap period after startup before > `.loki` names resolve. Older sample names such as `oxen.loki` are no longer a > reliable health check; resolving the container's self-published `.loki` > address is a better validation of the local Lokinet path. ## Monitoring and stack status Two lightweight tools are included for visibility: * `3proxy_exporter` exposes 3proxy counters in Prometheus format for external scraping. * `status_dashboard` serves a local-only status page for the whole stack, including container state, probe results, proxy usernames, and recent logs. ### how it works * `3proxy` is configured with `monitor -p6800`, which sets up a plain-text status socket. Samples look like `PROXY CONNS 12` or `SOCKS IN 345`. * `monitor/exporter.py` polls that socket every few seconds and exports the counters on HTTP port **9100** in Prometheus format. * `monitor/status_dashboard.py` talks to the local Docker socket, runs targeted DNS and SOCKS checks, and serves both HTML and JSON for stack status. ### building & running The monitoring utilities live in `monitor/`; build the images and start the stack: ```sh # build the exporter and status dashboard docker-compose build 3proxy_exporter status_dashboard docker-compose up -d ``` By default the status page is available on **http://127.0.0.1:2004/** and the raw JSON is available on **http://127.0.0.1:2004/api/status**. If you override the bind host/port via `STATUS_DASHBOARD_BIND_HOST` or `STATUS_DASHBOARD_BIND_PORT`, use that address instead. If you want external dashboards or alerts, point a Prometheus-compatible collector at the exporter and use metrics such as `proxy_conns` and `proxy_bytes_in`. ### tips * Alerts can be added in your external Prometheus rules, e.g. fire when `proxy_conns` exceeds a threshold for several minutes. * You can still query the monitor port directly with `nc`; nothing in the proxy depends on the exporter. * The status dashboard can show logs and configured proxy usernames, so keep it behind a trusted admin network or add your own access controls before exposing it broadly. * The `scripts/validate-config.sh` script warns if a 3proxy config lacks a `monitor` line. ## Production readiness checklist Make sure you never commit real secrets. The `secrets/` directory is now included in `.gitignore`; both timezone and Yggdrasil key files live there and are mounted into containers at runtime. Before deploying to a live environment, run the validation script and resolve any warnings or errors. The script covers: * YAML syntax and drift against the committed baseline * CoreDNS/PopuraDNS Corefile syntax * Unbound configuration syntax * Presence of required secret files * Portable host-local defaults for Pi-hole, the status dashboard, and router auth bypass CIDRs * Simple 3proxy configuration sanity (presence of `socks`/`proxy` rules) * Detection of mutable `:latest` image tags in deployment compose files * Verification that critical resolver/backend services keep explicit healthchecks * Live CoreDNS smoke checks for `.onion`, `.i2p`, `.eth`, and `.zil` * Verification that Tailscale stays opt-in and does not ship a placeholder auth key * Verification that restart policies exist The GitHub Actions workflow also includes a **smoke test** job that spins up all services in `docker-compose.yml` using a Docker‑in‑Docker service and waits for each container’s healthcheck to report `healthy`. This gives an additional layer of confidence that the stack can be built and started successfully. You can also extend the script with additional service-specific checks such as running `docker run ...` commands to exercise the images, scanning the `3proxy` config more deeply, or linting other mounted configuration files. Run the script locally via `./scripts/validate-config.sh` (or `.scripts/validate-config.ps1` on Windows) and review the output carefully. CI will execute the same validations automatically on pull requests.